DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 025 553 UD 007 273

By- Regal, J.M.

Oakland's Partnership for Change.

Oakland City Dept. of Human Resources, Calif.
Pub Date Jun 67
Note- 138p.
EDRS Price MF-$0.75 HC-$7.00
Descriptors- Action Programs (Community), City Improvement, City Wide Programs, Community Attitudes, *Community Change, Community Development, Community Organizations, Community Problems, Demography, Economic Opportunities, *Foundation Programs, Program Development, Program Evaluation, Program Planning, Racial Integration, Social Problems, *Urban Areas, Youth Programs
Identifiers- California, Oakland, *Project Ford Foundation Gray Area

This monograph is devoted to the first Ford Foundation Gray Area Project in Oakland, California. In 1961, the Foundation granted $2 million for an interagency project whose goals were to: (1) reverse the process of social disorganization, (2) accelerate the integration of newcomers, (3) salvage and improve human resources, (4) preserve a socioeconomically balanced community, and (5) strengthen the community's institutions as vehicles for achieving these objectives. Discussed are the history of Oakland, the organization of the project, the roles and activities of the various community organizations, and programs for youth. Also described are a survey of the Castlemont area of the city and economic opportunities in Oakland. Throughout the monograph efforts are made to assess the project, although it is noted that a rigorous design for evaluation was not part of the Foundation's original requirements. (NH)

Oakland's Partnership for Change

Oakland, California

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES • CITY OF OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

Oakland's Partnership for Change

J. M. Regal

Judge Lionel Wilson
Chairman, Oakland Economic Development Council

Honorable John H. Reading
Mayor

Mr. Jerome Keithley
City Manager

June, 1967
City of Oakland
Department of Human Resources
Oakland, California

PREFACE

A sequence of events, some chance, others planned, brought about a combined effort by the Ford Foundation and the Oakland municipal government to find a solution to the social problems of Oakland, California. This occurrence in itself was unique. We are accustomed to seeing government subsidize private enterprise; however, here was a case of a private foundation subsidizing governmental agencies. In this instance, Oakland became the first target of the Ford Foundation's Gray Area Project.

The author would like to be able to reassure the readers that the social scientists at Ford, after pondering all the variables, determined that the time was appropriate for some new type of social experiment, and, with scientific precision, examined a map and statistical tables of the United States and selected Oakland. However, this was not the case.

Through a series of chance circumstances, influential staff members of the Ford Foundation met several socially conscious people from Oakland. There was a desire by the Ford staff to expand their projects which were designed to find solutions to urban problems. In Oakland, the city government was selected as the instrument to carry out the project, largely because the staff of the Foundation perceived the City Manager as an able, influential administrator, committed to improving the social climate of his community. The leaders of the City of Oakland were pleased to have money made available to them which might help in alleviating social problems and would not increase the burdensome tax rate. Although millions of dollars were to be invested, and thousands of people reached by Ford-sponsored programs, a partnership for change evolved from casual incidents, with both partners sharing a mutual desire to improve social conditions.

The purpose of this report is to present the history of the Ford Foundation's intervention in Oakland. The work of many researchers is included in this evaluation of the programs which were intended to improve the conditions of the poor. The author of this study synthesized these research reports to help the reader develop an overview of many diverse activities.

Since the writing of a synthesis requires that the author exercise judgement, it is understandable that few readers will agree with all the writer's decisions. Therefore, depending upon the readers' interests, sections of this report may be considered overly simplified, overly academic, too liberal in going beyond the data, or too conservative in not drawing obvious inferences.

This report is organized so that the reader may first discover the conditions surrounding the initial introduction of the Ford Foundation to the City of Oakland and the social characteristics of the community that categorized it as a core city. The chapters which follow describe and evaluate the programs funded by Ford as well as some of those funded by agencies of the Federal Government. This study begins with the Ford Foundation as the major contributor to programs designed to bring about change and

concludes with the Foundation assuming a minor role. In the last chapter, the author discusses the central issues related to social intervention in Oakland, and suggests new directions for improving the conditions of the poor.

When the Office of Economic Opportunity assumed a predominate role in funding programs in Oakland, the philosophy of this Federal agency also influenced the direction of the project. Potential recipients of new social services were appointed to policy-making positions, and residents of depressed areas were encouraged to create and operate self-help programs. As lay citizens from various socio-economic strata became more involved in the project, the role of the professional as a decision-maker diminished.

We believe that our study would have been improved if we had been able to compare our intervention with that in other cities. Unfortunately, the Ford Foundation did not insist upon rigorous evaluation in other communities funded as part of the Gray Area Project. Perhaps funding agencies will learn from this experience, and begin making more rigid demands for comprehensive evaluations.

The writing of this history was funded entirely by the Ford Foundation. They reserved no rights of censorship and expressed a desire for an objective evaluation. All their behavior was directed at giving the author the freedom to maintain his integrity and individual prerogatives in the writing of this report.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Oakland's Partnership for Change was the product of many researchers' contributions. These dedicated professionals designed and carried out studies during a period of time when social research was frequently identified as a hindrance to immediate social action. Fortunately, most of the researchers in Oakland persevered and produced their reports; hence, we now have a record of the events which took place in the first Gray Area Project. This report is an acknowledgment of their efforts, with the hope that they gain some comfort from the possibility that social planners may decide to systematically study the experiences of the past before designing future programs. The researchers to be acknowledged are: Alden Badal, Gene Bernardi, John J. Carusone, Helene Conant, Richard Deming, Merle Elliot, Jack Felson, Margaret Gordon, Esther Hochstim, Barbara Juster, Del Kuykendall, Ed Larsen, Kay Meadows, Marque Miller, R. C. A. Moore, William Nicholls II, Juanita Pappilon, Patricia Peterson, Lynn Reynolds, Susan Sheffield, Stanley Soles, Alvin N. Taylor, Mort Tenenberg, Phyllis Warren, William Woodson.

CONTENTS

STATEMENT BY THE RESEARCH ADVISORY COMMITTEE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Although Dr. Regal properly takes upon himself full responsibility for the analyses and conclusions presented in the body of this report, it would be inaccurate to infer that the members of the Research Advisory Committee occupy a detached or neutral position. On the contrary we find ourselves in general agreement with the author's main conclusions although, among us, there are the shades of varying opinion with respect to detail which one would expect to encounter in an interdisciplinary, academic group. We are in unanimous agreement that the study should be of great interest at this time when the problems of poverty, equal opportunity, and personal development are being recognized as of such crucial importance in our urbanized areas.

Being a "research" advisory group, however, has brought its own set of problems and frustrations. At times the very notion of research has seemed out of place in the context of the urgent need for the programs which comprised the Oakland Interagency Project and later the work of the Department of Human Resources and the OEO program in Oakland. With such transparent need for action, who could think of research! Yet, if there is any single, overpowering conclusion to be drawn from this total experience, it is the repeated finding, stated time and time again in Dr. Regal's analyses, that the results of a program, project, or demonstration, would have to be considered inconclusive because of lack of adequate provision for, or execution of, suitable evaluative procedures. With the urgency for action daily mounting, with billions of dollars being spent, or ready to be spent, in an attempt to alleviate major social problems surely more thought should be given to the accurate, scientific evaluation of the methods being employed. It would cost so little and yield so much more in the long run.

Actually both the Ford Foundation and the OEO, which were understandably motivated to get action under way in the early phases of their programs, have come to recognize the importance of including evaluative provisions in as many programs as possible. And the experiences recorded in this report have contributed importantly to this new emphasis.

However important at least minimal levels of evaluation may be and however widely they may be included in future programs, it is also necessary to recognize that, in some instances, a much larger investment in research and evaluation may be called for. No successful American business would launch a new product without first thoroughly researching the potential market. Many programs of social action, however, are planned and carried out without prior research and without, therefore, the necessary understanding of the extent and causes of the conditions which the programs are intended to alleviate. Research to guide the planning process is often bypassed because it takes time and costs money, and proceeding without research seems often at the time the expedient thing to do. If the program fails, however, much more time, energy, and funds will have been wasted without even the knowledge being gained of the best course to follow the next time around.

Just as an investment in prior research is often necessary, an investment in more than minimal efforts at evaluation once a program is underway may also be required. This is particularly the case with regard to programs that are intended to be generalizable and applied elsewhere. In such instances, it is not sufficient to know simply that a program has had a net positive effect. It is also necessary to be able to explain how the effect was produced, to know who has benefited and who was not, and to identify which parts of the program produced leverage and which may have had no effect or, indeed, even a boomerang effect. Such information can be supplied only through careful and admittedly expensive evaluation. Yet, insofar as evaluation is essential to increasing program effectiveness, the effort would appear well worth the investment.

Research and evaluation of this more intensive kind are largely missing in the Oakland program. Each evaluation study has been conducted as an individual, ad hoc undertaking, each being specific to a particular project. No effort has yet been made to evaluate the over-all effectiveness of the Oakland anti-poverty programs, and Dr. Regal's book significantly has had to by-pass that larger question. A synoptic appraisal would be very difficult to accomplish, for the Oakland program itself has been conducted on an ad hoc, project-by-project basis. The over-all strategy to which the individual projects would contribute has not yet been made explicit. We would prefer that the individual projects sponsored by the Department of Human Resources would comprise tactical inputs to a long-range human-development strategy and that the evaluation research would then be directed to testing the effectiveness of the individual projects in accomplishing the strategic ends. We are hopeful that the Department's current program-planning efforts will soon develop the foundations for such a larger program framework.

In concluding this statement the Research Advisory Committee wishes to commend those responsible for the provision of such a body in the original proposal which is the base of this volume. The implementation of the plan and the continued utilization of the Committee is recognized as a significant commitment to responsible social action. The members of the Committee also wish to express appreciation for the cooperation of the many officers and representatives of agencies and groups with whom we have been engaged in this appraisal and research effort.

Theodore L. Reller, Dean, School of Education
Charles Y. Glock, Director, Survey Research Center
Van D. Kennedy, Professor of Industrial Relations
Joseph Lohman, Dean, School of Criminology
Davis McEntire, Professor of Social Welfare
Edward Rogers, Professor of Public Health and Medical Administration
M. Brewster Smith, Professor of Psychology
Melvin Webber, Professor of City and Regional Planning

1. The First Gray Area Project

In January, 1933 a Federally supported study named Oakland, California, one of the five most progressive cities in the United States.[1] This designation came as a result of a study which had been conducted to determine the degree of economic and commercial progress in many cities throughout the nation. In December, 1963, the Area Redevelopment Administration of the Department of Commerce identified Oakland as a depressed area, making it eligible for special Federal assistance.

The economic plight of Oakland is similar to the problems of many of the country's large urban areas. In 1967 the conditions which identify the central city are the in-migration of minority groups, high rates of unemployment, high incidence of welfare, rising crime rates, the exodus of Caucasians, and the decline of heavy industry.

Many people within the Oakland community have expressed deep concern about the social problems which beset the community. They have acknowledged the conditions of blight and have worked vigorously to obtain funds for programs designed to alleviate the city's problems. Consequently, support has been received from the Federal Government and the Ford Foundation for programs of social action.

The purpose of this report is twofold. We hope to chronicle the social awakening of a community, and to evaluate the programs which were designed to curtail social blight.

---

[1] Edgar J. Hinkel and William E. McGann (ed.) *Oakland 1852-1938,* published by the Oakland Public Library as a report of Official Project No. 465-03-3-337 conducted under the auspices of the WPA, Oakland, California, 1939.

In broad terms, as we examine the new programs and the changes that have taken place in Oakland in the past four years (1962-1966), we will observe that the Ford Foundation contributed to the social awakening, and the Federal Government provided most of the funds required to support the new community effort.

The staff of the Ford Foundation's Public Affairs Division, working jointly with community leaders, provided the stimulus for Oakland's programs of social intervention. In 1961 the Public Affairs Division was in the process of analyzing their recently formed Great Cities School Improvement Program. The purpose of this program was to improve educational opportunities for children who attended schools in depressed areas. The program, aimed at disadvantaged urban residents, inevitably served a population which included many Negroes.

In looking back to 1961 and the years immediately preceding, we should recognize that this was the period prior to the time when activities explicitly directed at achieving equality for Negroes had gained broad acceptance. The literature that resulted from the Great Cities project and other similar programs rarely stated that the efforts were intended to equalize the opportunities of Negroes but referred obliquely to the culturally disadvantaged and the culturally different. Apparently neither the society of educators nor the funding agencies were prepared to state that resources were needed to cope with a Negro problem — or with the problems of children of the poor. The problem of terminology is pointed out here only because it reflected a hesitancy to face the real problem at hand; perhaps there was a desire to change the nature of the problem through the use of palatable phrases.

Various kinds of cultural enrichment programs were undertaken in an awkward attempt to meet the needs of "disadvantaged children." Such programs typically offered trips to museums, symphonies, and historical monuments. When it became clear that these activities were not helping children acquire basic school skills, ideas of compensatory education were conceived. In order to compensate for the depressed environment from which the child had come, new curricula were required. Special language programs were instituted to improve the verbal and reading skills of Negro children and courses in Negro history were taught to compensate for ego damage.

For those who were sensitive to the preliminary evidence from the early compensatory education effort, there were sufficient cues that a modified curriculum could not compensate for a social system with built-in inhibitors to success. The theory of compensatory education was to provide special services for educationally deprived children from low-income families so that they could better adapt to a middle-class social system. Although the purpose of the program, stated in general terms, was to help children from low-income families of many ethnic groups, Negroes became the central target for compensatory educational services.

In 1961 the staff of the Ford Foundation was searching for new directions. They had learned that institutional education could not make a significant impact on the cultural milieu of a minority group out of phase with the culture of the dominant group. The environment of the child went well beyond the school and changes had to take place well beyond a school framework. The need to involve additional institutions which were related to the family and neighborhood was evident. An additional objective was that the development of a multi-institutional effort would create a greater impact on the social system. The Ford staff hoped that as institutions became involved in new programs of intervention the institutions would make changes in their operational and administrative

procedures. If enough changes could be brought about in enough institutions the social system would also change.

However, the concern of the Foundation at this time was primarily focused on youth. There was hope that by changing from a single institution to a multi-institutional approach real changes could be brought about. As the Foundation broadened their perspective for social intervention, they also gave greater recognition to the role of adults in the life of youth. Adults, in their supportive role to youth, became a secondary target for intervention.

After the Ford Foundation had accepted the logic of a multi-institutional approach, their next step was to find a community with a similar point of view. The Ford Foundation's interest in Oakland was an obvious outgrowth of a multi-agency commitment. In Oakland there was an organization known as the Associated Agencies which had been created in 1957 in response to inter-racial conflicts at two high schools. Following one potentially explosive situation, several public agency executives met (Oakland City Manager's Office, Oakland Police Department, Oakland Recreation Department, Oakland Public School District, Alameda County Probation Department and State of California Youth Authority) and agreed that individual agency efforts at youth control were inadequate. The original program of the Associated Agencies focused the combined services on one high school. The participating agencies were pleased enough with the results of this combined effort to expand into a city-wide program, and invited the Alameda County Welfare Department, Alameda County Health Department, Alameda County District Attorney's Office, and City of Oakland Building and Housing Department to join the organization.

The staff of the Foundation was impressed with the evidence of a multi-agency commitment to cope with a community problem. The Foundation decided to open negotiations with Oakland to determine if it would become the first city to participate in the Gray Area Project.

From a limited examination of relevant social data it was evident that Oakland was indeed a city with severe social problems. An examination of the 1960 census data[2] revealed that there was a rapid increase in the percentage of non-white residents, a movement of Caucasians out of Oakland, and an unemployment rate more than twice the national rate.

The staff of the Ford Foundation had now located a city with the qualities they were seeking. The question was how they would encourage this community to apply for funds for new programs of social intervention. The problem facing the Foundation was complex. The amount of money which could be made available was negligible when compared to the public money spent in Oakland just to maintain the normal governmental functions. In return for these extremely limited resources, the Foundation was asking a community to disrupt its normal style of functioning, and, at the same time, announce broadly that the city was burdened with severe social problems.

Since 1961 such admissions by community leaders of the existence of social problems have become common, stimulated by the requirements for funds from new Federal programs. But, placing the negotiations in the context of the times, these admissions were most uncommon. Before 1961 the typical public statements from Oakland's civic leaders were of the kind one might expect to hear from members of a chamber of com-

---

[2] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census of Population and Housing:* 1960, Final Report PHC (1)—137, Census Tracts, San Francisco-Oakland, California.

merce commenting on a salutory climate, the excellence of transportation, and the friendliness and diligence of the natives. Public commentary on the city's growing social crisis was clearly absent.

The Ford Foundation staff decided on a trial balloon, and informed some of the people in Oakland with whom they had a professional relationship that the Foundation might underwrite a demonstration project in the city if a proposal directed toward social intervention was submitted. When the City Manager learned of the Foundation's offer, he decided to take advantage of the opportunity to try to find some solutions to the social problems he faced in his daily work. The interest of the Ford Foundation offered him new hope and provided the community with new prestige.

The City Manager negotiated with the staff of the Foundation and there was agreement that, if Oakland submitted a proposal consistent with the interests of the Foundation, funds would be forthcoming. Although the City Council (Oakland's elected legislative body) expressed considerable enthusiasm for the Ford funds, they also indicated considerable concern about the conditions of a Ford grant. The problem of the level of the local tax rate is one which weighs heavily on the municipality. Consequently, the Council was most concerned that receipt of Ford funds would not be contingent upon the city's willingness to contribute additional tax funds to the proposed program. The Ford Foundation, on the other hand, did not want to contribute money to the community and have the funds dissipated within the on-going city expenditures. The Foundation was seeking commitment, and commitment can, in part, be measured by the amount of local resources contributed to a project.

This potential impasse was avoided through the application of the concept of redirected services. The plan was that existing staff time and building space of the various agencies which participated in the Ford project would be directed into the project as a local contribution. This compromise was accepted by the Foundation staff even though they recognized it to be a gesture of commitment, and it was evident that additional tax money would not be allocated to the project. This compromise proved useful to all parties concerned; for the participating agencies, who would receive new funds to attempt to solve the problems they faced; and for the Ford Foundation, since a relatively small investment was stimulating many agencies to participate in a new approach to social change.

The Foundation in later reviews of Oakland's program made it clear that they had interpreted the use of redirected services as a token contribution. Redirected services were not given the same value as hard cash. Ford wanted evidence that agency money was being allocated for new services, since the hope of the Foundation was that new projects which demonstrated their usefulness would receive on-going funding from the appropriate public institution. The Foundation urged the agencies to adjust their budgets so that they would be prepared to take a greater responsibility in the funding of new services, in anticipation that the new services would become part of normal agency operation. Agency executives, for the most part, rejected appropriating new money, claiming that they were unable to commit new funds unless they had some assurance about the future availability of funds. The Foundation was seeking a commitment which would insure the future of this new form of intervention, while the agencies, unable to identify new resources, were not prepared to go beyond making staff adjustments for funded projects. However, if one virtue of a compromise is mutual gain this was a more than acceptable agreement. Oakland was able to receive Ford Foundation support for under-

taking new programs, and the Foundation received a powerful weapon for pressuring agency executives toward a more complete commitment to the program.

Following this general agreement pertaining to local commitment, the initiative for designing a demonstration project and developing a comprehensive proposal passed from the Ford Foundation to Oakland. The City Manager enlisted the support of the Mayor and called a meeting of Oakland's powerful civic leaders. The purpose of the meeting was to gain support for a new program of social intervention and to solicit funds so that a staff could be employed to develop a proposal. The civic leadership agreed to support the program and readily supplied the necessary funds for the preparation of the proposal.

The staff assigned to develop the proposal met with many of the agency executives and their assistants in designing the various programs which were to comprise the project. The Foundation retained the final control in the approval of the proposal and made it clear during the developmental period what would be acceptable and what would be rejected. In some of the early drafts of the proposal, utilizing all the ideas projected by the various agencies, the funding would have amounted to $10,000,000. However, at a Ford Foundation policy making level, $2,000,000 had been determined as a maximum investment to be distributed over a three-year period. The proposal had to be tailored to meet the limits of the grant. The Foundation made it clear how the tailoring should be done.

Although it is difficult to identify the specific criteria used by the Foundation in determining which programs to fund, priority in the selection of programs for funding was in favor of youth. The younger the proposed recipients of program benefits, the greater the likelihood that the program would be funded. Therefore, some proposals directed at high school dropouts were rejected and child care programs accepted. One of the few programs directed toward helping adults, that of building neighborhood organizations, was almost eliminated at the Foundation and remained as part of the proposal only because of the adamant position taken by the authors of the proposal.

The other decision made by the Ford Foundation was that the $2,000,000 would be divided into two phases, with $1,250,000 as an initial grant. The remaining $750,000 was held in reserve until the community had gained experience with the project. The purpose of this two phase grant was to encourage the various agencies to continue to explore new approaches for more effective forms of social intervention.

Designing a structure for administering the first of the Gray Area Projects was not a serious problem. The Associated Agencies was a structure which had originally attracted the Ford Foundation to Oakland; the Associated Agencies was seen as a successful approach for dealing with a social problem within the community. Therefore, the similarity of the Ford project to the Associated Agencies in administrative organization was predictable. Whereas in many communities there was considerable debate as to whether projects should be under public or private auspices, Oakland's public agency precedent, in successfully working together within an interagency framework, resolved the problem before there was a unification of opposing forces. There was a minor skirmish related to administrative control of the project when the Alameda County Council of Social Planning, a voluntary organization, offered to have the project placed under their auspices. However, this move did not gain any significant community or Foundation support.

The aims and intentions of the Ford Foundation and the City of Oakland in under-

taking this first Gray Area Project may be understood through an examination of the five goals which were stated in the final proposal:

"Goal I. To reverse the process of social disorganization now characteristic of many neighborhoods and which lies at the root of many pathological manifestations such as delinquent behavior, school failures, and neighborhood deterioration.

Goal II. To accelerate the integration of newcomers into the community at neighborhood and broader levels.

Goal III. To salvage and improve human resources, enabling individuals to better develop their potentialities.

Goal IV. To preserve a socially and economically balanced community by making the city attractive, as a place to live, to all social classes.

Goal V. To enhance the effectiveness of the community's institutions in resolving problems and thereby contributing maximally to achievement of other objectives."[3]

The idealism expressed in the goals suggests that there was hope, at the Foundation and in Oakland, that a community could mobilize its resources and bring about major social changes. However, the goals were not commensurate with the level of funding. We may appreciate the relative size of the Ford Foundation intervention when we realize that the combined school district and city budget amounts to more than $80,000,000 per year. When we add the services provided from the county and state, it is doubtful that the new Ford funds reached the magnitude of one-half of one percent of the normal services budget.

If the success of the project was to be measured by the degree to which it attained its goals, then the project was doomed to failure the moment that it was assigned a $2,000,000 price tag. Since failure can be purchased for much less than $2,000,000, we should examine some other unstated goals which were sought by those involved in the project.

We may surmise that Ford was seeking a laboratory to study various methods of social intervention. Public statements made by the Foundation staff envisioned that, with their support, Oakland would awaken to the vast possibilities of new approaches to social problems. There was an opportunity to see if the community agencies, stimulated by Ford involvement, could develop creative programs. The two stages of the proposal allowed agency professionals to learn from their experiences and develop improved programs in the second phase.

The city administration was aware of the mounting social problems facing Oakland. The many pressures that the City Council reacted to yielded a tight budget which did not allow funds for experimenting with new methods to halt the deterioration of central city. With new funds the city administrators could hope that they would be able to find solutions. Perhaps the five goals of the proposal should be thought of as expressions of hope rather than realistic aims to be achieved by a limited project. To evaluate the effectiveness of the project, it is more appropriate to try to understand what happened to those hopes than to determine if the five goals were achieved. In later chapters, when

3 *Proposal to the Ford Foundation for a Program of Community Development, Oakland, California*, December, 1961, page 11.

we examine the project in detail, we will be able to observe if the agency leadership made a serious attempt to solve the massive social problems facing the community.

The Foundation was concerned with the new strengths that could be developed in a community through the process of coordination. However, there was no serious effort at the inception of the project to identify criteria of new strength. Therefore, the question of whether the project improved coordination, and thereby strengthened the community, cannot be answered. This report is not intended to rationalize the oversights in the design of the proposal but, because there were no specific criteria by which to judge the project, any overall evaluation would require going well beyond the data.

The fact that a single proposal was submitted to the Ford Foundation, and that there was a single administrator of the funds, the City of Oakland, might suggest that a comprehensive, integrated program had been designed. Actually, programs were developed by the agencies independent of each other; in some cases different departments within an agency developed programs independently of other departments. The community agencies' experience in coordinating the administration of services for delinquents was not generalized to a planning process for broad social action.

The proposal was not a strategy for a comprehensive attack on a problem of social disorganization; rather it was a directory of projects to be operated by independent agencies. In writing a history of the Ford project, it was necessary to organize a report on a project that functioned without apparent strategy. To synthesize many separate projects into an orderly report, projects were categorized according to the five goals. It should not be inferred from the organization of this report that the designers of the individual projects had any of the five goals in mind when they were creating their studies. The five goals serve as convenient threads with which to weave a history of the first Gray Area Project.

To understand Oakland's social problems, it is necessary to view the community in historical perspective. The social conditions with which we are concerned developed over a period of many years. The following chapter is devoted to a brief history of Oakland, with particular emphasis on the conditions which created a community depressed by severe social blight.

APPENDIX — CHAPTER ONE

FIRST PHASE OF FORD FOUNDATION GRANT TO OAKLAND, DECEMBER, 1961

Agencies	*Foundation*	*Agency*
1. School District	$ 414,500	$135,936
2. Recreation Department	143,000	193,543
3. Health Department	131,500	127,380
4. Probation Department	28,800	9,588
5. California Youth Authority	25,600	0
6. Council of Social Planning	96,900	92,477
7. Urban League	34,000	14,208
8. City Manager (coordination by associated agencies)	10,700	4,800
Subtotals	$ 885,000	$577,932
9. City Manager (administration, secretarial costs, contingency)	115,000	10,500
10. City Manager (evaluation, research, seminar)	250,000	0
TOTALS	$1,250,000	$588,432



2. A Brief History of Oakland *

Geographical Description

The city of Oakland, California is the fifth largest city in California and the second largest city in Northern California. It is located on the eastern, mainland side of the San Francisco Bay and covers an area of approximately 53 square miles. In 1965 its estimated population was 378,000. Oakland forms a part of a large metropolitan concentration which is nearly unbroken from Hayward in the south to Richmond in the north. This concentration includes Hayward, San Leandro, Alameda City, Berkeley, and Richmond – a metropolitan district containing well over one million people.

Oakland has several major identifiable geographical sections. That portion closest to the bay is highly industrialized with a major state freeway bisecting it. The commercial heart of the city is located in the west-central section. Here are highrise office buildings and department stores. The city's commercial section is bounded on the north, east and

*Prepared by Patricia L. Peterson, Research Assistant, City of Oakland, Department of Human Resources, Oakland, California.

west by an area which is called locally, "the flatlands." The flatlands include certain depressed areas – particularly West Oakland, parts of North Oakland, and a large section of East Oakland below East 14th Street. These areas of the city are densely inhabited by many low-income families and single individuals. A large proportion of the flatlands population is comprised of minority groups. Another major identifiable area, which is devoted mostly to medium density, middle-income, residential use, extends from the border of the flatlands to the hills. The last area is the hills, an area running the entire length of the city along its eastern border. The hills are a low density residential area and are inhabited primarily by middle and upper-class Caucasians.

Early History

Oakland's beginnings as a city are an interesting chapter of Americana. In 1820 the King of Spain granted 45,000 acres of land to a favorite soldier-explorer, Luis Maria Peralta. These lands were known as the "Rancho San Antonio" and comprised what we now know as parts of Alameda and Contra Costa counties. Peralta, too old to govern his territories, divided the lands among his four sons and retired to his hacienda. The sons, as well as other Spaniards who gradually settled in the area because of similar land grants, raised abundant crops of wheat, corn, fruits, and vegetables. This pastoral era was not to last. With the discovery of gold in California and the rush of thousands of adventurers and fortune-seekers to the San Francisco area, the tranquility of the Peralta territory was seriously threatened.

In 1851 the three men who were to become the major shaping force in the city's future, Horace Carpentier, Edson Adams, and A. J. Moon, came to Oakland. All three had arrived in San Francisco from the East Coast at the height of the gold rush and, disillusioned by the lack of gold prospects, envisioned great potential prosperity in the Peraltas' lands.

There are conflicting accounts of how they obtained their claims. One version explains that they persuaded the Peraltas to lease a portion of the land to them. Another says that they simply took control of the land, using the argument that it was Federal territory and, therefore, open to settlement by anyone. Because this was a time when anti-Spanish sentiment was very strong as a result of the Mexican War during the late 1840's, it was, perhaps, easy to dispute Spanish title to the land. In any case, it seems that there was at least a small amount of chicanery involved and the territory slipped slowly out of the Peraltas' hands.

Carpentier, Moon and Adams staked out adjoining claims of 160 acres each and laid out the central core of the original city of Oakland. They were soon followed by others, primarily farmers and small businessmen (the first store was a tent covered with hides) who settled in the groves of huge oak trees which eventually gave the town its name. In 1852, boasting a population of 100 people, Oakland was incorporated as a town.

During the early 1850's some of the important milestones were the building of a city hall in 1852, followed by the first school in 1853, and the establishment of the first Presbyterian church in the same year. Reverend Henry Durant, a minister from a Congregational church in Masachusetts, opened a private school for boys which later moved to Berkeley and became the University of California. Durant served as the university's first president. Oakland's first weekly newspaper, *The Contra Costa*, was printed in 1854.

The town's growing needs required regularly scheduled ferry-boat trips between Oakland and San Francisco. Horace Carpentier had procured control of the entire water-front and was responsible for the building of the Broadway Wharf, an accomplishment which led to his election as the first Mayor in 1854, the same year in which Oakland was incorporated as a city. A city commission, with the Mayor at its head, directed public programs and activities. A vigilance committee maintained law and order. Public concern produced a bank, hospital, library association, a water company, and paved streets. By 1869, when the first transcontinental railroad entered the city, the population had reached almost 10,000 persons.

The city had outgrown its days as a small settlement built on a tract of rolling hills. Oakland had become a municipality in its own right, its culture a fusion of the Spanish and Northeastern backgrounds of its citizens. And, as a growing municipality, Oakland faced its problems. During the late 1870's labor disputes plagued the city. There was great unrest among the unemployed, and street gatherings were a common occurrence. The arson-burning of the city hall in 1877 was attributed to a discontent labor faction. Another problem in the labor controversy centered upon the resentment toward about 100 Chinese laborers, known as the "Basket Brigade," who carried large baskets of fresh fruits, vegetables, and fish from the docks to market each morning. People throughout California resented the competition of cheap Oriental labor, but public sentiment was especially strong in Oakland for several years. At one point an "anti-coolie" club was organized and posed a serious threat to the Chinese, requiring a police cordon around Chinatown.

During these years, however, despite fairly rapid population growth and continuing economic development, Oakland was primarily regarded as a residential community which housed people employed in the financial center of San Francisco. In essence, Oakland was a "bedroom city." The years of her prominence as an industrial and transportation center were yet to come.

A view of Oakland's early history recalls the prominence of a number of colorful figures. One such person was Dr. Samuel Merritt, physician turned Yankee trader and adventurer. At one time the city's Mayor, he was a major force in the civic spirit of Oakland's early days and supplied a great amount of the financial backing needed to build the 12th Street Dam, creating Lake Merritt. Jack London, Bret Harte, and Robert Louis Stevenson all lived and worked in Oakland. Many of London's stories are based upon characters and events which were part of his younger days on the Oakland water-front. London ran for Mayor of Oakland in 1901, campaigning on a Socialist share-the-wealth platform. He was soundly defeated, receiving only about ten percent of the vote. Another literary figure, known particularly to Californians, was the poet Joaquin Miller. Known as "The Poet of the Sierras," he wrote a number of romantic poems sympathizing with the famous California bandit, Joaquin Murietta. Miller, whose original name was Cincinnatus Heiner, went so far as to take the bandit's name for his own.

One of the most unusual moments in Oakland's history was the day its population doubled. The date was April 18, 1906, when San Francisco was leveled by an earthquake. During the next few days thousands of San Franciscans fled their burning city to seek shelter in nearby Oakland, barely touched by the quake. It has been estimated that Oakland housed 50,000 refugees during the crisis and that approximately half of them remained to become permanent citizens. The sparing of Oakland during the earthquake was a great blessing. The *San Francisco Examiner*, a week after the disaster, in a

tribute to the generosity and kindness of the city, said, "Never can San Francisco forget the nobility of Oakland."

The sudden impetus to business in Oakland launched a period of growth unparalleled in the history of the state. The population increased to 150,000 by 1910, including the largest concentration of Negroes on the West Coast, many of whom were laborers for the railroads. It was during these years after the turn of the century that Oakland's unique geographical situation changed her to a city of industrial magnitude.

Oakland's location on the estuary of the San Francisco Bay, with easy access to the Pacific Ocean, enabled her to grow as a shipping center. The Moore Shipbuilding Company, the first modern shipyard in Oakland Harbor, was founded in 1906. The years during World War 1 established this company as one of the nation's major shipbuilders. The Union Construction Company made its start in 1910 as a firm of consulting and construction engineers for placer mining operations. In 1918 they entered the shipbuilding field and soon established one of the finest shipyard organizations in the bay district, employing approximately 3500 persons, among them some of the best known shipbuilders on the west coast. They made a substantial contribution to the industrial growth of Oakland.

Several major railways established their western termini at the Oakland waterfront. The railroad complex, combined with shipping facilities and an excellent location for trade with foreign ports, eventually raised Oakland to the rank of a major commercial center. However, her position as a "bedroom city" for San Francisco continued until the years during the first World War. In 1912 four-fifths of the commuters to San Francisco came from Oakland and adjacent areas.

Industries, encouraged by Oakland's level terrain (more suitable for industrial purposes than San Francisco), and its access to vast amounts of hydro-electric power (more than most industrial centers of the Northeast), began to develop on a large scale. By 1910 Oakland boasted 460 manufacturing establishments with an annual output of approximately $30,000,000. Its main producers were large food plants, packing houses, canneries, mills and iron works. In 1915 General Motors built a Chevrolet plant in Oakland and then expanded its facilities into a larger General Motors plant in 1927.

By the end of World War 1, Oakland was referred to by some as "The Glasgow of the United States," because of its great shipbuilding and drydock complex; "The Marseilles of the Pacific," because of its vast production of foodstuffs; and "The Detroit of the West," because of Ford and General Motors plants and an unusually large number of automobile distributing houses. Its peculiar functions of heavy manufacturing, warehousing, and transportation left San Francisco in a dependent position, industrially and commercially, for the first time in the history of the two cities.

But as a financial, shopping and cultural center, San Francisco was, and still is, the dominant city in the Bay Area. The citizens of Oakland were considered rather phlegmatic in their stimulation of cultural and recreational activities. In the days of vaudeville there was a joke that "the three worst weeks in show business are Christmas, Easter, and Oakland."

A pattern of rapid growth in Oakland continued after World War I. In January of 1933, a survey was conducted by the Federal Government to determine the degree of industrial and commercial progress in many cities of the United States. Oakland was ranked as one of the five most progressive cities in the nation and the only such city on the West Coast. Producers of soaps, wines, soda, tiles and leather goods prospered.

Several large inter-state trucking firms based in Oakland. A municipal airport, built during the thirties, added to the transportation facilities; it has since been expanded to a modern $20,000,000 jet-port. In 1939 the number of industrial plants had increased to 1,415 with an annual output of almost $500,000,000, a gain of 300 percent over the number of establishments in 1910 and a gain of 1,500 percent in value of goods produced. By 1940, the population had climbed to more than 300,000 people.

The Impact of World War II on Oakland

The years between 1940 and 1945, when the United States was involved in World War II, marked the most substantial turning point in Oakland's history. In order to bring the history of the city within the scope of our analysis of the development of Oakland as a gray area, we will describe the impact of the war years and the post-war years upon the city's industrial, commercial, and population growth.

The entire West Coast experienced an unprecedented expansion of industry during the war years. A national defense production program involved the development of plant construction, reconversion and expansion, and brought about huge increases in employed personnel. With the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the step-up of war production, great masses of the population moved to the coasts and the Great Lakes region where ships and planes were to be built and military and naval installations located. The recruitment of workers for industry brought a million persons, including 250,000 Negroes mainly from the South and Southwest, to the Pacific Coast. The San Francisco Bay Area, as the key shipbuilding center of the state, quickly became one of the major war production centers of the nation and, likewise, one of its important labor market areas.

The war boom brought millions of dollars worth of industrial investment to Oakland. For many years the city had been developing into one of the Pacific Coast's major industrial and transportation centers. Oakland was the terminus of three trans-continental railroads, the Southern Pacific, Western Pacific, and Santa Fe. The port provided extensive harbor facilities for inter-coastal, South American, and Trans-Pacific steamship lines. The city was a base for several inter-state trucking firms which served an eleven-state area of the West. Many acres of industrial sites were available for development, as were vast amounts of hydro-electric power.

In 1940, prior to the United States' intervention in the war, the metropolitan Oakland area had more than $62,000,000 in government contracts for defense. In addition to this $62,000,000 in government funds, more than $127,000,000 was awarded to Oakland shipbuilding and manufacturing concerns. Approximately 18,500 people were employed in defense industries. The Oakland Naval Supply Depot, Alameda Naval Air Station, and Oakland Army Supply Base employed almost 8,000 persons. Three major shipbuilding firms, Todd Shipbuilding, Moore Shipbuilding, and General Engineering, employed another 8,000.

In 1942, after U.S. intervention in the war, more than 142,000 people were employed as laborers in the city's eleven shipyards. Most of the industrial activity during the war years was centered in food and kindred products, heavy machinery, and iron, steel, and their products. More than 61,000 people were employed in industries. The Henry J. Kaiser Corporation located its Pacific Coast headquarters in Oakland, as did the U.S. Maritime Commission.

Information on Oakland during the years 1942-44 is limited. During those years the War Department prohibited publication of information concerning new industries and the expansion details of present industries because a great many were producing vital war materials in addition to their usual peacetime output. Population estimates for 1944 indicated that the Bay Area population gained 582,809, showing the largest gain of any area in the nation for the period 1940-44. The metropolitan Oakland area gained in population by 172,537 during 1940-44, a growth rate which was nearly double the growth rate in San Francisco.

By 1945 there were more than 155,000 workers from the metropolitan Oakland area in industry. Industrial growth in the form of new investments and buildings as well as expansion of old facilities represented more than $11,500,000. Among the new plants in Oakland was a half-million dollar laboratory for Forest Products and a large aircraft-building complex for Hiller Industries. Considerable expansions were made in the Iron and Steel Division of Kaiser Industries, the Bechtel Corporation, and the American Pipe and Construction Company. Approximately $90,000,000 was invested in new homes and apartment buildings, $26,000,000 in utilities and transportation, and more than $75,000,000 in county and city projects.

The post-war years brought about significant changes in Oakland. The end of the war, and the subsequent cancellation of many government contracts, struck a severe blow to Oakland's heavy industrial activity. Millions of dollars worth of investments were abruptly withdrawn from the city, leaving behind a large force of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, many of whom were Negroes who had been recruited during wartime.

An extensive freeway system was beginning to emerge throughout the Bay Area after the war, offering great mobility to the work force. The freeways offered a similar mobility to industry and appear to be a factor in the industrial move from Oakland. No longer was it essential to locate in Oakland, heart of the labor market. The costs of land for industrial sites were rising and imposed serious restrictions upon plans to expand the physical facilities of plants for additional buildings or extended parking facilities. New methodology and automation were rendering many factories obsolete.

Heavy industry begun to leave Oakland proper, moving to peripheral areas where land costs were lower and more space was available. Many new industries located in Contra Costa and southern Alameda counties, where the population figures and industrial investments have steadily climbed since the war years. Such nationally known firms as General Motors, Dow Chemical, and Shell Oil Company relocated to expanded sites in suburban areas.

A general trend since the war, coinciding with the out-migration of heavy industry from the city, has been for more technical and research industries to locate in Oakland. There has also been an influx of service institutions, such as banks, to Oakland, as well as a growing warehousing business. Both fields of endeavor are expected to continue to expand.

In order to gain some additional perspective on current conditions in Oakland, an examination of several problem areas may be helpful.

Population

The population trends during the last 25 years bear heavily upon our analysis of the development of Oakland as a core city or gray area. Population figures for whites and non-whites are based upon census tract data for the years 1940, 1950, and 1960.

The figures show the increasing out-migration of Caucasians from the city and the continuously increasing in-migration of non-whites. The influx of non-whites to Oakland began during World War II when government and industrial interests recruited Southern Negroes as unskilled laborers for factories. Since the war, the continued migration of Negroes to Oakland has resulted in part from technological displacement in the agricultural areas of the South. This movement has resulted in Oakland becoming a "terminal" city in the Negro movement to the West. A summary of the population changes during the period 1940-1960 is represented in the table below:

WHITE AND NON-WHITE POPULATION IN OAKLAND (1940-1960)

Year	*White Population*	*Non-white Population*	*% of Total White*	*% of Total Non-white*	*Total Population*
1940	287,936	14,227	95.3	4.7	302,163
1950	328,797	55,778	85.5	14.5	384,600
1960	270,523	97,025	73.6	26.4	367,548

The census tract data for 1940 indicates that 84 percent of the total non-white population was contained in 17 out of 72 census tracts. At this time the non-white population represented 4.7 percent of the total population. All other census tracts in the city contained less then five percent non-Caucasian population. In 1940 the Negro population, comprising more than one-half of the non-whites in Oakland, numbered 8,462. With few exceptions this Negro concentration was located in West Oakland.

In 1950 the non-white population had tripled but was still concentrated in much the same area: 16 out of 72 census tracts contained 89 percent of the total non-white population. However, for the first time a number of census tracts, located primarily in West Oakland, contained over 75 percent non-Caucasians. In addition, 15 census tracts which had previously contained less than five percent non-Caucasians then registered between five and 50 percent non-Caucasians. The Negro population, numbering 47,562, comprised approximately four-fifths of the total non-white population.

A continuing population increase had been expected for the city in 1960 – an assumption based upon records indicating a greater supply of dwelling units and an increase in school-age children since 1950. However, the population decreased by approximately 17,000 during the decade of the 1950's, a decline of 4.4 percent from the 1950 figure. An analysis of the census tract figures for this period shows that while the overall population decreased, the number of non-whites increased sharply, a gain of 73.9 percent over the 1950 non-white total. The figures reveal an obvious out-migration of Caucasians from the city.

During the 1950's the non-whites began to expand from areas which they had previously occupied and moved into traditionally white areas. Geographically the non-white movement was from West Oakland to the northern and eastern sections of the city. By 1960, 36.1 percent of the census tracts (26 out of 72) contained more than 86 percent of the total non-white population. The Negro population numbered 83,618, comprising approximately 22.8 percent of the total population.

In 1960, 6.5 percent, or 23,729, of Oakland's residents had Spanish surnames. In other words, the Spanish surname minority group was about one-fourth the size of the non-white population. Negroes and Spanish surname minority groups together made up about one-third, or 33 percent, of Oakland's total population.

Education

The population of the Oakland Public Schools reflects the increase in minority group attendance. The population change in recent years becomes evident when we examine the following table:

RACIAL COMPOSITION OF
OAKLAND PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1963-1965

	Spanish Surname	*Other White*	*Negro*	*Oriental*	*Other*	*Total*
June 1963	4,932	27,130	26,430	3,215	369	62,076
	8%	44%	42.5%	5%	0.5%	100%
March 1964	4,675	25,678	28,018	3,264	603	62,238
	7.5%	41.5%	45%	5%	1%	100%
March 1965	4,761	23,978	29,239	3,185	624	61,787
	8%	39%	47%	5%	1%	100%
October 1965	4,862	22,738	30,871	3,269	653	62,393
	8%	36%	50%	5%	1%	100%

The percentage of Negroes is highest in the lower grades, and diminishes with advancing grade levels. The combined minority groups for elementary schools in October of 1965 exceeded 60 percent. Since this figure is considered the best available base for predicting future junior and senior high school populations, it is reasonable to assume that the Oakland schools will, in the very near future, be predominantly attended by minority groups.

This shift in the racial composition of the Oakland schools is related to the flight of the young, child-bearing Caucasian families to the suburbs, and their replacement by Negro families with children. Movement of families at the child-bearing ages produces a profound effect on the racial composition of a community.

The table on page 17 presents information concerning the educational level of the citizens of Oakland, based upon 1960 census data. It is significant that more than half, or 52 percent, of the Spanish surname population has completed only elementary school or less. It is also significant that 44 percent of the non-white population has completed elementary school or less.

Employment

In June, 1964 the U. S. Department of Labor estimated the overall unemployment rate in Oakland at 11 percent. A general rule applied to the Oakland area by the California State Employment Service for approximating the percentage of unemployed in the non-white population is to double the overall rate. The 1964 non-white unemployment rate would therefore be estimated at a figure in excess of 20 percent. The 1960 census reported that 14 percent of the Negroes in Oakland were unemployed. Since there was a general growth of unemployment until June, 1964, the 20 percent figure appears to be a reasonable approximation. A recently published report by the California State Department of Public Health estimates that, for the second quarter of 1965, the city-wide unemployment rate was 5.6 percent. The unemployment rate for non-whites could be estimated at approximately 11 percent for the total city.

DISTRIBUTION OF OAKLAND POPULATION
IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF SCHOOL YEARS COMPLETED
(1960 Census Data)

Years of School Completed	*Total Oakland*	*%*	*White Without Sp. Surname*	*%*	*Non-White*	*%*	*Spanish Surname*	*%*
Persons 25 Years or Older	230,076		169,011		48,844		12,221	
Elementary School or Less (Persons 25 Years of Older)	77,444	34%	49,571	29%	21,555	44%	6,318	52%
High School (1 – 4 Years) (Persons 25 Years or Older)	107,997	47%	81,479	48%	21,508	44%	5,010	41%
College (1 – 4 Years) (Persons 25 Years or Older	44,635	19%	37,961	23%	5,781	12%	893	7%

When we consider the census figures in broad context it appears that being non-white increases the probability of being a member of the poverty population. In 1960, 26 percent of Oakland's population was non-white. However, 64 percent of the non-whites were in the lowest quartile of income, and 65 percent were in the lowest quartile of education. The relationship between income, education and employment has been well documented.

The table on page 19 shows the distribution of the Oakland population in relation to unemployment and family income, based on 1960 census information.

Welfare

Coinciding with the population changes in Oakland, there has been a disproportionate increase in the number of welfare cases in the city. Although the estimated population increase in the City of Oakland between January, 1964 and January, 1965 was .8 percent, the increase in the number of welfare cases in less than one year, July, 1964 to April, 1965 was 12.6 percent. In view of this fact, that the welfare sector of the population is growing much faster than the population of the city as a whole, it would appear that economic circumstances have caused a considerable shifting of formerly non-dependent residents into the welfare sector of the community. The following table shows the number of cases in each of the welfare programs during a one-year period.

WELFARE CASES
OAKLAND (1964 – SPRING, 1965)

	1964	*Spring, 1965*
Old Age Assistance	7,507	7,603
Aid to the Blind	499	497
Aid to Families with Dependent Children	4,771	5,003
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (father unemployed)	-----	606
Children in Boarding Homes and Institutions	-----	276
Aid to Disabled	1,206	2,014
Medical Assistance to the Aged	353	455
General Assistance	389	255
Total Cases	14,725	16,709

Housing

One of the problems which emerged from the migration of minority groups to the Bay Area during the war years was that of providing adequate housing facilities. The jobs for which many Southern rural and semi-rural Negroes had come west were in shipbuilding and government installations. By 1946 most of these jobs had ended. Most of the Negroes remained in this area and their numbers were increased as war veterans and other migrants moved in.

During the war years thousands of units of temporary war workers' housing had been built, housing 55 percent of all Negro families in the Bay Area. Ninety percent of these dwelling units were considered substandard either by structural condition, lack of sanitary facilities or through overcrowding (there were three Negro families to every two dwellings occupied by Negroes).

DISTRIBUTION OF OAKLAND POPULATION
IN RELATION TO UNEMPLOYMENT AND FAMILY INCOME
(1960 Census Data)

	Total Oakland	%	*White Without Sp. Surname*	%	*Non-White*	%	*Spanish Surname*	%
Total Number of Persons	367,548	100%	246,794	67%	97,025	26%	23,729	7%
Total Male Civilian Labor Force	98,643		69,752		22,603		6,288	
Unemployed Males	7,873	8%	4,185	6%	3,121	14%	567	9%
Income in 1959								
Oakland All Families	97,193		69,092		22,293		5,808	
Deprivation Level ($4,000-6,000 per yr.)	21,115	22%	13,127	19%	6,202	28%	1,786	31%
Poverty Level or Below (Under $4,000 per yr.)	24,061	25%	14,223	21%	8,539	38%	1,389	24%

The end of the war brought about legislation intended to close down these public housing projects, thereby greatly diminishing the supply of cheap housing in nearby areas. Negroes were suddenly forced to find adequate private housing elsewhere. For many of these people the only alternative was to move to the older central districts in Oakland and Berkeley. These older cities contained the only significant supply of cheap housing available in the whole region. They also contained most of the districts open to ethnic minorities at any price.

Figures for the total number of families who moved from nearby war housing projects to Oakland are not available. However, a few limited relocation studies indicate that there was a definite trend for displaced Negroes to relocate in Oakland. In a study of the movement of 338 non-white families from a Berkeley-Albany temporary housing project, it was shown that approximately 44 percent, or 161 families, located in 12 census tracts in Oakland. Such factors as overcrowding and doubling-up of families, low vacancy rates, obsolescence and old structures were, and are, characteristic of the areas of non-white concentration. It seems clear that the city was not prepared to accommodate those families moving from nearby areas, let alone the rising number of migrants from within and out of the state.

In recent years the Bay Area as a whole has experienced a tremendous building expansion. Most of this building takes place outside the older cities such as Berkeley and Oakland, forming an extensive belt of predominantly new cities and unincorporated communities almost totally occupied by white families in the lower-middle, middle, and upper income groups. On the other hand, the stock of housing available to lower income and minority group families is small in relation to the constantly increasing demand. Whatever low cost housing is available is concentrated, for the most part, in the central districts of the older core cities. Thus, in these districts there is a tendency toward chronic shortage and concomitant exploitation, with steady expansion of blight and ghetto conditions. It appears that additional lower income and minority group people will continue to locate in the older cities, such as Berkeley, Oakland, and San Francisco, simply because they have no other place to go.

3. The Organization of the Project

In December, 1961 the "Proposal to the Ford Foundation for a Program of Community Development" from the community of Oakland was submitted, and in March, 1962 the first phase of the Oakland Interagency Project (OIP) was funded. A grant of $2,000,000, extended over a three year period, provided only limited funds for the project. With so limited an investment it was pointless to hope to achieve any substantial impact on the entire city; therefore, a reasonable alternative was to select a section of Oakland for a demonstration project.

The staff of the Foundation apparently visualized this project as a parallel to the research programs of industry. Prior to 1961 industry had considerable experience with research and development projects but parallels had not been established for such projects in local government. Therefore, since there was no precedent, the shortcomings in the design of the proposal to meet a research and development purpose should be understood in light of its pioneering aspect.

Restricting the project to the Castlemont High School attendance area, rather than dispersing the limited resources throughout the city, increased the chances that the project would create a visible impact. This area, the extreme eastern section of Oakland, contained approximately one-fifth of the city's population. The rationale for selecting Castlemont was that it had many more strengths than the central slums, and these strengths provided an atmosphere more amenable to social change. From an analysis of the 1960 census data, it appeared that Castlemont was racially mixed; however, in the 1950-60 decade there was substantial evidence that Caucasians were leaving as Negroes were migrating into the area.

Population Changes in Castlemont[4]
1950 to 1960

	1950	*1960*	*Net Change*
Total Population - Castlemont	72,797	76,993	+ 4,196
White	69,574	55,907	- 13,667
Negro	2,678	19,376	+ 16,698
Other races	545	1,710	+ 1,165

The developers of Oakland's proposal were concerned about the probability of Castlemont becoming a Negro ghetto. The proposal stated: "The present racial pattern also affords an opportunity to test whether, through a concerted and intensive attack on social problems, the process of racial transition can be arrested."[5]

A description of the transition which was taking place in Castlemont was presented in the proposal:

"The Negroes moving into Castlemont are largely of the lower middle classes, but with a not negligible sprinkling of teachers, professional men and civil servants. For the majority of Oakland Negroes, a move to East Oakland is a move to better housing and better neighborhoods. No great social distance, apart from color, separates the incoming Negroes from the whites they are replacing, but, of course, the whites are themselves moving upward, with the Negroes following. The outgoing whites look to the suburbs while the Negroes are moving from downtown slums to what was an outlying area twenty years ago."[6]

The many participating agencies began to prepare themselves to undertake the programs related to the *first* phase of the Ford grant which provided $1,250,000 for demonstration programs. The agencies proved to be in various stages of readiness for the implementation of their projects.

For the purpose of administering the project, a structure was developed within the existing framework of the city government. The project was administered by the City Manager's office, with the City Manager acting as Executive Director. He delegated authority to the staff which coordinated the project. The staff was comprised of city employees who were an integral part of the bureaucracy which operates government. (See organizational chart, page 23.)

Committee of Executives

A Committee of Executives was established to coordinate the program and to act as a liaison with cooperating agencies. The duties assigned this committee were: (1) to establish interagency policy for the project, (2) to guide the project coordinator's activities in implementing the interagency aspects of the project, (3) to review applications for funds.

It should be noted from the outset that this was a committee of executives – not an executive committee. They were authorized to make policy only in the limited area of interagency coordination, and the statement of their charge carefully excluded them from infringing on the autonomy of any of the participating agencies. The members of this

4 Proposal to the Ford Foundation, December, 1961, p. 15.

5 *Ibid.*

6 *Ibid.*

OAKLAND INTERAGENCY PROJECT
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



first Committee of Executives were the City Manager, the Superintendent of Schools, the Chief of Police, the Superintendent of Recreation, the Chief Probation Officer, the Director of Welfare, the Health Officer, and the Supervising Parole Agent. The District Attorney later joined the group.

One parallel between the Interagency Project and the coordinative organization which preceded it, the Associated Agencies, may be observed in the composition of the Committee of Executives. The same men who served as members of the Executive Committee of the Associated Agencies comprised the Interagency Project's Committee of Executives. In practice they met part of the day as an Associated Agencies committee; then, after a brief adjournment, they reconvened as a committee of the Oakland Interagency Project.

The committee crossed four political jurisdictions: the city, the school district, the county, and the state. This situation generated jurisdictional problems which were not resolved during the life of the project. Later additions to this committee further compounded the problem of crossed jurisdictions when two voluntary agencies were invited, the Council of Social Planning and the Bay Area Urban League. The California State Employment Service finally joined the group.

No crisis situations developed on this committee because they did not test the limits of their authority. The maintenance of good interpersonal relationships took precedence over program issues. The committee acted largely as an advisory body to the City Manager, who placed great weight on the nature of their advice. Even though the proposal delineated that this committee should make policy for inter-agency aspects of the project, they were unable to carry out this modest function. The executives were confronted with a conflict of responsibility since, as agency administrators, they reported to separate policy making bodies to whom they owed their primary loyalty. They consequently followed a judicious path of not challenging the prerogatives of their employers. Any significant modification of interagency relationship would affect individual agency policy and this was an area which was avoided to protect the autonomy of the participating agencies.

Citizens Advisory Committee

A Citizens Advisory Committee (CAC), composed of nine civic leaders appointed by the City Manager, was established with the following functions: (1) it certified that applications for funds were in order; (2) it reviewed recommendations of the Committee of Executives concerning the redistribution of funds; (3) it received progress reports from participating agencies, and the Committee of Executives, and forwarded such reports with recommendations to the City Manager; and (4) it reviewed applications for funds which were to be procured from sources other than the Ford Foundation. Although the proposal called for nine members, it was many months before the CAC was brought to full strength. The later appointments to the CAC increased the representation from minority groups.

The City Manager recognized the importance of lay leadership in stimulating agency executives to participate in an inter-agency project. However, he did not anticipate a continued citizen involvement after the project was operational.[7] The Citizens Advisory Committee was inserted in the structure of the Interagency Project at the insistence of

---

7 Wayne E. Thompson, *The People Problem,* National Civic Review, LI, No. 8 (September, 1962).

the Ford Foundation. Since the City Manager was the director of the project, his attitude about the role of lay people in the on-going operation of the project may have caused the CAC to accept a secondary role during the life of the project.

The committee was the only part of the administrative apparatus which involved the lay citizenry of the community. All the other administrative committees were comprised of professionals who were related in some way to the conduct of the project. The Citizens Advisory Committee interpreted its function as that of a reactive body to the recommendations of the Committee of Executives and the City Manager. Throughout the history of the OIP, the CAC did not interpret its charge as including the initiation of action, and they maintained a relatively passive role.

Research Advisory Committee

A unique feature of the project which was incorporated into the proposal was the development of a link with staff members of the University of California. The Research Advisory Committee (RAC) was appointed by the Committee of Executives and served them in an advisory and consultive capacity. This committee was composed of distinguished faculty representing several fields, including sociology, social welfare, business administration, criminology, public health, education and city planning.

At the outset of the project the role of this committee was vague. Although there may have been some anticipation that serious research would be undertaken, most of the agency programs were developed with little attention given to evaluative designs. This omission created considerable difficulty in developing the necessary data which is basic to research.

The role of the Research Division as originally conceived underwent major revision when the responsibility for designing new programs was transferred to a separate department. This step was taken in the fall of 1963, and served as a formal recognition that the project was not oriented toward a research and development objective. However, this separation made the Interagency Project conform more closely to the organization of the other Ford Gray Area Projects. New Haven, Boston, Philadelphia, North Carolina, and Washington, D.C. had been funded following the original grant to Oakland.

Oakland was the first community funded as part of the Ford Foundation Gray Area Project. However, the linkage between a community project and a university did not serve as a prototype for other communities. Perhaps the uniqueness of this relationship has some bearing on the fact that Oakland proved to be the only community of the Gray Area Projects to make an effort at comprehensive evaluation of *all* of its programs. In the other communities research was relegated to a secondary position and even such a basic research function as evaluation of programs was an unusual occurrence. In Oakland, due to the recommendations of the Research Advisory Committee, policy was established by the Committee of Executives and the Citizens Advisory Committee that all programs funded through the Interagency Project would be evaluated. However, this policy was carried out by the participating agencies with varying degrees of enthusiasm.

The Research Advisory Committee functioned as consultants in assisting the research staff in the development, implementation, and analysis of evaluative studies. This committee also played a major role in selecting the Research Director, and in making many of the resources of the University of California available to the research staff of the project.

Project Operations Committee

Since all the programs funded under the Interagency Project were designed and operated by a number of community agencies, the problem of coordination persisted throughout the life of the project. There was need for a structure to facilitate communication among staff who were directly responsible for the operation of the programs. The directors of programs were staff members of community agencies who were assigned this operational responsibility. The Project Operations Committee served as a vehicle for communication when the program directors faced operational problems.

The staff who served on this committee, representing a middle management level in their own agencies, had conflicts in responsibility similar to those of the executives. In order to strive for the goals stated in the proposal, the directors would have had to implement new services and contribute to bringing about institutional changes. At the same time, they were employed by institutions which were historically reluctant to change. During the history of the Project Operations Committee, the group managed well in carrying out assignments from the Committee of Executives in solving problems of administrative detail, but they did not initiate any actions which challenged the structure of any institution.

Field Liaison Committee

For a brief period of time a Field Liaison Committee coordinated activities at a field operations level. The members of this committee were field supervisors who utilized this committee framework to interpret the policies developed at the higher echelons to the field personnel.

The Oakland Project

The Ford Foundation funded the University of California Extension with a three year grant of $99,500 to undertake an urban extension project. This project was related to, but not part of, the grant to the city. The purpose of this project, which was identified as The Oakland Project, was "...to test the hypothesis that community development and improvement programs can be effectively aided and accelerated by the application of university resources to the substantive and methodological problems which must be resolved if social science research is to be translated into improved social practice."[8]

This project provided Oakland with a number of institutes and seminars for the professionals and lay citizens. These meetings, sponsored by the Oakland Project, typically were presentations by a panel of experts on topics such as race relations and housing, with all those attending invited to participate in spirited discussions. The effectiveness of these meetings in improving social services or increasing community involvement was not evaluated.

Implicit in this grant to the University Extension was that this project would direct the resources of the University into Oakland to assist the community in making needed institutional changes. It is interesting to note that this project, which was funded to assist

---

8 University Extension, University of California, *Proposal to the Ford Foundation for a University of California Extension Service Program in Cooperation with the Oakland California Inter-Agency Community Project, Proposal to the Ford Foundation for a Program of Community Development,* (December, 1961), p. 1.

community agencies modify practices, attacked the problem by application of the traditional procedures of the University Extension Department.

There is not sufficient data to make an accurate assessment of the success of the Oakland Project in extending the resources of the University into the community. It is incongruous that the staff of a project designed to translate social science research to a community failed to implement an objective evaluation of their own activities.

The Project Reorganization

The City Manager, with the assistance of the Committee of Executives and representatives of the minority community, selected the Coordinator of the Project. The man who was selected was an obvious choice, since he had played a vital role in acquainting the Ford Foundation with the problems of Oakland and had been one of the authors of the proposal to the Foundation. In addition, he brought to the job his experience as the designer and coordinator of the Associated Agencies. He was experienced in the field of community relations, and his acceptability to the minority community was enhanced because he was Negro.

The Coordinator had the responsibility to help the agencies implement their programs and generate community support for this new venture while working within the framework of a municipal government. Although there was a change of coordinators during the first phase of the project, the job responsibilities remained the same.

Bringing a new organization into the structure of a city created a dislocation and required some changes within the municipal government. Social service programs, such as the Oakland Interagency Project, were new to the city bureaucracy. The slow, painful accommodation caused enough frustration within the staff of the new agency to lead to the resignations of the first Coordinator and Research Director.

The Committee of Executives was able to assist the Coordinator in coping with administrative issues. They made decisions on reallocation of funds and paved the way for improving interagency communication. However, the policies which guided the Coordinator were those set by his immediate superior, the City Manager. The role of the City Manager, as Executive Director of the Project, was not challenged since the executives on the committee were careful not to infringe on each other's jurisdictions. As a committee of executives, they had no power to enforce their decisions. The power for decision making at a policy level remained with the elected officials such as the City Council, Board of Supervisors, Board of Education, and the State Legislature. Therefore, the Committee of Executives had power only while they functioned on a common consent basis.

Throughout the entire history of the Interagency Project, the scope of authority of the Committee of Executives remained obscure. The efficiency of operation was maintained because the project was part of the City Manager's Office. Since the City Manager is the Administrative Officer of the City Council, with direct communication to the source of power, policy decisions were available to the Coordinator through the City Manager.

This failure to clarify the authority of the Committee of Executives created considerable hardships when the structure of the Interagency Project was changed in November,

1964 in order to qualify for the funds available under the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA).[9] This act required that a representative board be established as the policy making body for the administration of programs funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO). Oakland was fortunate to have a structure which could be adapted to meet the requirements of the OEO. The organizational ambiguities were not appreciated until a series of crises were experienced by the new board of directors.

In the process of meeting OEO requirements, the Mayor commended the Committee of Executives and the Citizens Advisory Committee for their past services and appointed the Oakland Economic Development Council (OEDC) to serve as the new policy makers. This council was built on the cadre of the membership of the Citizens Advisory Committee and was expanded to include broader representation from labor, minority group leadership, and civil rights organizations, as well as business and industry.

The OEDC was given the power by the City Council to apply for funds and approve their dispersal. However, since the funds were administered by the City of Oakland, the final approval of all requests for funds, and approval for expenditures, remained with the City Council. The staff of the Oakland Interagency Project was redesignated the Department of Human Resources. The Department of Human Resources staff are city employees and subject to the instructions of the City Manager. Therefore, the City Council also controls the staff which is to serve the Development Council. Again, this may restrict the policy making effectiveness of the OEDC, since their scope of responsibility appears to be the initiation of requests for funds and preliminary approval for their expenditure.

At the time of this writing, the limitation of policy making power does not appear to have seriously affected the decision making role of OEDC. To date, the City Council has approved, with one exception, the actions of the Development Council, and the members of OEDC function as though they have broad policy making prerogatives. As long as the City Council continues to endorse the actions of OEDC, they are functionally a powerful policy making body, since they act as an extension of the City Council.

In the one instance when the City Council vetoed the action of the OEDC, a crisis developed. The veto was interpreted by the membership of OEDC as a challenge to their authority to make policy. The feelings generated by this act of the City Council apparently stimulated both bodies to meet so that they might more clearly define the relationship between the OEDC and the City Council. At the time of this writing the work of this committee has not been completed.

The present state of ambiguity appears to have resulted from the transfer of authority from the Committee of Executives and Citizens Advisory Committee to OEDC. The policy making bodies of the Interagency Project were established by the Mayor and City Manager of Oakland, with the concurrence of the City Council, who controlled the money. However, the extent of authority of the committees appointed to administer the Ford project was not defined.

When we examine the difficulties related to the ambiguity of structure, there is the likelihood that the project enjoyed some benefits because of the lack of clarity. When the OEDC was first established, the City Council might have been reluctant to delegate authority to a new force which would have a powerful voice in determining the expenditure of millions of dollars. The membership of OEDC, on the other hand, might not have accepted a role in which they interpreted their function as perfunctorily endorsing the

[9] U.S. 88th Congress, 2nd Session. S. 2642: *The War on Poverty* The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Washington, D.C.: Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 1964.

decisions of the City Council. Therefore the ambiguities provided an area for negotiation. It is possible that, at the time OEDC was first appointed, neither body could have accepted a clear mandate as defined by the other. At this time, it would be premature to predict how the process of clarification of responsibilities will affect the mutual relationship between OEDC and the City Council.

4. Reaching Out

The concept of actively bringing social services to those who have need for some form of assistance has undergone many changes and has experienced varying stages of popularity in modern urban history. Some of the earlier forms of reaching out services involved bringing assistance to the poor, such as food, clothing, household furnishings, and medical services, as well as advice on how to behave and believe.

Modern aggressive social services have diminished the emphasis on material assistance. Food and clothing distribution have been replaced by advice and services (medical, housekeeping, etc.). With the current interest in Oakland in reaching out, the poor now may remain passively at home, and there is a likelihood that they will be discovered and advised by a community worker. Although we have many resources with which to assist people who are unable to provide for their own basic necessities, the process of making application for such help requires that applicants be sufficiently skilled to find an agency which provides services appropriate to their needs and then follow prescribed application procedures.

Goals One and Two, stated in the proposal to the Ford Foundation, were most directly related to reaching out services. In this chapter we will describe the programs most related to these goals:

Goal I. "To reverse the process of social disorganization now characteristic of many neighborhoods and which lies at the root of many pathological manifestations such as delinquent behavior, school failures, and neighborhood deterioration.

Goal II. To accelerate the integration of newcomers into the community at neighborhood and broader levels." [10]

As we examine the programs in detail, we should be aware that the services were designed with an implicit assumption that the potential recipients had an unexpressed need for advice. If this basic assumption was false it is logical to anticipate that the programs related to Goals One and Two would be met with considerable apathy.

The Alameda County Council of Social Planning had the only program directed at Goal One. Activities related to Goal Two attracted three agencies, the Oakland Recreation Department, the Alameda County Health Department, and the Urban League. The common purpose of all the projects described in this chapter was to aggressively reach out to people who had not previously made use of community agencies.

The Council of Social Planning

The Council of Social Planning (CSP) is a county-wide organization through which interested citizens and organizations work to coordinate and plan public and private social welfare services. The Council also provides information and referral services to the general public and recruits volunteers to work in public and private health, welfare, cultural, and recreational activities.

The CSP's District Council Program was intended to bring about citizen involvement at the district and neighborhood level and to encourage voluntary neighborhood improvement projects. District organization programs have been used in a number of the nation's cities to energize communities in achieving social change. Traditionally a neighborhood-block group has been relatively powerless to accomplish change. However, a district council can draw upon several neighborhoods and, therefore, a wider range of citizen resources. Such councils have the potential to mobilize a more powerful public force.

District councils were organized in Oakland in 1957 by employing professional community organizers to encourage existing district-community leaders to participate in a council movement. The Ford Foundation added new funds to expand the existing program. However, the staff of the Foundation was not enthusiastic about the District Council Program. In fact, they agreed to fund the project only because of the persistent and persuasive arguments of the proposal's authors. The Oakland project designers firmly believed that such a District Council Program was needed and were determined to see it funded.

The Foundation seemed to be more opposed to the Council of Social Planning as the operating agency, than to the idea of district councils. The Ford Foundation staff believed that the Council of Social Planning was governed by a Board of Directors who were typically cautious in their administrative policy. Since the purpose of the district councils was to promote social action to bring about innovations in the community, it seemed unlikely that the CSP would provide the kind of leadership necessary for such a social movement.

10 Proposal to the Ford Foundation, (December, 1961), p. 11.

The Council of Social Planning is dependent upon a United Community Fund for support, which is in turn dependent upon industry and business for major financial contributions. The nature of the financial backing perhaps explains the observations of the Foundation staff as to the apparent conservatism of the Board of Directors. The Ford Foundation had previously observed the difficulties confronting an agency which organized an assault on its own source of life. It is not surprising that the Foundation was reluctant to sponsor this project.

A second reason for the coolness of the Foundation may have been that they did not believe that the District Council Program was consistent with the primary goal of helping disadvantaged youth. The Foundation staff believed that programs for youth were the most effective means to break the cycle of poverty. However, Ford relented and the District Council Program was funded, enabling social workers in the community to gain valuable experience in community organization. The CSP had the foresight to employ a research person so that the experiences could be recorded, and the community could learn from the successes and failures of this program.[11]

The district councils, acting as a link between the neighborhoods and the city administration, were dependent upon the existence of neighborhood organizations. Relatively few neighborhood organizations oriented toward civic improvement existed in 1957 or in 1962. From the outset it was apparent that the district councils were built on a weak foundation. The members of the district organizations were to act as planners and strategists, while the neighborhood organizations were to provide the energy and drive in programs of social action. However, from an analysis of the results of this program, it appears that the Council of Social Planning was successful in recruiting generals to plan strategy but unsuccessful in enlisting troops for the battle.

Only one district council was successful in organizing and broadening the scope of neighborhood associations – the Baymont Council, serving the target area of the Ford Foundation project. The Baymont area had neighborhood associations prior to the establishment of the district councils, and the community organizer devoted much of his energy to strengthening these neighborhood groups so that the council would retain neighborhood roots.

The other council which had modest success was the Sunset District Council which served West Oakland and was dominated by the Oak Center Neighborhood Association. This association was organized by a professional employed by the Council of Social Planning. The original purpose of providing an organizer for the neighborhood was to help the residents of the area participate in the redevelopment activities in West Oakland. The neighborhood meetings were well attended, and programs of local improvement were designed and carried out effectively. The neighborhood association did not look to the district council for leadership, nor did they use the council as a channel to City Hall. When meetings with city officials were needed, the Oak Center group made their own arrangements. The Sunset District Council had little influence without the support of the Oak Center Neighborhood Association. During the life of the project, this council remained as a satellite to the powerful Oak Center organization.

The two remaining district councils, North Oakland and Eastlake, did not have a neighborhood base and during the life of the project were structures without function.

Although there were major differences in the success of the various district councils,

11 Stanley Soles, *Evaluation Study of District Community Councils*, prepared for the Council of Social Planning—Oakland Area (May, 1965).

citizens from all four areas contributed thousands of hours in attempting to cope with community problems. City departments were frequently confronted with neighborhood problems, and city representatives often met with the district council membership. There are notable examples of how the combined efforts of the city officials and neighborhood residents brought about the resolution of local problems. One outstanding example of such cooperation was the Tassaforanga Tot Lot Project. In this joint effort the residents within the Baymont Council District raised funds and, with the cooperation of the Recreation Department, the Department of Housing, and the manpower of local citizens, converted a junk-laden lot into a delightful playground for young children.

Similar examples of neighborhood conservation activities took place when local citizens supplied the manpower to cope with problems of trash collection, and the Public Works Department contributed the equipment necessary for clean-up campaigns. During the three year Ford program the councils made over 500 contacts with the city administration and resolved such problems as street lighting, police protection, and recreation services. Equally important was the exchange of ideas between the citizenry and the city administration.

Discussion

The district councils found success and broad support from the community when they addressed their energies toward local problems of immediate concern to the neighborhood. They were less successful when they interpreted their role as one of offering leadership for bringing changes in national legislation. Apparently neighborhood associations would look to the district councils for help when there was hope that the council could function as a potent force. In those cases when a district council was able to help a neighborhood group with a project, the council became strengthened through the subsequent strengthening of their constituent groups. For example, one meeting called by the district council to raise funds for the Tassaforanga Tot Lot project was attended by more than 1500 residents. Through the organization of the council the neighborhood was able to utilize the resources of the surrounding area in building a better community. The council members failed when they attempted to offer educational leadership to the community on topics of broad national concern. Meetings called to discuss housing, employment or race relations seldom attracted a large number of residents. Although such educational programs may be meaningful to a community, they did not contribute to building strong neighborhood associations which were the foundation of a successful district council.

Neighborhood associations are organized when the residents of an area recognize that they have a mutual need. For the organization to survive the members have to feel that they are making some progress in meeting that need. The district councils which were able to offer the neighborhood groups help in achieving their objectives thereby strengthening the neighborhood core, were the only councils that continued to be functional throughout the three years of the Ford grant.

The District Council Program was the only effort directed at Goal One. However, Goal Two, directed at accelerating the integration of newcomers into the community at neighborhood and broader levels, attracted three agencies: the Recreation Department, the Health Department, and the Urban League.

The Oakland Recreation Department

The staff of the Recreation Department believed that they could best contribute to integrating the newcomer by operating programs directed at improving the social skills of their patrons. They undertook many programs which were funded by the Ford grant. Some brief background statements may provide insight to the broad scope of the Oakland Recreation Department and the types of programs they designed.[12]

The Recreation Department was organized in 1907 to provide playgrounds for children. The program later expanded to a "recreational movement" for individuals and groups of all ages and interests. The activities of the Recreation Department were, and still are, closely coordinated with the Park Department and the Public Schools. In 1920 the Recreation Department took on a new dimension when it merged with the settlement house programs. This merger set the Oakland Recreation Department apart from most public recreation programs in the United States. In Oakland the recreation program was developed not only as a creative use of leisure time, but also as a tool by which people could better adjust to the community, personally and socially.

Since the contribution of the Recreation Department to the Interagency Project was to improve social skills in the Castlemont District, the first step in evaluating this program was to arrive at a definition of social skills. It was essential to define the term before we could evaluate the success of the programs in improving social skills. This effort at definition was somewhat less than successful. Consequently, our only alternative was to assess the programs individually to determine if each program accomplished its stated goals. The Recreation Department undertook many programs which were funded by the Ford grant. We will examine only the more significant projects in this report.

The Day Camp Project[13]

In the summer of 1963 the Recreation Department conducted a day camp for 200 children between the ages of seven and eleven. Half of the children who participated were residents of a district having a large population of Negro families; the other half were children from an area which was primarily white middle and upper-middle class. From this population children were randomly selected for the experimental and control groups. The two groups were subjected to different types of camp experience. The experimental group, organized into ten sub-groups, was subjected to an ethnically-oriented curriculum including folksinging, construction of varied cultural artifacts, introduction of foods and games having diverse cultural origins, utilization of skits, and stories and plays illustrating the diversity of American life. The control group had a similar day camp experience, but the ethnicity curriculum was excluded from the program.

The sub-groups were varied in ethnic composition from all white to white dominance to Negro dominance to all Negro. The experimental group demonstrated more positive cross-race *behavior change* than the control group, as measured by a pre-post sociometric technique. To study whether the day camp experience developed a generalized attitudinal change toward the children of other races, an ethnic picture test was used as a social distance scale. This test required that children select favorite companions from

12 Alvin Nephi Taylor, *"The Oakland Recreation Department: A Study of Institutional Transition"* (unpublished Master's dissertation, Political Science, University of California, June, 1962).

13 Jack R. Felson. *A Follow-up Study of Racial Attitudes in the Day Camp Situation*, Oakland Recreation Department.

their group, and it appears that the special program had a positive effect in bringing about interracial choices. Although the children in the experimental group demonstrated greater cross-race acceptance of the children with whom they associated, they did not generalize this attitude beyond their immediate companions. The variation of ethnic composition of the sub-groups did not appear to have a significant effect on the cross-race attitude change.

This study was repeated with some refinements during the following summer, 1964, and in this case the leadership, as well as the composition of the groups, was varied. The major finding was that Caucasian children demonstrated greater cross-race acceptance when the leadership of their group was Negro.

The implications of these studies merit discussion. When adult leaders support interracial understanding, children make more interracial choices among the children they have come to know. This finding should be examined in the light of our previously stated finding that the children in integrated groups failed to generalize to a broad interracial attitude change. One possible interpretation is that the parental values of rejection of other races are so deeply ingrained within the child, that not only does he require exposure to other adult values, but generalization of interracial acceptance on the part of the child is limited to those cases where he observes direct evidence to support new teaching.

The finding that Negro leadership has a beneficial effect on Caucasian children provides us with a lead for additional study. Some of the questions which stem from this finding are: Given a limited number of Negro staff, should they be assigned to predominantly Caucasian groups to improve interracial understanding, or should they be placed with predominantly Negro children to improve the role image? Why did Negro leadership improve the interracial understanding of Caucasians, but Caucasian leadership did not improve the interracial understanding of Negroes?

The Language Arts Development Program[14]

During the school year 1963-1964, the Oakland Recreation Department, in cooperation with the Oakland Public Schools, conducted a Language Arts Development Program at one elementary school. This program was designed to assist a selected number of children who had previously experienced difficulties in acquiring the necessary language skills to progress in school. The program emphasized special cultural enrichment activities, including the use of puppets in dramatic presentations. Evaluative information on the program is limited to the reactions of parents whose children participated in this special program. Most of the parents expressed positive feelings about the project. However, there is no evidence that the program helped the children improve their language skills.

Creative Arts Workshop[15]

Another program, undertaken in the fall of 1963 and the spring of 1964, was a Creative Arts Workshop. Eighty children between the ages of six and eleven were given instruction in dance, drama, music, and art for three hours on ten successive Saturday mornings at a recreation center. The program also included a weekly movie or lecture on subjects related to creative arts.

---

14 Felson, *An Exploratory Study of a Language Arts Development Program*, Oakland Recreation Department.
15 Felson, *An Evaluation of a Creative Arts Workshop*, Oakland Recreation Department, (November, 1965).

Two tests were administered on a pre-post basis. One test, not requiring verbal skills (circle test), did not yield significant changes in the children's performance. A verbal test (tin can test), in which the subject is asked to describe the uses for a tin can to the examiner, did show an improvement in response at the conclusion of the program. However, the fact that the pre-post tests were administered less than three months apart raises some obvious questions on the effect of memory and test experience. Another problem which arises when we examine the data is that the scores on the tin can test were positively correlated with socio-economic status. This result could be anticipated from a test requiring a high level of verbal skill.

The evaluator of this project was confronted with the difficult problem of attempting to measure creativity. Since creativity is such an elusive concept, instruments selected may have been inadequate to quantify an area of human behavior that is so ill-defined. Because of the inadequacy of the test instruments the evaluation may have failed to measure either creativity or any changes in creativity that took place.

The Mobile Recreation Home Service[16]

The Mobile Recreation Home Service was designed to broaden the community's participation in recreational activities. A mobile unit went to various neighborhoods in the project area and provided arts and crafts programs for mothers and children at their residences. This unit visited each neighborhood once a week for several months between January and May, 1965.

The residents of the area receiving these mobile unit services gained substantially in awareness of Recreation Department services, in comparison to those who lived in areas not receiving these special services. The obvious follow-up to this study, to determine if increased awareness led to greater participation in the normal Recreation Department programs, was not undertaken because of an insufficient research budget.

The Recreation Department sponsored other programs designed to help increase the "social skills" of children, but the evaluation was so limited that it is not possible to know whether the children learned additional skills or if the activities of the staff were consistent with the purpose of the program.

Our report does not attempt to describe all the activities of the Recreation Department in their participation in the Castlemont project. In an overview, the vigor and experimental atmosphere which pervaded the department appeared to bring new energies into meeting the goals of accelerating the integration of the newcomer.

The Alameda County Health Department
The Newcomer Study[17]

The Alameda County Health Department interpreted the term "newcomer" more literally than any of the other agencies related to the project, and directed their efforts at locating newcomers and reaching out to them with health services. The techniques employed in locating newcomers were economical and efficient. The Health Department used utility company and school records to locate newcomers to the community. The

16 Felson, *A Study of a Mobile Service Project in Recreation,* Oakland Recreation Department.

17 Stewart B. Gross, Wilma Johnson, and James C. Malcolm, *A Descriptive Study of Newcomers to the Castlemont Area,* Alameda County Health Department.

percentage of the population they identified as newcomers was almost identical to the estimate that was arrived at after an extensive community survey conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of California.

The Health Department defined a newcomer as someone who had moved into the target area within the last 90 days, and they found that this group amounted to approximately 11 percent of the population. Castlemont contained a highly mobile population. The findings of this study of the newcomers helped shatter any stereotype that the newcomers in this area were largely Negroes from the rural South who had difficulty in making an adjustment. Fifty-two percent of the newcomers had moved from within the county, 24 percent from out of county, and about 23 percent from out of state. The newcomer population was 43 percent Negro. Most of these Negroes had moved from within the county, and they had a higher median income than the whites who moved within the county.

Those Negroes who in-migrated from out of county or out of state had a lower income than the Caucasians in the same category. When examining the income of newcomers, setting the poverty level at $4,000 for a family of four, we find that 23 percent of the newcomer families had incomes below that point. This poverty group was 56 percent Caucasian, 40 percent Negro, and the remaining 4 percent, other minorities. Without further pursuing the analysis of the Health Department data, we may conclude that any stereotyping of the newcomer to Castlemont is likely to be misleading.

Because the health problems of newcomers to metropolitan core city were unknown in 1962, the Alameda County Health Department engaged in a project directed toward locating early, and serving better, the new families.[18] In carrying out this project, the Health Department was faced with two major problems: (1) Can newcomers be identified early and efficiently? and (2) Can initiating Health Department services to newcomers as soon as they are identified be more beneficial than waiting until the newcomer seeks out or is referred for services?

The first problem, that of locating the newcomer, was solved, as discussed previously. The second problem was attacked by assigning, on a random basis, half the newcomers to a public health nurse (experimental group) for completion of a brief socio-economic form. Public health nurses completed an extensive interview with each of the newcomer families in the experimental group, and after consultation with a supervising nurse, scheduled any necessary revisits. A public health investigator administered a brief questionnaire to a control group but offered no advice on health problems.

An evaluation questionnaire was administered to control and experimental groups six months after their initial entry into the study. The findings suggest that initiating health services as soon as newcomers are identified is hardly more beneficial than waiting until they seek out or are referred for services. In the comparison of health problems, such as immunization status, chest x-rays, medical or dental checkups, health insurance, or handling personal illness, no significant difference was found between the experimental and control groups. It appears that time was a more significant factor in orienting newcomers to good health practices than the reaching-out activities of the Health Department. In taking note of the contribution of this study, it would be interesting to subject a broad range of reaching-out social service programs to the same type of rigorous examination to determine which method is most effective in accelerating the adjustment of clients.

---

18 Stewart B. Gross, Wilma Johnson, and James C. Malcolm, *Health Maintenance Among Newcomers,* Alameda County Health Department.

The Bay Area Urban League Leadership Development Program[19]

The Bay Area Urban League, in an effort to help the Negro newcomer assimilate into the community, proposed a leadership recruitment and development program. This program was directed toward two segments of the newcomer population: (1) those persons who already had training and economic security and were ready for immediate involvement in boards and committees of public bodies and voluntary agencies; and (2) those persons whose backgrounds of education and economic status indicated potential for leadership.

To achieve more leadership roles for Negroes, the League undertook such activities as a community service fair, at which fifty public and private agencies presented their programs at an exhibition, a skills bank to upgrade Negro workers, a voter education project, a Negro women's conference, a leadership development course, and consulting services for various Negro organizations.

The problem with evaluating this effort was that the term, "leadership development," was not defined, and the goals of this project remained vague throughout its history. There was no evidence that Negroes were appointed to positions of responsibility as a result of this program, and there was no great influx of Negroes in policy making or advisory boards until the implementation of the Economic Opportunity Act in Oakland.

Observations

The Urban League and the Council of Social Planning apparently made a similar error in their basic assumption that the large number of apathetic residents were potential followers looking for a leader. As we generalize from the findings of these studies, it appears that in Oakland there was a shortage of people who were willing to participate in organized civic activities in any capacity. The results of the District Council Program and the Urban League Leadership Development Program were disappointing because the designs of the projects may have been built on false premises. Perhaps the Urban League was too ambitious for their limited resources. They may have better directed their efforts at small scale community development where local residents could have gained organizational experience and learned how to be leaders as well as followers. The District Council Program was designed to coordinate the activities of neighborhood organizations, which, as it turned out, were largely non-existent; the Urban League project was designed to develop leaders for an undiscovered mass of followers.

There was considerable pressure on many public agencies to get programs under way following the receipt of the Ford grant. The Recreation Department reacted quickly. They implemented many programs which were aimed at improving the social skills of Negro children. These programs were consistent with the intent of the proposal to compensate for the social deprivation of the Negro children in the Castlemont area.

In the process of rushing programs into operation, the designs of the Recreation Department's projects typically were incomplete. With the exception of the Day Camp and Mobile Recreation Home Service programs, objectives were not specific and terminology remained undefined. The lack of specificity made evaluation an impossible task

19 Phyllis A. Warren, *Leadership Development Through Community Service*, A Project of the Bay Area Urban League, Dept. of Human Resources, (Oakland: January, 1966).

for the research staff, since they could not determine what was being demonstrated. The choice of instruments to measure change in creativity was an example of poor evaluative design being applied to a vaguely described project. Although it was apparent that a great deal of energy and enthusiasm were invested by program staff, it was not possible to discover whether the children who participated were helped.

However, the failure to complete a project design prior to the implementation of a program was not, and is not, unique to Oakland's Recreation Department. The Office of Economic Opportunity stresses the need for urgency when proposals are to be submitted from the local community. The proposals are typically examined for correctness of budget, legal soundness, and consistency with general policies established in Washington. Although most proposals do contain broad statements of purpose, the rough outline of the project operation is seldom directly related to the stated purpose. Since the operation is only generally described, the process of specifying activities takes place while the project is operating. At the proposal stage, goals and operation are at best only obscurely related. Therefore, the project activities become defined in the absence of an agreed central objective. Although such an arrangement provides considerable flexibility for the operational staff, the type of service received by the client becomes largely dependent upon each staff member's interpretation of his role.

There are other programs which are predetermined in Washington and are then carried out by the local community. Project Head Start is an example of such a program. In this case, the staff composition is described in detail by Washington, and program outlines are provided. The problem of these predetermined programs is that they are designed and implemented with the implicit assumption that they are improving the conditions of the clients. Therefore, they do not make provision for adequate evaluation. Since the assumption is that the program is bringing about a social good, even carefully designed variations of the program or staff patterns are discouraged.

Therefore, we are confronted with two conditions which inhibit evaluation: (1) incomplete operational designs from locally initiated programs; and (2) highly structured programs from Washington which do not allow for experimental variations. Because of the limited possibilities for evaluation, both types of programs offer little promise for providing us with knowledge to cope with today's social problems.

Oakland was the first Gray Area Project. Hence, the failure of the recreation staff to comprehend the requirements of its first demonstration project is understandable. It is far less forgivable for the Federal Government, which has had an opportunity to learn from the many Ford projects, to continue to compound our small scale mistakes.

The Alameda County Health Department, with many years experience in demonstration projects, designed and executed an excellent program. They developed an inexpensive and efficient means for locating a newcomer population and tested the effectiveness of reaching-out health services. Their finding that the type of aggressive health services offered in Castlemont was not effective may serve as a major contribution to other disciplines. If, as a result of this study, other agencies presently employing aggressive social work techniques would apply similar rigorous evaluative designs to their programs, we may learn what situations are amenable to imposed social services, what form this intervention should take, and what conditions require some other forms of treatment.

During the period that the community organization, recreation, and health programs were underway, other major projects were in operation. The schools served more clients

than any other agency participating in the Castlemont project – and the Associated Agencies were working with more agencies than any other project: Therefore, the problem of determining precisely what service or combination of services caused what kind of changes is not possible for us to estimate with the limitations of our evaluative designs. Perhaps by understanding the substance of each of the projects we may be able to gain some sense of what the total impact was on the residents of Castlemont.

The following chapter will describe how the Oakland Public Schools and the Associated Agencies contributed to the community attempt to make a combined effort at solving its social problems.



5. Concentrating on Youth

The Oakland Public Schools and the Associated Agencies (AA) conducted separate programs which were linked by their common concern with youth. The schools' programs appear to have been directly related to Goal Three of the proposal to the Ford Foundation, which was "to salvage and improve human resources, enabling individuals to better develop their potentialities."

In the Associated Agencies' Elementary School Project several agencies working together were able to improve their communication and subsequently serve better their client population. The Associated Agencies' project seemed to be directed to Goal Five of the Ford proposal, which was "to enhance the effectiveness of the community's institutions in resolving problems and thereby contributing maximally to achievement of other objectives."

The Oakland Public Schools

Because services to youth were emphasized in the first phase of the Ford project, the largest grant was made to the Oakland Public Schools. The staff of the schools had considerable experience in implementing special programs and had a structure prepared to administer the grant prior to the time that money was available. A director, who reported to the superintendent, was selected for the school project.

The intention of the organizational design of the school project was to establish a framework separate from the regular operating departments. This administrative organization had the advantage of providing the school project with considerable freedom. However, the project director felt that he was an outsider with a good deal of freedom, but without influence.

The teachers and counselors employed to carry on the project had to adjust to a lack of clarity concerning the direction of their activities. Although the project director offered spiritual and budgetary leadership, the staff were directly responsible to the principals of their assigned schools. The principal was in turn responsible to an assistant superintendent. There was no administrative relationship between the principals and the project director. This administrative organization placed the project director in a position of directing a project where he had only the power to advise the staff. The staff received supervision and direction from the principals.

The quality and innovativeness of the programs in each of the project schools were largely dependent on the building principal. Those schools with an enthusiastic and creative principal had more enthusiastic faculties trying out new ideas. The principals retained the right to modify programs and this allowed considerable flexibility within the project. The disadvantage of this flexible system was that such autonomy was incompatible with the development of a comprehensive evaluative design for discovering new solutions to the problems of children from depressed areas.

The Ford project was incorporated into the school system without any significant changes in the administrative structure. Had the project director been given the status of an assistant superintendent, he might have had substantial influence on the central administration as well as the principals. A project director with administrative influence might have developed guidelines for the principals so that a coordinated program could have been developed to attack educational problems related to compensatory education. The Oakland Public Schools attempted to absorb a major project into their system by making minimum changes in the administrative structure. Perhaps, had more appropriate adjustments been made, the schools might have been more effective in developing a comprehensive plan.

If a single agency could not develop a comprehensive and coordinated plan for its own activities, there was little likelihood that the more difficult problem of interagency planning could be resolved. As we examine the programs in detail, we will observe that most of the programs were planned to operate within the narrow confines of a single agency within a single school. In only one case was a new working relationship established, with the Recreation Department, for the Language Arts Program (previously discussed in Chapter Four). The other interagency relationship was established long before the Interagency Project, with the Associated Agencies. With the exception of these two cases, the new programs did not make expanded use of other community agencies.

Each principal directed each separate program toward achieving his interpretation of the project goal. Within this framework, the school principals accepted with enthusiasm the charge of directing new programs, hoping that they would improve the services offered by their individual schools.

In the fall of 1962, the Oakland Public Schools initiated the following programs: Third and Fourth Grade Language Development Program, Special Instructional Program in Junior High School, Elementary School Library Program, the Youth Study Centers, and the Elementary and Junior High School Counseling Program. In the fall of 1963, a Pri-

mary Language Development Program and a Junior High School Language Enrichment Program were added. The programs were designed to provide special services to help children improve their basic verbal skills. The Oakland schools had ample evidence that children in depressed areas were significantly retarded in their verbal skills compared to children from middle-class areas.

The Primary Language Development Program[20]

The Primary Language Development Program differed from traditional programs in that it was preventive rather than remedial. The program was aimed at developing effective language skills during the earliest years of a child's attendance at school. The children were taught by their own teacher during a period set aside for special language instruction.

The special instruction was designed to help children: (a) discriminate among the various groups of elements which make up the written and spoken language such as letters, words and sounds; (b) learn to reproduce basic speech sounds and associate sounds with printed symbols; (c) develop a sight vocabulary; and (d) learn to read.

A multi-sensory approach was built into the language lessons to stimulate the child to perform. The child responded to stimuli directed at several senses by listening, watching, closing his eyes, clapping, standing, moving his hands, arms and body, as directed. Classroom activities fell into two categories: (a) lessons with half of the class during which all students responded to the same stimuli, and (b) periods of time when activities were highly individualized with each child working alone or with one other child at some task which no others in the room might be engaged in at that time.

The children who participated in this program were compared to a control group in order to determine the effectiveness of this specialized language program. In the 1963-64 academic year, these special language programs were instituted in kindergarten and first grade.

The kindergarten experimental group achieved significantly higher reading readiness scores than the remainder of the kindergartners at the school. When the kindergartners who had the special program were tested a year later, at the end of the first grade, they proved to have significantly higher reading scores than first grade children who had not participated in any of the special programs. First grade children who participated in a special program achieved significantly higher reading scores than first grade children who were not in the program. The children who were in the special first grade program continued to increase their reading skills at the end of second grade and scored significantly higher in reading achievement than their contemporaries.

In the 1964-65 academic year, a special program was again offered at kindergarten and first grade. In this experiment the kindergarten children did not make greater gains than the children in the control group. However, in the special first grade program (1964-65) the children did significantly better than the other first graders.

With the limited information we have available at this time, it is not possible to explain satisfactorily why children gained reading skills in the 1963-64 kindergarten program and did not gain in 1964-65. The same teacher was involved in both studies; therefore, unless some gross change in her attitude took place, it is reasonable to assume that the teacher personality factor remained constant. It is not possible to assume a con-

20 *Stonehurst Primary Language Development Program*, Oakland Public Schools, Special Urban Educational Services, (January, 1966).

stancy of curriculum, since there was insufficient monitoring on the content of either year's program. Although it is likely that the children in the two studies had similar characteristics, this variable was not explored and may have had a bearing on the children's performance.

In order to gain some further understanding of the merits of special programs at the kindergarten level, this study should be repeated with the content of the program closely monitored. In addition, the children in the 1964-65 kindergarten study should be observed for at least another year to determine if the program had some latent effect.

When we examine the total Primary Language Development Program, we find that, for the most part, children were helped and were able to perform at grade level or above. Perhaps of even greater significance is the finding that children continued to benefit from the effects of this program a year following their exposure to special instruction. This carry-over at the primary grade level merits further study. The school project was not designed to discover the optimum age for intervention. However, as we continue to examine the separate school programs, we may learn how to design future projects which will shed some light as to what age children are most amenable to special language instruction.

Third and Fourth Grade Language Development Program[21]

The purpose of the Third and Fourth Grade Language Development Program was to improve verbal and reading skills. Specially trained teachers had two groups of students for two hours per day. The size of the groups varied from 15 to 20 students with a specialist instructing each group ten hours per week in language skills. The classrooms were equipped with projectors, tape recorders, phonograph records, easy-to-read books, games, and self-help devices. The activities were diverse and included reading activities, and listening to the children's own oral expression on tape recorders, as well as field trips and discussions.

The group which participated in the program during the academic year 1962-63 gained significantly in reading skills when compared to a control group at the end of the year. In May of 1964, the group which had received this one year of special program was significantly ahead of the control group and in May of 1965, they were still performing significantly better in reading than the control group. Therefore, it appears that the gains made during the program were retained at a significant level.

However, we should not become too enthusiastic about the lasting effects of a one year intervention. When we re-examine the data, it appears that in the second year following the program (1964-65), the control group's actual gain during the one year period exceeded that of the experimental group. The reason that the experimental group remained significantly ahead of the control group was that they began the 1964 year with a substantial advantage. Clearly, if the tendency revealed in the third year of the study continued, we would expect the experimental group's yearly gains to diminish to a point where they do not perform at a level superior to the control group.

When this study was repeated in Oakland with the third and fourth grade students from 1963-65, the findings were that the children who participated in a special program read significantly better than a control group at the end of the first year. However, a

21 *Language Development — Third and Fourth Grade*, Oakland Public Schools, Special Urban Educational Services, (January, 1966).

year following the termination of the program, their performance was not significantly better than that of the control group.

There are enough inconsistencies in the findings of the elementary school programs to caution us against arriving at premature conclusions. The research staff of the Oakland Public Schools demonstrated unusual dedication to sound research practices in their repetition of studies. Because of their persistence, we are able to build on trends we observe in their findings and, at the same time, not make the serious blunder of moving ahead with false assurances.

The first trend we observe is based on the repeated finding that children from kindergarten through the fourth grade responded quickly to special instruction and made significant gains in reading skill.

The second trend observed is that the children maintain the benefits of these special programs for about a year following their last exposure. In some cases the gains made during the year following the experimental program were greater than the gains which took place during the year of special instruction.

The third trend we observe is that by the time two years have elapsed following the children's participation in a special instructional program, their rate of gain is less than that of children who have not received special instruction. In the second year in a regular school setting, the children who were not subjected to a special program appeared to improve their reading skills more rapidly than the experimental children.

These three trends should provide us with clues for improving the design of future programs. A research project should be designed to test for the optimum time interval which should be allowed between exposures to special intervention. One possible demonstration would be to provide special instructional opportunities for children in alternate years. An alternate-year approach does have support in learning theory. This spacing would be consistent with a learning model which teaches children new skills, and then gives them an ample opportunity to practice these skills until they become internalized. When the process of internalization is completed, the children should be ready to begin the cycle again. There are many time variations, in relation to other variables, which merit testing if we are to find the optimum time cycle for scheduling special programs.

There are numerous clues for new directions suggested by the research of the Oakland project. As an example, at this time we have only gross information as to what activities were undertaken with the children in the special instructional program. Therefore, if one type of activity actually was producing spectacular improvement in the reading skills of children it would go undetected. There is need for carefully designed studies so that we will be able to differentiate the successful and unsuccessful techniques. It would be a substantial waste of a major research investment if we do not build upon these studies, so that we may accumulate knowledge and design an efficient system of compensatory education.

The Elementary School Library Program[22]

One of the more exciting school programs involved the addition of librarians to selected elementary school facilities. Librarians were placed in two of the project elementary schools and provided special services to the children and the teachers. The libraries were open at lunchtime and after school so that greater use could be made of the library facilities. In one school the average book circulation gained in the first year from

22 *Elementary Library Programs*, Oakland Public Schools, Special Urban Educational Services, (March, 1966).

one book per month per child to almost four books per month by the end of the first year. By the end of the second year, the average reached 59 books per year per child. Most reading experts recognize that the more children read the better they read, and this study clearly suggests that a minimum investment increased the quantity of children's reading. In addition, the teachers were pleased with the services offered them by the librarians in providing special materials to enrich their teaching. By the end of the first year of the library program, the contribution of this service to the school curriculum was obvious, and there was a widespread demand for librarians by the principals of the elementary schools throughout Oakland.

The Elementary and Junior High School[23] Counseling Program

Counselors were placed in a junior high school and two elementary schools in the fall of 1962 to augment the adjustment of new pupils to new school situations. The activities of these counselors included:

1. Programming newcomer students
2. Individual interviews with parents
3. Follow-up meetings with students
4. Arranging meetings between newcomer parents and community leaders
5. Home visits
6. Inaugurating parent group meetings
7. Consultation with teachers
8. Intensive individual and group counseling programs with children exhibiting disturbed behavior
9. Responsibility for augmenting student government programs
10. Leadership development programs
11. Adult education classes for parents – including Negro history, basic skills, home economics. Courses needed to fulfill requirements for high school diploma were also offered.

An examination of this program indicates that parents, children, and teachers felt that this program was helpful in assisting newcomers adjust to the school environment. A special group of counselees who were referred for behavior problems was studied to determine the effectiveness of counseling on school achievement and behavior.

The designers of this study failed to establish a control group; therefore, the criterion of success was defined as the improvement in academic grades and citizenship ratings from the beginning to the end of the academic year. The children who were counseled did not make unusual gains, either academically or behaviorally.

The results of this study are consistent with the findings of most of the studies examining the effectiveness of counseling in contributing to modifications of behavior. The weight of evidence is that the effects of counseling are not observable behaviorally. Counseling theory suggests that the changes which do take place are intrinsic and not readily apparent. In the Oakland counseling study, whether or not these intrinsic changes took place remains a matter of conjecture.

In 1964 the counseling activity was modified into a school-community worker pro-

23 *School-Community Worker Program,* Oakland Public Schools, Special Urban Educational Services, (January, 1966).

gram. The purpose of this modification was to place special emphasis on improving communication between parents and the school. Many parents were seen individually and in groups by these workers, and parents were encouraged to participate in school and broader community activities. Those parents who were most active participants in the meetings related to this program reported that they were more comfortable in school surroundings and were more supportive of the school programs as a result of this project.

The shift in emphasis toward involving the community in school activities was, in part, a reflection of a national pattern. School administrators were learning of the dangers inherent in parental misunderstanding of the goals of school programs. Because of a failure to maintain communication between the policy makers of the school district, and the consumers of service, school administrators had become a prime target of the civil rights movement. The introduction of the school-community worker was a response to this need for improved communication.

Study Centers[24]

The first study center opened in November, 1962, for junior high school students. The study center program was designed to provide students with a place to study and tutors to help them with homework. By the end of the 1963-64 school year, seventeen centers were in operation with over 1,000 students per week being helped by 350 tutors.

A study of the 1963-64 program concluded that students with a wide range of academic achievement and work habits attended the centers. Teachers, parents, and the students themselves indicated support of the program and a desire for its continuation. However, there was no evidence that the academic performance of those children who attended the centers improved. When we examine the program and realize that the centers were open only one or two evenings per week, perhaps our expectation that there would be improvement in the children's performance was unrealistic. Even if a child wished to make maximum use of a center, the limited number of exposures available did not permit substantial remedial activities.

In the 1964-65 program, there was an effort to study the effect of different types of center operation on the children. There was an unstructured center, open to everyone, and students could come and go as they wished. There were also semi-structured and structured centers where students had to be recommended by teachers in order to attend; incentives were used to have the child attend regularly. In the unstructured center, a student had to initiate a request for assistance, and a tutor would then provide the help that was required. In the semi-structured and structured centers the tutors carried out a prescribed curriculum, led drills, made assignments, and checked work.

Comparison of the three types of operation is difficult because the groups which attended the three types of centers were not comparable. Those students who attended the unstructured centers were more deficient in basic skills than the children attending the other types of centers. The children attending the semi-structured and structured centers had better attendance records and improved their academic performance more than those in the unstructured setting. However, the difference in performance may be related more to the school skills which the child brought to the centers than to the type of center operation.

24 *Study Centers 1964-65*, Oakland Public Schools, Special Urban Educational Services.

From the findings of this study, it is not possible to compare the effectiveness of the various center structures. Had the groups attending each center been selected for comparability, the investment of our resources in this program may have yielded a rich harvest of information. Because of this oversight, we have little additional knowledge to contribute to the design of future study centers.

Special Instructional Program at Madison Junior High School[25]

Between the fall of 1962 and June of 1965, a special language development program was conducted at a junior high school. Although the program changed in form during the three year period, the main purpose was to maximize the acquisition of reading and language skills. A reading specialist and several English teachers worked as a team to individualize reading experiences and to expand the types of activities to include library work, group discussions, dramatizations, and recreational reading.

When the reading gains of the students who participated in this special program were compared to the reading gains of students in a control group, it appeared that the special program did not benefit its students. These findings merit close examination. The failure of the children to profit from the program raises questions which should be explored in future studies. Do junior high school children from depressed areas require intensive intervention because they have been deprived for many years of the experiences which are conducive to learning school skills?

The Junior High School Language Development Program does not appear to have provided sufficient opportunities for individual or small group remedial activities. Such opportunities were made available in the elementary school language program, and these opportunities may have had a bearing on the gains in reading made by younger children.

There are additional questions which merit study: Are junior high school children more resistant than elementary school age children to remedial activities? Is it more difficult for the junior high school child to recognize that he is not equal to his age-mates academically and to accept help that he needs?

Since the junior high school program did not prove successful, perhaps an attempt should be made to adapt the elementary school special instructional techniques to the older age group. To obtain the greatest benefit from the Oakland schools' demonstration project, the school administrators will have to recognize the need for on-going demonstration projects, make broad application of their successes, and be prepared to discontinue failures.

Discussion

The school programs were designed to salvage human resources and to help individuals develop their potentialities (Goal Three)[26]. If we consider the funds made available for attaining this goal, less than one half million dollars distributed over three years, we can see that the development ofchildren's potential would be done on a small scale.

In 1961 the types of programs designed in Oakland were similar to the compensa-

25 *Research and Evaluation Report of Special Instructional Program at Madison Junior High School 1964-65,* Oakland Public Schools.
26 *Proposal to the Ford Foundation,* (December, 1961), p. 11.

tory education programs which were under way at that time in many other communities. During this period, numerous articles appeared which extolled the virtues and successes of similar programs, such as the Higher Horizons Program in New York City. Higher Horizons was judged a success prior to any serious evaluative study of the program. Nevertheless, many communities were not deterred from imitating the experiment.

In many communities compensatory education programs were initiated without any evaluative design. Perhaps they assumed that what was effective in New York would work locally. Fortunately, in Oakland there was a substantial effort made by the school department to evaluate their programs. Although the evaluation could have been more comprehensive, enough information came from these studies to provide us with guides for developing future programs.

We have found that children in elementary school responded quickly, by improving their reading skills, when they were exposed to a specially designed language program. It appears that these gains were not retained much beyond a year, suggesting the need for reinforcing experiences. At the same time, we discovered that a language development program at the junior high school level was not successful. An interpretation of this finding would suggest that we seek new directions for language remediation in junior high school and that we experiment with adaptations of elementary school methods.

We are able to draw some inferences from the less well evaluated studies. We observe that adding librarians to an elementary school faculty increases the circulation of books, that counselors are able to improve school-parent communication, and that children make use of after-school study halls.

Had better evaluative designs been implemented, we would now have more precise information on which to build future programs. But in Oakland we are far more fortunate than the communities which have continued and expanded compensatory education programs based on intuitive judgement. We are in a position to build on our successes and discard the failures. Other communities which do not evaluate their programs are not able to distinguish between the successes and failures. Their continuance and discontinuance of programs are related more to whim than to fact.

Because at the time of original funding there was so much hope that the cycle of poverty could be broken by focusing on children, the failure of the children to respond to the new programs, by making a lasting academic improvement is a disappointment. Some of the programs did bring about immediate unusual gains, which were retained for more than a year. However, there was no consistent pattern to these successes. Although there was a tendency for younger children to make significant gains more frequently than older children, we may not conclude that special reading programs will provide an inverse relationship between reading gains and age. In designing compensatory education programs we should consider the influences, other than the school curriculum, which may affect the academic achievement of the child.

When we realize that a child is exposed to school for a maximum of six hours a day for 180 days a year, we must be concerned with what is happening to him for the major part of his waking hours. We must try to understand the value system by which his family lives. Does the home place high value on academic achievement? Are parents able to provide the child with the type of support he needs to cope with the stresses related to school? Do the attitudes of his friends and neighbors support his endeavors to succeed in school? How do television, newspapers, and radio influence a child's self-concept in relation to the larger community?

The school is part of the cultural milieu of a child, but we do not have evidence that it is the most significant part of a child's environment. The Oakland schools have been the target of attacks by many community groups because minority group children do not perform as well in school as the children of the dominant group. The fact that the schools have not compensated for the deficiencies of a society which has deprived families of equal opportunity in employment, housing, health, and leisure activities is interpreted as a shortcoming of the public schools. The school curriculum is often identified as the causative factor which prevents minority group children from attaining academic success.

It is unlikely that we will discover a single ingredient which causes a large population of children to succeed or fail in school. There are many studies which demonstrate that there is a high positive correlation between socio-economic status and school success. However, we also have studies which demonstrate that the most experienced teachers, the smallest classes, and the newest buildings with the best equipment are located in the upper socio-economic areas. Since there is a complex interdependence of the many forces which affect the lives of children, we have ahead of us the massive task of testing the relationship of these forces and their effect on the child.

The proposal to the Foundation assumed a multiple causation for the many problems which beset the children and adults from depressed areas. The approach to those complex problems suggested in the proposal was to coordinate the resources of the various community agencies so that individuals would no longer be treated in a segmented fashion. The programs which have been reviewed in this chapter reflect a concern for the child in school. However, this is the same child who lives with a family who must cope with health, nutritional, inter-personal, and community problems.

Since socio-economic status is so highly correlated to children's success in school, it is possible that the employment of the parents may have a direct bearing on the success of the school child. Therefore, a logical interagency study would have been to design a program utilizing an outreach program of the California State Employment Service. Where health was a hindrance to employment of parents, or school attendance of the child, services of the Alameda County Health Department could have been utilized to correct the disabilities. Numerous other programs could have been tested to discover the most efficient means for agencies to combine their efforts in solving the problems which inhibit children from attaining their full potential.

The programs which we have described previously were part of the first phase of the Ford project. Interagency planning was new. The coalition of agency resources had been achieved prior to the Ford grant for dealing with problems of delinquency. But delinquency brings crisis situations which demand attention. A crisis brings about atypical reactions and motivates agency executives to seek each other out in order to cope with some immediate threat to the community.

The Associated Agencies is an example of how efficiently executives can work cooperatively in taking steps to relieve situations which are of immediate concern. The executives did not carry these lessons over to problems which required long-range planning. Many problems which had been prevalent in the community for years did not become the focus of attention because their presence was not seen as an immediate threat.

The schools had grown accustomed to the poor achievers from low-income families. Since poor achievers from depressed areas were seen as something which had always been, the school district did not feel stimulated to seek new solutions outside its tradi-

tional practices. The Oakland Public Schools applied the new Ford funds to implement new projects addressed to problems to which they had become accustomed. The traditional practices which the schools applied to these long standing problems failed to test the efficiency of the interagency process suggested in the proposal.

The first phase of the Ford grant was a period for the personnel of the Oakland Public Schools to learn how to adjust to a demonstration project. Since demonstration projects frequently require carefully specified activities, the autonomy of the building principals was being challenged. Historically, principals have maintained certain prerogatives in making changes in teaching assignments as well as modest curriculum alterations. A highly structured demonstration project inhibits these prerogatives.

The advantage of encouraging more flexibility for the principal is to stimulate the creative skills which the school faculty contributes to the project. The disadvantage is that, without carefully specified controls, there is no way of determining what the project was demonstrating. Another problem associated with the principals' retention of a high level of autonomy is the difficulty the school district faces in attempting to coordinate multiple programs functioning independently within one interagency project. Clearly, the administration of the school district was going to have to learn from these experiences if they were to be expected to find solutions to the complex problems facing urban school districts.

The Associated Agencies Elementary School Project[27]

The Associated Agencies Elementary School Project was the only program directed toward Goal Five, which was "to enhance the effectiveness of the community's institutions in resolving problems and thereby contributing maximally to achievement of the other objectives."[28] This project sought to prevent elementary school children from becoming delinquent by coordinating the activities of ten public agencies within the attendance area of seven elementary schools.

The Associated Agencies had considerable experience at the secondary schools with problems of juvenile control. The organization was born as a result of a crisis at the secondary schools and had gained considerable community prestige because it resolved some potentially explosive situations. Although gang warfare had been a serious problem in many Bay Area communities, it did not erupt in Oakland; the comparatively peaceful condition of Oakland gangs was attributed to the existence of the Associated Agencies.

The Ford Foundation, in seeking a community that had demonstrated some skill in coordinating community resources to cope with social problems, was impressed with the Associated Agencies. Since there was a general attitude in the community and among the Ford Foundation staff that the AA was effective in controlling delinquency, it is not surprising that the AA was assigned the task of undertaking a delinquency prevention program. The proposal to the Foundation provided for an untested method to be adapted to an undefined problem.

Following the receipt of the Ford funds, the planning and operational committees of the Associated Agencies addressed themselves to defining the problem of delinquency prevention and designing a subsequent course of action. The project designed by these

27 *Associated Agencies Elementary School Project*, City of Oakland, Department of Human Resources, (January, 1966).

28 *Proposal to the Ford Foundation*, (December, 1961), p. 11.

committees was directed at younger children in order to provide corrective services before delinquent behavior became ingrained. Ten agencies agreed to offer appropriate help to the children and families in the project.

This study had two parts: the major problem was to determine if coordinating services would prevent delinquency; and the second part was to find out if coordination was actually taking place.

The principals of the participating schools were asked to select boys in grades two through five who presented serious behavior problems. From this group an experimental group and a control group were selected. A second control group was selected outside the project area, to escape a possible halo effect of staff who might have been affected by project attitudes. The three groups of boys were studied on the following: (a) reasons for referral, (b) attendance, (c) scholastic grades, (d) conduct grades, (e) teacher ratings, and (f) agency contacts.

To determine if coordination was taking place, the amount of communication among the personnel within the ten agencies participating in the project was compared with that of their counterparts working in other areas. The assumption was that coordination required interaction among the agency personnel, and interaction of professionals was dependent on communication. Although it was recognized that a great amount of communication about clients did not prove that coordination was taking place, at least it was a measurable symptom of interaction. A second symptom of coordination was examined. The meetings of the Associated Agencies, where cases were presented, were studied to determine if cases were followed up and reported on after they had been assigned to an agency. This study was conducted for one school year.

The major activity of the AA in delinquency prevention was the utilization of a case conference method with the professionals from ten agencies. The school principal would present a case, and those at the meeting would then determine which agency was to undertake what activity with the client. The agency representatives were expected to make progress reports on the cases to which they were assigned. When an agency accepted responsibility for a case, that agency had the sole prerogative to determine the conduct of the case and when to terminate services. The Associated Agencies had no power to mandate that agencies must report their activities on a case; yet, the agencies participating in the project consistently reported their follow-up activities at the regular meetings. Because of budgetary limitations no comparison was made of professional service time received by the clients of the project and the control group.

Coordinating the efforts of ten public agencies did not have any measurable effect on the behavior of the clients whose cases were considered by the Associated Agencies. The experimental group did not show any gains in comparison to the control group in attendance, scholastic grades, conduct grades, or teacher ratings.

Communication among those professionals who were treating children in the project area was significantly better than communication in a control area. From observation at the case conferences, it would appear that the agencies followed up their assignments and made progress reports to the other participating agencies. The cases in the project did receive more interagency attention than the control group, but this finding does not suggest that clients consequently received more direct services. From our finding we may infer that more coordinated efforts were taking place in the project than in the control area.

Discussion

If the purpose of coordination was to bring about behavior change, there is no evidence that coordination achieved this end. It is reasonable to assume that the process of coordination is going to bring about a better informed professional worker who will be able to offer a higher quality of service to his clients. Although we were unable to obtain evidence on the quality of the service received by the clients of the project, we are aware that the service did not improve the behavior of the subjects.

Perhaps our findings suggest that coordination is a feasible process which is readily developed among agencies. We should consider that a coordination process may be best examined within the context of improving administrative procedures and not be viewed as part of a client's therapeutic process. If we hypothesize that services will help a client modify his behavior, we should test this hypothesis by offering variations in level of direct services. It is unreasonable to assume that changes in administrative procedures would be meaningful to a distressed client.

Observations

The hope that the Oakland Public Schools' and Associated Agencies' program would have a significant, permanent effect on young people was not fulfilled. However, the implementation of the many programs, with the large number of agencies participating, suggests that the community was making a sincere attempt to find solutions to youth problems. A learning process was going on in the community. What had been thought of as a broad comprehensive program was still too narrow and constricted to cope with the existing social problems. Although the schools developed new programs and techniques in an attempt to equalize opportunities for youth, only one aspect of growth was considered—formal education. The Associated Agencies was concerned with another narrow field, that of preventing anti-social behavior. But who was providing the children with decent housing, sufficient clothing, a wholesome diet, free and open spaces in which to play, and pride in himself and his family? Without these necessities how were the children to have the freedom to learn and grow?

In the Interagency Project the community agencies were working together, but the programs were still conceived and operated independently. Clients were considered only within the range of traditional services offered by the separate agencies. As an example, the schools did not feel the responsibility to deal with the problems of hunger, clothing, or housing. Even with the improved interagency relationships, the poor had to adjust to being sent to the next window for each problem. And at times they found that there was no next window. As the community tried new projects to solve its social problems, a learning process was taking place, so that the magnitude of the problem was becoming recognized, and the shortage of miracle cures was becoming evident.

In the next chapter we will observe how the community broadened the scope of the project by funding an employment program and a pre-trial release program. More resources were being committed to heads of households. The community was learning that the problems of youth and adults are interrelated. The disappointments of the first phase of the Ford grant were leading to more constructive social intervention.

6. The Second Phase

Within a month after the funding of the first phase of the Ford grant in March, 1962, the Committee of Executives began consideration of the second phase. In June, 1962 a public meeting, attended by more than 500 people, was held to discuss community problems and to arrive at some consensus on the needs of Oakland. In addition, there were numerous meetings of agency personnel during which priorities for funding new programs were discussed. Discussions concerning new programs continued for more than a year. The $750,000 of the second phase was identified in the original grant as a developmental fund.

The staff of the Ford Foundation did not take the same active role in the development of proposals for this grant as they had taken in the first phase. Although the Foundation retained the right to approve or disapprove individual proposals, they did not attempt to directly influence the community's study of proposals.

The intent of the Foundation appears to have been to encourage community initiative in exploring and developing new ideas. In order to expose professional and lay leaders to programs of social intervention which were going on in other communities, the Foundation made funds available for travel. Groups of Oakland officials and influential lay citizens made up the task forces designated to study projects in other communities.

The type of education acquired from the observation of on-going projects can be both beneficial and dangerous. The benefits are that members of a community are provided an opportunity to observe and learn about some of the social experimentation taking place throughout the nation. The dangers lie in the inferences which may be drawn by the task forces. One apparent inference drawn by the Oakland task force was that the Foundation approved of the programs which were visited and were gently suggesting that Oakland duplicate these demonstrations. Being exposed to the national scene had some disadvantages for the professionals who accompanied the task forces. They managed to learn the terminology of grant negotiators. The projects which were visited frequently became identified as "winners" and clever ideas for programs were classified as "sexy." Since the professionals in Oakland apparently needed to have sexy and winning programs, they began to design programs similar to the projects they had observed. We may question whether the travel sponsored by Ford broadened the outlook of the participants or if it stamped in a new pattern of conformity.

Consequently, the projects which were eventually submitted to the Project Operations Committee, a community workshop, and the Committee of Executives were adaptations of the projects that had been observed in other communities. The projects which were approved and sent to Ford for review appeared to provide needed services to the community, but they did not represent any new or startling approaches to dealing with the problems of Oakland.

Some of the discussion at the community workshops provided clues for future events. At a workshop in October, 1963 there was considerable discussion about directing a large part of the developmental funds into self-help projects. However, self-help programs did not have much prestige in 1963, and when the time came to consider proposals there was no structure available to develop or implement a self-help program.

The development of proposals and the process of approval for the second phase of the Ford grant involved a much broader segment of the community than the original grant. Proposals from many agencies were submitted and circulated among the OIP committees, agency personnel, city and county administrative staff, faculty members of the University of California, and organizations representing a wide variety of community interests such as labor unions, ethnic groups, and civil rights groups.

The presence of an OIP professional staff, and the experience which agencies had previously gained in coordinating their efforts, provided the necessary mechanism for involving a broad community representation. The major recommendations for priority of funding were developed at a workshop in January, 1964. The participants at this meeting were the Citizens Advisory Committee, the Committee of Executives, the Project Operations Committee, the Research Advisory Committee, and selected community leaders.

The priority for funding was determined by a popular vote. Only $750,000 was available and once the money was allocated for the more popular projects, the remainder of the list had little significance. The projects recommended for funding were: (1) Youth Opportunities, (2) Adult Employment, (3) Pre-Trial Release, and (4) Pre-School Instruction. The Committee of Executives and the Citizens Advisory Committee approved the recommendations, and the Ford Foundation funded the four projects. (See page 56.)

The funded proposals reflected a continuing interest in youth, but in this second phase grant a larger proportion of money was earmarked for an older age group. Shifting emphasis to an older age group was a difficult process. The advocates of services to adults were competing for the same funds that were being requested for children's pro-

PROGRAMS FINANCED
FROM DEVELOPMENTAL FUND
SECOND PHASE OF FORD FOUNDATION GRANT

Program	*Time Span Covered*	*Amount*
Youth Opportunities	3 Years	$301,248
Adult Minority Employment	3 Years	227,782
Pre-Trial Release	2 Years	101,350
Pre-School	2 Years	119,620
	TOTAL	$750,000

grams, and they were reluctant to accept the responsibility for depriving little children of needed help.

At the time of this writing, the data collection for these projects, funded in the second phase, has not been completed. Therefore, this review will be restricted to a description of the programs and preliminary observations regarding their effectiveness.

Adult Employment Project[29]

The Adult Employment Project was the first program in Oakland where Ford was a minor contributor and the Federal Government the major source of funds. However, the Ford support was vital because negotiations with the Department of Labor were prolonged by internal disagreements in Washington. This project would have been delayed many months if the resources provided by the Foundation had not been available.

The employment project was designed to "...reduce unemployment and underemployment of minority and other disadvantaged adult males, and as a result to strengthen the role of the head of the household and reinforce the male image in the family structure, in the minority community."[30]

Some of the activities planned for the project were:

"1. To conduct a skill inventory of the minority work force.
2. To provide specialized placement services adapted to the needs of the minority population.
3. To place eligible unemployed workers.
4. To upgrade underemployed workers.
5. To train minority and other disadvantaged workers under the Manpower Development and Training Act.
6. To maintain a program of education, information and job solicitation with em-

[29] Margaret S. Gordon, *Preliminary Review of Activities of the Oakland Adult Minority Group Employment Project, September, 1964 to January, 1966*, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley, (April 15, 1966). [Condensation of an interim report prepared by Dr. William B. Woodson, Director, Oakland Adult Project Follow-up Study.]

[30] *Application for a Demonstration Adult Training Program under the Manpower Development and Training Act*, California State Employment Service, Oakland, California, (January 20, 1964), p. 1.

ployers and unions, in order to increase the employment potential of minority group workers.

7. To open new doors for qualified minority workers."[31]

The first employment office for the project was opened in September, 1964, and two additional offices were opened shortly thereafter. The casual visitor entering the project offices observes a different operation from that of the California State Employment Service (CSES). The project offices give a great deal more time to the applicant and do not refer him from one specialist to another. The placement interviewer attempts to cope with the entire employment problem. There also appears to be a higher proportion of minority staff employed as interviewers. Another obvious difference between the project offices and the regular employment office is the ethnic composition of the clients. The project offices attract a predominantly Negro clientele, a sizable number of Mexican-Americans, and very few Caucasians.

A family caseworker from the Family Service Bureau is stationed in each of the project offices, and clients are referred by staff when they believe that a client's personal problems are a severe handicap to his employment. The most obvious difference between the project and regular CSES offices is the size. The smaller area, fewer workers, and fewer clients seem to provide a warmer and more personal atmosphere.

This project is operated by the California State Department of Employment with the support of an Adult Employment Advisory Committee composed of representatives of employers, organized labor, and minority group organizations. The responsibilities of this body have been vague from the outset. The committee's policy making powers for project activities have not been resolved. There is some question that the State Department of Employment could legally accept this committee as a policy making body, since policy for state agencies is determined by the Governor and State Legislature. Other basic issues such as the relationship between the Employment Committee and the OEDC have not been defined. The confusion about the charge and scope of activity for this committee has caused considerable conflict and may have limited its effectiveness.

Some of the areas on which there was general agreement for the committee to function was for employers to open new job opportunities and for union representatives to help gain admission to unions for minority group persons. At the committee meetings there appears to be considerable mutual criticism by labor and management that the other has failed in their assignment. The conflict in the committee appears to stem from the dearth of jobs which have been made available to the project applicants.

From September, 1964, through January, 1966, the project received 6,518 applications for jobs. Less than 12 percent of the applicants were placed on jobs which the employer indicated would last for three or more days.[32] To date, there has been no follow-up to verify that the jobs did, in fact, last more than three days or to determine the length of employment following placement.

Some of the population characteristics which distinguish the project offices from the CSES office are as follows: The project offices attract a much higher proportion of minority workers; the project offices' clients are approximately 90 percent minority groups while the CSES office clients are less than 40 percent minority groups; the project at-

31 *Ibid*, pp. 1-2.

32 Susan S. Sheffield and William B. Woodson, *Second Interim Report of the Oakland Adult Project Follow-up Study*, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley (December, 1966).

tracts a higher proportion of females, young people and people with a lower level of job skills.

The occupational category, sex, and the jobs started by those who use the project employment services were studied for May through July, 1965. (See Table 1, below.) An examination of Table 1 provides some additional perspective on the problems which face an applicant at the project offices. He may well face similar problems at other employment offices, but such information is not available at this time.

TABLE 1[33]

NEW JOBSEEKERS AND JOBS STARTED, BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY AND SEX
May-July, 1965

Sex and Occupational Category	New Jobseekers		Jobs Started Temporary + Permanent (3 or more days)	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Men				
Professional and managerial	41	8.4	2	1.1
Clerical and sales	57	11.7	12	6.9
Skilled	53	10.9	6	3.4
Services	97	19.9	23	13.1
Semi-skilled	118	23.8	59	33.7
Unskilled	114	23.4	73	41.7
Other	9	1.8	---	---
Total	487	100.0[a]	175	100.0[a]
Women				
Professional and managerial	38	8.9	1	2.3
Clerical and sales	144	30.4	21	47.7
Skilled	5	1.3	---	---
Services	193	40.7	16	36.4
Semi-skilled	42	8.9	4	9.1
Unskilled	48	10.1	2	4.6
Other	3	0.6	---	---
Total	474	100.0[a]	44	100.0[a]

33 Gordon, p. 13.
a Items may not add to totals because of rounding.

Thirty-one percent of the male applicants were categorized in the three highest employment skills. However, of those who were placed on jobs, only 11 percent were placed in these categories. Sixty-nine percent of the applicants were categorized in the lower skills; although 89 percent of the jobs started during the months studied were in these lower skill categories. Therefore, we may observe that the more highly skilled worker has less chance of being placed in a job appropriate to his skills than the worker with lower level skills.

Furthermore, a woman applicant has only a remote chance (less than one in ten) of being placed in a job. From further analysis of the employment data, we found that 75 percent of the jobs started are expected to last more than three days. Therefore, it is reasonable to estimate that, of the 474 women applicants described in Table 1, 33 were placed on jobs lasting more than three days. Since in the Negro community women are frequently the head of household and the major breadwinner, these findings have particular significance in a project serving a predominantly Negro clientele.

One of the objectives of the employmen project was to develop jobs. There was the hope that, by educating employers and union officials, members of minority groups could be placed on jobs formerly unavailable to them. In order to implement this program, two job development specialists were employed—one assigned to work with management, the other with labor. A study was made to determine the number of people hired on permanent jobs as a result of the activities of the job-specialists for the period April through July, 1965.[34] Their activities resulted in a total of thirteen people being hired during these four months. When we study these results, we may wish to re-examine the feasibility of developing jobs through the process of solicitation of labor and management.

Another goal of the project was to match people to the job market through training. A community is eligible to establish training classes under the Manpower Development and Training Act when there is the likelihood that people who are trained will be absorbed by the labor market. After the project was underway for five months, the first MDTA class was organized. There was difficulty in finding suitable facilities for training, and the approval process for establishing classes was lengthy and cumbersome. By January, 1966, 106 applicants had been trained. Fifty-seven had been trained as taxi drivers and forty-nine as ward maids. There has been no follow-up on how many of the trainees were placed on jobs or how many of these newly trained people continued in these occupations.

A follow-up of this first group of MDTA graduates merits study, since there is considerable information about the occupational instability of taxi drivers and the low hourly wages of ward maids. One purpose of training programs is to upgrade applicants. Therefore, the people who were trained in this project should be examined to determine if the training program was commensurate with their level of skill. There is the possibility that training job applicants in unstable and poorly paid occupations contributes to downgrading those with substantial potentiality.

Discussion

The intent of the Adult Employment Project was to provide special assistance to the minority community to help them compete in the job market. Terms such as "matching

34 Susan S. Sheffield and William B. Woodson, *Interim Report of the Oakland Adult Project Follow-up Study*, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley (June, 1966).

men to jobs" reflected the underlying thinking of the authors of the proposal. There was recognition that generations of deprivation and prejudice had excluded minority group persons from learning skills which would enable them to compete successfully in the labor market. There was the hope that providing minority persons with new skills so that they might enter an enlightened labor market would be a major step toward equalizing employment opportunities for those formerly rejected. However, if this was the hope, some facts were ignored.

At the time the proposal was written, most occupations had a labor surplus, not a shortage. Employers are in business to make profit, and after generations of deprivation, many of the progeny of poverty were no longer efficient producers. If we anticipated that the chronically unemployed could respond to new opportunities by immediately changing their attitudes, we were ignoring our knowledge of human behavior. The labor unions had men who were unemployed, and the first obligation of union administrators was to their membership. Union officials feared that newly trained minority workers would flood a saturated labor market, thereby threatening the livelihood of their membership.

When the minority population became aware of a new employment project, they came in large numbers for new employment opportunities. The project did not control the job market, and, as a result, the comparatively few jobs which were available within the project were the same less attractive jobs which historically were filled by minority group members. The MDTA-sponsored programs were so limited in variety, and available to so few people, that the effort at job upgrading should not have been expected to have any impact on employment patterns of minority group members of the labor force.

The employment project is still under study, but at this point it appears that the less desirable jobs in the community are directed to the project. If this is confirmed by further study, and since we presently have conclusive evidence that the clients of the project are predominantly minority group members, a serious de facto segregation system may have unwittingly been created. We may have developed a project for minority persons to get the jobs which have historically been designated appropriate for minority groups.

Youth Opportunities Project[35]

The original proposal for a Youth Opportunities Project had two goals:

"1. The development of in-school programs aimed at improving the holding power of the school and improving the preparation young people receive for entering the labor market; and

2. The establishment of Youth Opportunities Centers which would help *out of school*, out of work youth in the area move into full time employment."[36]

The two agencies which were to operate this program were the Oakland Public Schools, supported by Ford Foundation funds, and the California State Department of

---

35 Robert C. A. Moore, *Research Report on the Oakland Public Schools Youth Opportunities Project: The Experience of the First Year, 1964-65*, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, Berkeley (Spring, 1966).

36 F. B. Jeffrey, *Proposal for a Comprehensive Demonstration Program for Unemployed Youth and School Dropouts in Oakland, California*, Youth Opportunities Board of Alameda County (February 10, 1964), Introduction.

Employment, supported by Department of Labor funds. This proposal was funded by Ford in the spring of 1964. However, the Department of Labor funds were hopelessly enmeshed in Washington jurisdictional problems. Although notification was received from Washington that more than $900,000 was available for the project, and newspapers announced the funding,[37] the funds were not made available so that the employment phase could be implemented. Therefore, the project was limited to the in-school component which was directed at improving the holding power of the schools.

The modification changed the essence of the project. In the original proposal much attention was given to part-work, part-school programs which would have provided success experiences, training, and financial assistance to high school students who found the existing school curriculum unrewarding. The failure of the work opportunities program to materialize was a severe injury to the youth opportunity concept. The modified program was to provide "an intensive motivational counseling casework technique in reducing dropouts among selected dropout prone students."[38]

Two high schools were identified for the study. Dropout prone students who met the following criteria were selected: chronic truants, disciplinary problems, returned exemptions and suspensions, students receiving failing grades, self referrals, and young mothers. From this group students were selected at random for the experimental and control groups.

Some of the problems of undertaking a study within a community agency were clearly demonstrated by the behavior of the principal in one of the high schools. During the life of the project, he exercised administrative prerogatives by changing the composition of the experimental group by making experimental group assignments for students whom he thought needed intensive counseling. In addition, he assigned the project counselors other duties which were not related to the project. These actions limit the confidence with which we report the findings from this school.

One purpose of the modified project was to provide additional counseling services to the students in the experimental group. The project counselors attempted to contact their students as soon as they were assigned and inform the students that they had been contacted because of the probability of their dropping out of school. The students were informed of the nature of services they were to receive, that the counselor would be seeing them weekly for the rest of the year, and that the counselor was available on an as-needed basis. The number of counseling sessions held with each student is difficult to assess, because the counselors failed to record each of their interviews. This failure points out another difficulty in attempting to evaluate a project without sufficient research staff to monitor the program.

Another problem faced by this project was the failure to have a counselor training program so that each of the counselors and supportive staff had a clear understanding of their roles. For example, the work experience coordinator, assigned to these two schools to help students get jobs, interpreted his role as a leader of group counseling sessions. Although there is evidence that group counseling sessions were held, there is no evidence that he was able to place anyone on a job following these sessions.

The ethnic composition of the two high schools varied considerably. School A was less than 40% minority groups, while school B was almost exclusively Negro. In both schools the holding power for the experimental group was no greater than for the con-

37 San Francisco Examiner, June 11, 1964.

38 Moore, p. 3.

trol group. When subgroup comparisons were examined some interesting differences were found.

In school A the experimental group of twelfth grade boys had a significantly lower drop out rate than the control group. This finding may suggest that counseling is more effective when students are close to a goal. The girls in the experimental group in school A had a significantly higher drop out rate than the boys. This difference could be explained by the inclusion of a large number of pregnant girls in the experimental group. However, such inferences should be considered highly speculative in the absence of complete case records.

In school B there was no significant difference among the various subgroups. Although the control group dropout rate for boys was substantially lower than the rate for the experimental group, it was not significant. The improved holding power for control group students may be related to the actions of the principal who modified the study by selecting disturbed youngsters for the experimental group when he felt that intensive counseling services were needed.

Discussion

This Youth Opportunities Project is an example of a study which only remotely resembled the original design. A patched-up program was substituted to cope with a complex problem. The staff did not appear to understand their roles and there was not adequate research time allocated to monitor the program. The result was a serious deficiency of useful data to analyze the program. At this time we know only that a counseling program was undertaken and that the program did not appreciably improve the holding power for those subjects who participated.

The fact that twelfth grade boys in school A appeared to benefit from counseling should be interpreted cautiously. There is a possibility that students benefit from counseling when the counselor can point out rewards which will be available in the near future. Dropout prone students may be less able than better adjusted students to delay gratification of needs. Effectiveness of counseling may be directly related to the immediacy of the rewards. At the grades further removed from graduation, the student may need to be directed toward subgoals in order to have some immediate rewards.

It is difficult to guess what would have happened if a work program had been available to students so that they could have enjoyed immediate success experiences. It was not until the summer of 1965 that a youth work program (Neighborhood Youth Corps) came into existence. Does such a program increase the holding power of schools? Does counseling for dropout prone students help keep them in schools when associated with a work program? Do students see work as a success experience? These are some of the questions which we must consider before we know whether a counseling employment program is an answer to the problem of dropouts. Because of an unfortunate series of events we are unable to answer these questions from the results of this project.

Pre-Trial Release Project[39]

The problem of justice for the poor has been studied by many legal societies and associations in recent years. There have been national conferences on the subject, and

39 D. L. Kuykendall, *Oakland Pre-Trial Release Project, Research Report No. 4, A Mid-Project Summary of Research Findings*, (November 10, 1966).

the predominant opinion appears to be that the poor are less likely to have their rights protected than the people with substantial resources.

One of the more apparent problems, where financial resources are directly related to being in jail or out in the community, is the availability of funds for bail. The poor are less likely to be able to produce the fee for a bail bondsman and consequently must remain in jail pending trial. In addition, there is ample evidence that, in cases where people are charged with similar crimes, those who are unable to find money for bail are more likely to be found guilty.

The traditional system of producing money for bail clearly discriminates against the poor. For example: If a man has enough money to pay the full amount of his bail, he will be able to recover that full amount upon his appearance at trial. On the other hand, if a man does not have enough money to pay the full amount of bail, he must pay a fee (approximately 10 percent of the total bail) so that a bail bondsman can post a bond for him. This fee is not recovered by the client when he appears at trial.

The bail system, then, imposes particular hardship on the low-income individual. Because he is not wealthy enough to pay his full bail, he is penalized by having to pay the bail bondsman's fee. Frequently the fee itself is more than the low-income person can afford.

Because of the growing recognition that our laws do not serve the rich and poor equitably, pre-trial release programs were tried in the early 1960's in many parts of the country. The program which gained the greatest national recognition was the Manhattan Bail Project. In this project law students interviewed defendants in jail, with the exclusion of those arrested for certain categories of crime. On the basis of an objective scale they recommended persons to the court for release, or made no recommendation if the prisoner did not meet certain criteria. The criteria considered in the recommendation included job stability, marital status, length of residence, and previous history of bail forfeitures. The Manhattan Bail Project was considered a success. A report from a legal services task force from Oakland which went to New York to study this project reported, "Preliminary data from this project indicates that a system of pre-trial release, based on adequate investigation, can be utilized in a great number of cases with low risk of non-appearance."[40]

The committee which wrote the Oakland proposal for releasing prisoners charged with a misdemeanor was composed of representatives from the District Attorney's office, the Judiciary, the Probation Department, the Alameda County Bar Association, the University of California, the Oakland Police Department, and the Public Defender's office. The proposal was designed so that the Probation Department would receive sufficient funds to employ three probation officers who would, after investigation, recommend to a judge that the misdemeanants be released on their own recognizance (O.R.), or that they not be granted this form of pre-trial release. In addition, the Probation Department was to be available to recommend for release those persons charged with felonies whom a judge felt merited consideration for pre-trial release.

Although statutes were enacted in 1959 to enable a judge to release a defendant on his own recognizance, the judiciary seldom exercised this prerogative in the five succeeding years. Releases were not granted, partly because of a lack of facilities for investigating the defendant's suitability for release. Therefore, the proposal which was

40 *Proposal for Oakland Pre-Trial Release Project*, Oakland Interagency Project Legal Services Task Force (March 6, 1964), p. 5.

developed in 1964 was a means to enable judges to take advantage of the opportunity to release defendants on their own recognizance.

The Oakland proposal for pre-trial release suggested that the Probation Department operate the program; it was hoped that this pre-trial process would become part of a normal operation if the program was found to be successful.

The authors of the proposal found the implementation of this program considerably more difficult than they had anticipated. Although the proposal received approval from the Ford Foundation and substantial support from the representatives of the community who had the responsibility of recommending funding, the project faced a serious problem with the Board of Supervisors of Alameda County.

The Chairman of the Board of Supervisors had considerable support in his position that the Pre-Trial Release Program would release prisoners who would be free to continue to prey on women and children in the community. For two meetings the Board remained deadlocked on agreeing to accept funds for the program. The faction opposing this proposal remained immune to the arguments that persons charged with crimes who had money were free to roam the streets. The action of the Board was simply one to support the belief that those persons who attained a level of financial success were less likely to commit a crime pending trial than those who were financial failures. Or, if there is a presumption that most of those awaiting trial are guilty, then the Board felt more comfortable with successful criminals at large than the unsuccessful ones.

At the third meeting of the Board of Supervisors, a majority was finally persuaded to accept the money, and the program was implemented in September, 1964. Three experienced probation officers were assigned to the project, and they investigated applications of defendants for pre-trial release. The recommendations submitted by the officers to the court contained:

"1. Factual information pertaining to relevant background issues, (e.g. length of residence, employment history, arrest record) and
2. Specific recommendations for or against release."[41]

During the first eleven full months of operation the project received more than 1,800 applications for release without bail. Of these, 1,100 applications were processed. The remaining 700 were not completed because the applicant was ineligible due to the nature of the charge (felony, drunk driving, defaulting defendants, etc.), had bailed out, or had entered a guilty plea before the application was processed.

Although the processing of applications was more complex than arranging bail, the reports and recommendations were typically completed and submitted on the same day the application was received. However, there was an additional delay since a judge had to act on the recommendation before a defendant was released.

During the eleven month period, 315 defendants were released on their own recognizance following a report and recommendation by the project. In 285 cases release was due to a positive recommendation. Ninety-four percent of those defendants released following a positive recommendation proceeded through the process to trial without mishap. There were 17 cases in which the defendant either deliberately defaulted or was detained in jail elsewhere and unable to appear for trial. Thirty persons were released by a judge following a negative recommendation, and three of these defaulted on their pre-trial obligation.

41 Kuykendall, p. 1.

The six percent defaulting rate among those released after a positive recommendation is somewhat higher than other similar projects throughout the nation. However, the failure to define terminology and categories between projects makes comparisons at this preliminary stage in the project hazardous.

Discussion

The Pre-Trial Release Project was one of the more controversial demonstrations undertaken as part of the Ford Foundation grant. On the Board of Supervisors there was organized, outspoken opposition; and the bail bondsmen organized and aggressively lobbied against the project being implemented. However, there were other areas of difficulty. One of the municipal judges was unsympathetic to the project and typically rejected the recommendations of the probation officers for clients' release without bail.

The Chief Probation Officer of Alameda County reports to the Board of Supervisors, and was sensitive to some of the Board's hostility to the project. Since he has a large departmental budget to get approved by the Board every year, he did not wish to antagonize them by being aggressive in supporting or implementing the project. Therefore, when the project was implemented, the probation officers were advised to be extremely cautious in their recommendations.

In part, this caution did injury to the intent of the project, as an underlying theme was to equalize justice for the rich and poor. Since all the categories eligible for pretrial release had a fixed bail schedule, the defendant with finances to put up bond was released without a cautious study. The poor person, on the other hand, requesting release on his own recognizance, was required to undergo a character study prior to recommendation for release.

The fact that only 285 defendants who received a positive recommendation were released in eleven months raises serious questions about the efficiency of the project. If we consider that three probation officers worked 20 days a month for 11 months, we find that the project used 660 probation officer days. Therefore, it took more than two man-days to release one man. The large number of man-days investment per defendant did not bring outstanding results in reducing the percentage of defaulting defendants.

Other communities with a less cautious approach, such as neighboring Berkeley, assigned a police officer one hour a day to work on pre-trial release. The police officer made a comparatively superficial study of the applicant for pre-trial release, and informed the judge of his findings. The Berkeley municipal court and the police department developed a highly efficient system. Berkeley managed to release a much higher proportion of defendants while investing far less staff time. Although Oakland was more cautious than Berkeley, the additional caution did not have a salutory effect on the rate of defaulting, since Oakland's rate of defaulting was six percent compared to Berkeley's four percent.

After the first few months of the project in Oakland, it was apparent that the primary need for pre-trial services was for felonies. In this category of crime, bail was higher and there was less likelihood that poor people could raise the necessary funds. Therefore, there was greater probability that the person without financial resources, charged with a felony, had to remain in jail many weeks awaiting trial. The marginal worker placed in jail for an extended period of time may anticipate losing his job, and the community may anticipate another family becoming dependent on welfare support.

Early in 1966, the project began a pre-trial release program for persons charged

with felonies. We do not have sufficient information to determine if the same painful caution is being applied to the program for felonies, as was applied to the program for misdemeanors. We are several months away from knowing how the judges will respond to recommendations for release for those charged with felonies, or the percent of felony defendants who default.

There is a basic question of equal justice in pre-trial release still not answered by this project. Why is it necessary for the poor to be faced with two trials when charged with a crime? The first trial is to determine their worthiness for pre-trial release; the second trial is to determine their guilt or innocence. We may question the process of recommendation for pre-trial release and the judges' decisions. We do not know if pre-judgements are made as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant and the granting of release by O.R. is affected by these appraisals. The present pre-trial release program will help reduce the gap in the inequality of justice received by the poor and the wealthy. However, as long as a double standard for release exists based on the availability of money, this program is, at best, a hesitant movement in the direction of a corrective action.

Pre-School Program[42]

The Oakland Public Schools conducted a pre-school education program in three target area elementary schools during the school years 1964-65 and 1965-66. The 120 children who were enrolled were, for the most part, "volunteers" whose parents had responded to public announcements and fliers sent home from the schools. All of the applicants were to enter kindergarten the year following their participation in the program. The children were considerably below average in terms of their understanding of vocabulary as measured by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test.

The purpose of the program was to provide experiences within an enriched environment so that "disadvantaged" pre-school children would be better prepared for school experiences, thereby increasing the probability of success in the primary grades. The program was designed to recognize individual differences and to encourage maximum development of individual potential.

The curriculum was planned in detail. Children attended half-day sessions for four days each week; on the fifth day, the teachers devoted time to curriculum development, materials preparation, contacts with parents, and in-service work with teacher aides. There were three parent aides and one teacher in each classroom. Some of the regularly scheduled activities were:

1. Manipulative exercises to improve physical coordination,
2. Language development lessons, e.g. vocabulary enrichment, auditory and visual perception, language awareness, etc.,
3. Nutrition lessons,
4. Story groups,
5. Creative arts lessons.

The teachers attempted to broaden the children's experiences by providing films, field trips, classroom visitors, and other similar enrichment activities.

Parents were encouraged to become familiar with the program through adult education classes and through planned and informal classroom observations. The adult edu-

42 *Preliminary Report of Evaluation of Pre-School Program at Clawson, Cole and Stonehurst Schools—1964-65*, Oakland Public Schools Research Department, Report No. 12, (1966).

cation classes included presentations by special speakers, question and answer periods, and discussion groups. Some of the topics covered in these sessions were the purposes and activities of the program, child development, discipline, and how parents can help their children to succeed in school.

In an attempt to determine the impact of the program, the Research Department of the Oakland Public Schools randomly selected experimental and control groups from the pool of voluntary applicants for the program. The experimental group consisted of children who participated in the program; the control group was made up of children who did not.

The entire applicant population was pre-tested just prior to the beginning of the program in September, 1964. Post-testing took place 17 months later, in February, 1966, when the children had completed one semester of kindergarten. School psychometrists administered the following instruments on both occasions:

1. *Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test,* designed to measure a child's verbal intelligence.
2. *Perceptual Ability Forms Test,* designed to sample selected aspects of visual perception and motor skill development similar in nature to tasks included in many reading readiness tests.
3. *OPS Expressive Vocabulary Test,* locally constructed for this evaluation project since no satisfactory instrument covering these age levels was available.
4. *Vineland Social Maturity Scale,* a scaling system based on interview information obtained from a parent or guardian familiar with the growth and development of the subject.

Evaluation information is available only on the children who attended the 1964-65 program. By the middle of the kindergarten year following the program, there were slight differences in test score gains in favor of the experimental group children. Over the duration of the program, pre-school staff members reported significant growth in the areas of mental health, socialization, and communication. In addition, the parents of children who participated in the program indicated that they felt that the program had benefited their children in a variety of areas such as spoken language, relations with playmates, and self-confidence.

Discussion

The concept of pre-school education is currently experiencing great popularity locally and nationally. As pre-school education has gained in popularity, an enlarged halo has emerged and multiple virtues are ascribed to the effects of early school experience. The expansion of the Head Start program of the Office of Economic Opportunity is an example of the increased enthusiasm for pre-school programs. This commitment to pre-school opportunities seems to be based on a theory that intervention which takes place at a young age level will have a more profound effect on the individual than those experiences in later years. The lack of experimental evidence to support this thesis apparently has not hampered the growth in numbers of believers.

When we interpret the results of studies of pre-school programs which have been conducted in many communities, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the pre-school age is the most malleable or that we should expect more permanent changes as a result of intervention at that age. In the absence of powerful contravening evidence,

we should be most hesitant to hypothesize that intervention with pre-school children will bring about a greater modification of behavior than programs directed at older children.

In our previous review of the Oakland Public School programs, we pointed out the transitory nature of the gains children made as a result of special learning activities. In the Oakland pre-school study, we do not have information as to how much the children learned from the program's activities; it is clear that by the middle of the kindergarten year, the experimental group children were not significantly ahead of the control group children who had not had pre-school experience.

Considerably more experimentation must be conducted before we discover the contributions and limitations of pre-school education. Presently, pre-school programs are receiving substantial support by policy makers in Washington and local communities. Frequently, unrealistic goals are set for pre-school education programs. Policy makers, teachers and parents anticipate that such programs will bring about long-range academic success for the children who attend. There is the danger that these programs will be judged failures if the children make only modest gains. Consequently, policy makers may eliminate or cut back programs which are making a positive contribution but are not meeting unrealistic expectations. Therefore, it is necessary that we begin intensive evaluative studies so that we may obtain sufficient information to plan realistically for pre-school education. If we are able to arrive at a reasonable estimate of the contribution of these programs, perhaps our expectations and findings will have greater proximity.

Cyesis Program (Teen-Age Pregnant Girls)[43]

The Cyesis Program is the best example of a project which was developed as a result of the experience agencies had gained with the Oakland Interagency Project. A proposal for a teen-age pregnancies program did not have the priority to receive approval for funding as part of the second phase of the Ford grant. Under the leadership of the Oakland Public Schools, several community agencies who were determined to attempt a project for pregnant girls despite financial obstacles joined forces to undertake a pilot study.

In March, 1964, the first girls were admitted to the pilot program. Staff services were provided by the YWCA, the Oakland Recreation Department, the Alameda County Health Department, and the Oakland Public Schools. During the spring semester 16 girls went through the program with an average attendance of 12.

The sponsors of the pilot program hoped to determine whether a multi-agency project for teen-age pregnant girls was feasible, and to study the clients' reactions to such a program. The problem of teen-age pregnancy in Oakland is of substantial magnitude. The staff at the public schools estimates that more than 350 girls drop out each year because of pregnancy. Unless these girls receive special help there is little likelihood that they will receive adequate pre-natal care or instruction in maternal care. They will probably never have an opportunity to complete high school.

While the pilot program was under way, the Executive Committee of OIP approved the submission of a proposal for a cyesis project to the Rosenberg Foundation in San Francisco. This foundation approved the proposal for a two year funding, beginning in the fall of 1964. Therefore, when the project was implemented in the fall semester, there

43 John J. Carusone, *Cyesis Program*, Special Urban Educational Services, Oakland Public Schools (November, 1965).

was considerable experience which contributed to the efficiency with which the project was begun.

The project operated five days a week and had facilities at two recreation centers. Each girl who participated received 17 hours of academic instruction, three hours of health education and recreational activities, and two hours of group counseling per week. Seventy-two girls attended the centers during the school year 1964-65.

To evaluate the effectiveness of this project, a study was designed to compare the benefits received by the girls who attended the centers and those who received home instruction. Home instruction was the traditional method used to treat pregnant girls in Oakland prior to the special cyesis program. The evaluation effort was funded by the Ford Foundation. This project turned out to be not only a multi-agency project but also a multi-foundation study.

At some unidentified time, the original evaluative design was modified. The design which was initially presented for funding provided for a population of pregnant girls to be selected by a screening committee and then randomly assigned to group or home instruction. By the time the project became operational, the clinical judgment of the committee was substituted for random assignment of the girls for different types of treatment. Hence, the selective factors which are related to the clinical judgment of the committee prohibit a comparative study and permit only some observations of the effects of two different types of treatment on two different groups.

> "Fifty-six girls of the 72 girls assigned to the Centers in 1964-65 completed the program at the Centers. Fifty-one, or 91 percent of those completing the Center program, either graduated in the case of 12th graders...or returned to regular school in Oakland."[44]

The author of the Cyesis report made some comparisons of the effects of the center and home instruction programs.

> "Comparative data which can be used in attempting to gauge the possible effects of the Centers are available for home instruction cases in only two areas: the number known to have returned to regular school in Oakland, and the pre-post grades of a small number of returnees. Though the percentage of graduates and school returnees is slightly higher for Center girls than for girls on home instruction, it does not represent a statistically significant difference. Similarly, the difference in mean grade point average gain between the Center and home instruction cases compared was not found to be statistically significant. There is no evidence in this study to support the conclusion that Center attendance has had significantly more effect than home instruction or whether or not girls subsequently return to school or on grades in academic subjects in regular school."[45]

The author of this report wisely urged caution in the interpretation of his findings. This is another case where violence was done to an evaluative design. Consequently, we are unable to make an objective examination of the only multi-agency program to evolve from the Interagency Project.

---

44 John J. Carusone, *Cyesis Program*, Special Urban Educational Services, Oakland Public Schools, (October, 1966), p. 74.
45 *Ibid*, pp. 77-78.

Discussion

Although we are unable to determine the effectiveness of the program for pregnant girls from this study we were able to determine some of the characteristics associated with teen-age pregnancies. The incidence of reported pregnancies increased with grade, with the twelfth graders having the highest percentage. There was a higher incidence of pregnancy for those schools with a greater percentage of minority groups, which serve sections of the city with higher rates of unemployment and lower average income.

The attitudes of the girls in the center program were studied, and most of them wished to keep their babies. The attitude toward the baby grew more positive as the time for giving birth approached. For most girls the idea of adoption was repugnant. Although a social worker discussed this possibility with all the girls at the center, only two girls chose to place their babies for adoption.

> "Girls with below average grades in academic subjects have been represented with much greater frequency than girls with above average grades in academic subjects. The number of reported cases who have evidenced learning or behavior difficulties sufficient to result in the school making a referral to the Department of Individual Guidance can be estimated to be at least 50% of the total."[46]

In addition to the useful descriptive information we obtained in this study, had we retained the initial evaluative design, we presently would be in a better position to improve the effectiveness of the center program.

The Cyesis Program is a symbol of the attitude developed by agency personnel during the time that OIP was functioning. A problem was defined, and the community agencies were determined to try to find a solution. When Foundation funds were not readily available, these agencies scraped together their existing resources and determined to learn how to develop a treatment program. They hoped that somehow funds might be forthcoming. A pilot program was implemented because professionals in community agencies were able to mobilize to deal with a serious problem. The dedication of the professionals was rewarded when funds were made available.

The Cyesis Program was made operational with each agency carrying out its role efficiently. Operational problems were identified and resolved in the pilot stage. Therefore, when the time came to change into a full scale project, a framework of organization was available.

Observations of the Second Phase

(The Developmental Fund of $750,000)

In the process of planning, designing, and implementing programs for the second phase, the community was becoming less dependent upon the Ford Foundation. The community was learning how to examine its own resources for new strengths, to bring in diverse elements in the community to participate in social planning, and to search for financial support for new programs which were well beyond the Ford allocation to Oakland.

Some of the early symptoms of what was to eventually take place with the Oakland Economic Development Council became visible in the community meetings concerned

---

[46] *Ibid*, pp. 128-29.

with the Developmental Grant. Such groups as civil rights organizations, Mexican-American organizations, labor unions and religious groups become actively involved in discussing and determining priorities. Once involved, they continued as active critics of the Oakland Interagency Project. Although the formal approval process still rested with the Committee of Executives and the Citizens Advisory Committee, these committees were, in fact becoming rubber stamps for the community pressure groups.

The development of programs for the second phase was to provide the community organizations of Oakland with the experience of negotiating, bargaining, and working together toward compromise objectives. Therefore, when major Federal funds from the Office of Economic Opportunity were made available, and a community-wide structure was required to administer these funds, the transition was performed with a minimum of trauma.

From the experience gained in the first phase, the community had learned how to use Ford Foundation funds as planning money to attract Federal as well as other foundation funds. Although the programs which were funded were rather uninspired, they had to be developed within the framework of community agency policies, sensitive to the attitudes of the legislative bodies of city, county, and state government. Since, at the time of the development of second phase programs, the only agencies available to operate major social service programs were public agencies, the structural realities did not make any radical departures feasible.

Some of the modestly innovative changes suggested in the new programs had severe difficulty prior to implementation. The difficulty of the County Board of Supervisors to comprehend the injustice of the bail system for the poor; the difficulty of the California State Employment Service to accept the responsibility to aggressively search out jobs from employers; the difficulty of training institutions to modify their priorities sufficiently so that they would be able to develop training programs; the difficulty of the public schools to utilize their new manpower to seek jobs for high school students; the difficulty in the Department of Labor to resolve their internal disputes, thereby seriously delaying the Adult Employment Program and scuttling the Youth Opportunities Project, all contributed to preventing the second phase Ford grant from bringing about any substantial impact on potential clients.

This chapter concludes the description and evaluation of all the programs funded by the grant from the Ford Foundation in March of 1962.

On the basis of 1960 census information, the Castlemont area was identified as a "community in transition." The authors of the Ford proposal were concerned that this integrated residential area was in the process of becoming a Negro ghetto. Our next chapter discusses in depth the changes which took place in the Castlemont area during the period of the Interagency Project. From this analysis we are able to determine the effectiveness of the Interagency Project's attempts to arrest the ghettoization of Castlemont.

7. The Castlemont Survey*

Introduction

In February, March, and April of 1965, a major interview survey was undertaken in the Castlemont area as part of the research and evaluation program of the Interagency Project. Given the timing of the survey, three years after the inauguration of the Interagency Project and two years after its action programs had begun full operation, we recognized that the survey could not provide a direct measure of the project's effectiveness. Comparable data had not been collected before the start of the action program, and a second survey at its termination was not foreseen. Nevertheless, a major interview survey was deemed appropriate: (1) to provide an accurate portrait of the area in which the action program was taking place; (2) to measure demographic changes in the area since the 1960 U.S. Census; (3) to describe the kinds of problems currently facing residents of the Castlemont area; (4) to assess the residents' awareness and use of selected governmental services; and (5) to collect other information relevant to the evaluation of existing programs and the development of new ones.

*Prepared by William L. Nicholls II, Survey Research Center, University of California at Berkeley.

The Castlemont Survey, as it came to be known, was designed by the Survey Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley following extensive consultation with the staff of the Interagency Project and representatives of the various governmental agencies responsible for its action programs. The Survey Research Center also conducted the field work of the survey and undertook the analysis. Results of the survey have been separately released in a preliminary demographic report prepared in the summer of 1965 and in two final reports completed in the summer of 1966.[47] This chapter draws upon material collected by the survey to examine major changes within Castlemont since the 1960 Census, to describe its 1965 population emphasizing its demographic, ethnic, and economic characteristics, and to present evidence bearing on this area's future. Since the goals and action programs of the Interagency Project were partially based on an understanding of Castlemont obtained from the 1960 Census, this more recent picture of Castlemont provides a test of the continuing validity and relevance of these assumptions.

About the Survey

The geographical area encompassed by the Castlemont Survey is delineated by the map on page 75. It consisted of that portion of the Castlemont High School attendance area lying below (or southeast of) Mac Arthur Boulevard, its principal boundaries being Seminary Avenue, Mac Arthur Boulevard, the City of San Leandro, the Metropolitan International Airport, and San Leandro Bay. Although the original proposal to the Ford Foundation provisionally defined the geographical locale of the Interagency Project as the full Castlemont High School attendance area, few of its action programs extended above Mac Arthur Boulevard. For this reason the area above Mac Arthur was excluded from the survey. Although the name "Castlemont" is used for brevity, all statistics presented in this chapter refer only to the area delineated by the map, not to the full attendance area.

The map also serves to distinguish two major regions of Castlemont which will be referred to throughout the chapter. One corresponds to Target Area D of the officially designated target areas of Oakland's anti-poverty programs under the Office of Economic Opportunity. The other consists of the remainder of the study area falling outside of Target Area D. For brevity, these two regions are referred to in this chapter as "above" and "below" East 14th Street, the latter corresponding to Target Area D. These terms are used here merely as convenient labels and are *not* intended as precise geographical designations, for, as shown by the map, one part of Target Area D extends above this main artery.

A two-stage, self-weighting, probability sample of households was used.[48] First, 240 blocks were chosen by stratified sampling with probability proportionate to size, and then

---

47 This chapter closely parallels one of these final reports which was titled *The Castlemont Survey: A Summary of Results*. A companion report, *The Castlemont Survey: A Handbook of Survey Tables*, contains an extensive collection of detailed tabulations covering virtually all topics included in the survey and a thorough discussion of the survey methods. Both reports are publications of the Survey Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley and were prepared under the general direction of William L. Nicholls II. The preliminary demographic report referred to above was prepared by Esther S. Hochstim and was entitled "Castlemont Population — 1965."

48 Persons residing in group quarters, such as motels, hotels, and nursing homes were not included. In the 1960 U.S. Census, less than 0.5 percent of the population in the study area were living in group quarters.

approximately equal numbers of housing units were selected from each block. In total, 1,281 housing units were ultimately chosen, roughly one-sixteenth of those in the study area. In 1,098 of these, or 91 percent of the occupied units, at least a basic enumeration of household members was completed. Full interviews, averaging one hour in length, were obtained at 1,017 households, or 84 percent of the non-vacant units. A household interviewing approach was used. One person was interviewed at each household, typically the wife of the household head, and asked to provide information about each person living there. Negro households were contacted by Negro interviewers, and Spanish speaking interviewers were available to complete interviews with Mexican-American respondents who did not speak English. The field work of the survey lasted eleven weeks, extending from February to early April of 1965.

Housing

The selection of Castlemont as the site of the Interagency Project was in part based on the type and quality of its housing. Census figures for 1960 suggested that the housing stock consisted predominantly of single family homes, most of them owner occupied with the great majority remaining in good condition. Fully 95 percent were classified as "sound", rather than "deteriorating" or "dilapidated." There were, of course, some problem areas. Below East 14th Street only 88 percent of the units were "sound", but the preponderance of owner occupied, single family homes seemed to preclude the necessity for redevelopment and to impede the development of slum conditions.

The Castlemont Survey found that several changes had taken place in this housing stock by 1965. Two of these are illustrated in Figure 1. First, between 1960 and 1965, the total number of housing units increased 10 percent, from 20,150 to an estimated 22,170 units.[49] Second, almost all of this increase was attributable to the construction of new apartment buildings with three or more units. While the *number* of single family homes remained essentially unchanged between 1960 and 1965, proportionately they declined from 77 to 70 percent of the total units. Similarly, although the number of owner occupied units stayed about the same, the proportion of families owning their own homes declined from 64 to 58 percent. Should these trends continue, the reputation of Castlemont as an area of owner occupied, single family homes could well be changed.

Changes in Castlemont's housing stock may also result from continued high density occupancy. If more than one person per room is taken as the criterion of overcrowding, then approximately a seventh of Castlemont's homes, 14 percent, were overcrowded in 1965. Above East 14th Street, overcrowding was relatively rare. Only six percent of the occupied units had more than one person per room. Below East 14th Street, however, almost a fourth of the homes, 23 percent, were overcrowded by this standard, and the figure was up three percentage points from 1960. Almost 30 percent of the Negro and Mexican-American families in this region were living in homes with less than one room per person, and for Negro families with less than two years residence, the figure reaches a third. If this last group is taken as suggestive of future trends, overcrowding with its typically attendant deterioration of housing stock seems likely to become more common.

---

49 Figures compiled by the Oakland City Planning Department from building permits and similar records estimated the number of housing units in the same area as 22,371 as of July 1, 1965, approximately four months after the Castlemont Survey. The closeness of the two estimates lends credance to other population totals estimated from this survey.

CASTLEMONT STUDY AREA



FIGURE 1

Housing Units by Number of Units in Structure, 1960 and 1965



Gross Population Trends

Given the increase in Castlemont's housing stock, it is not surprising to find a similar increase in its population. Between 1960 and 1965, Castlemont's population rose 9.6 percent, from 62,133 to an estimated 68,100. The increase in this five-year period exceeded that in the previous ten years, where only a 3.7 percent rise was recorded. Thus, not only is Castlemont's population growing, its rate of growth appears to be increasing.

Castlemont's most significant population trend, however, is its continuing racial transition. As shown in Figure 2, only five percent of its population was non-white in 1950. By 1960, the proportion increased to a third. By 1965, the majority of Castlemont's residents were non-white, Negroes alone accounting for 50 percent of the population. Should the trend continue to the end of the decade, by 1970 Castlemont's population would be at least two-thirds non-white. This, however, is not a prediction, for there appear to be countervailing trends which are discussed below.

Castlemont's growth and racial transition has not proceeded evenly in each of its two main regions. As shown in Figure 3, most of its population growth has occurred below East 14th Street, that is in Target Area D, where a 15 percent Increase in population

FIGURE 2

Population by Color, 1950, 1960, and 1965



was recorded between 1960 and 1965. Above East 14th Street, the increase was only four percent. The racial transition also has reached different stages in these two regions. Between 1960 and 1965, the region above East 14th Street changed from roughly an eighth to a third non-white while the region below East 14th changed from roughly half non-white to more than two-thirds. More exact proportions are given in Figure 3.

Since information on Castlemont's population is available only from the 1960 Census and the 1965 survey, the standing of its racial composition at each year during this period is unknown. However, some indication of more recent trends may be gained by examining the racial composition of persons known from the survey to have moved into their homes in the previous year or two. Not all of these people were new to Castlemont; some had merely changed their homes within it. But if the racial transition was rapidly accelerating, one would expect to find relatively few whites among them.

This was not the case. Forty percent of the persons who had moved into their homes 12 to 23 months before the survey were white, and of those who had moved in most recently, in the year before the survey, an even larger proportion were white, 43 percent. This suggests that the racial transition is slowing, at least temporarily.

unlikely to reverse or stabilize Castlemont's racial transition, it does appear to be retarding it.

The Present Population

The distinction between white and non-white populations is a crude one, primarily useful for reporting broad trends. A meaningful description of Castlemont's present population requires a more detailed ethnic breakdown which takes account of important sub-groups within each broad color grouping.

A closer look at the non-white population finds that it was approximately 95 percent Negro both in 1960 and in 1965. The remaining five percent was almost evenly divided between Orientals, that is persons of Chinese, Japanese, or Korean ancestry, and members of other non-white races, such as American Indians, and Polynesians. Within the white population, Mexican-Americans are the most discernable sub-group. In 1965, they formed approximately one-eighth of Castlemont's white population. While comparable figures are not available for 1960, it seems likely that the proportion of Mexican-Americans within Castlemont increased during this five year period.

A breakdown of Castlemont's ethnic composition by region is presented in Table 1. In this table, and in the text which follows, the term *white*, italicized, is used to designate that portion of the white population which was not Mexican-American. Using this convention, we may note that above East 14th Street, 63 percent of the population were *white*, while below East 14th Street, the figure was only 24 percent. More than three-fourths of the people in Target Area D, therefore, were members of racial or ethnic minority groups.

The age compositions of the *white* and Negro populations of Castlemont are presented in Figure 4 as a race-age pyramid. In the remainder of this chapter, attention will be focused primarily on these two ethnic groups with occasional reference made to the Mexican-American population as a distinct group. Too few Orientals and other non-whites were included in the survey to attempt a description of their characteristics from sample results. Even statements made about the Mexican-Americans must be regarded as merely suggestive, since full interviews were taken at only 47 Mexican-American households. It is important, however, to consider them separately, since in many respects, such as median age, the Mexican-Americans more closely resemble the Negro population in Castlemont than the *white*.

As shown in Figure 4, the *white* population of Castlemont is a relatively old one. Its median age was 37.6 years, and approximately a quarter of the *white* residents were at least 60 years of age. By contrast, the Negro population is a very young one. Its median age was less than half that of the *white* population, 18.5 years, implying that almost half the Negroes were young children or of school age. As suggested above, the age composition of the Mexican-American population was similar to that of the Negro population with a median age of 19.3 years.

These differences in age composition have important implications for the potential growth of the respective populations. The growth of the *white* population is limited by its age, and it may actually decrease in the future due to the dying off of its older residents. At the same time, the Negro and Mexican-American populations seem likely to increase as the younger children move into adulthood and begin to have children themselves. Thus, even without any further movement in and out of the area, Castlemont's racial and ethnic transition would be likely to continue.

TABLE 1

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION BY REGION, 1965

Ethnicity	Total Castlemont		Above East 14th Street		Below East 14th Stree.	
	Number[a]	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
White	27,800	40.9%	18,800	62.6%	9,000	23.7%
Mexican American	4,200	6.1	1,900	6.2	2,300	6.1
Negro	34,400	50.5	8,500	28.6	25,900	68.0
Oriental	900	1.3	400	1.3	500	1.2
Other non-white	800	1.2	400	1.3	400	1.0
Total	68,100	100.0%	30,000	100.0%	38,100	100.0%

[a]Numbers have been rounded to the nearest 100 to emphasize that they are population estimates.

FIGURE 4



[a] Does not include Mexican Americans.

As would be expected, their differences in age composition are reflected in differences in household size. Young populations tend to be composed of younger adults and their minor children, while older populations tend to be composed of older couples whose children have left home and of widows and others living alone. The median size of the *white* households in Castlemont was 2.1 persons, and only 32 percent contained school children or pre-schoolers. By contrast, the median size of the Negro household was 3.7 persons, and 70 percent contained school children or pre-schoolers. Mexican-American households tended to be slightly larger, with a median size of 3.9 persons.

Before turning to a consideration of Castlemont's employment picture, one additional household characteristic should be mentioned to overcome a common stereotype of the Negro family. Fully 81 percent of the Negro households were headed by men. This is approximately the same proportion as found for Mexican-American households and larger than the proportion of *white* households with a male head, 76 percent. Moreover, 79 percent of the Negro women between 25 and 64 were found to be married and living with their spouses, which compares favorably with the corresponding figure of 76 percent for *white* women of the same age range. This is only one respect in which Castlemont's Negro families depart from commonly held stereotypes about the urban Negro.

The Employment Picture

In discussing employment in Castlemont, we will be concerned only with adults, persons 14 and over no longer attending junior or senior high school. Of these adults, 83 percent of the men and 38 percent of the women were in the labor force, that is they were either employed or unemployed and looking for work at the time of the survey.

To understand the types of jobs most Castlemont residents held or were seeking, it is necessary to briefly review their educational backgrounds. Slightly more than half the adult labor force, 52 percent, had completed high school and an additional 26 percent had at least some high school training. Here, at least among the men, the *whites* enjoyed an advantage. Fifty-five percent of the *white* men in the labor force were high school graduates as opposed to 46 percent of the Negro men and only 29 percent of the Mexican-American men. These differences may help to explain the somewhat differing kinds of jobs they typically held. However, among the women, an equal proportion of *white* and Negro labor force participants were high school graduates, 58 percent.

In the original proposal to the Ford Foundation, it was suggested that while the new Negro residents of Castlemont vary in socioeconomic status, "no great social distance, apart from color, separates the incoming Negroes from the whites they are replacing." If the remaining *whites* are taken as the basis of comparison then the statement is more or less true depending on the criterion of socio-economic status used. Income is considered later, but at least in the types of occupations they typically held, the *white* and Negro populations of Castlemont did differ.

As shown in Figure 5, almost two-thirds of the *white* men were employed in white collar occupations or as skilled craftsmen. By contrast, the majority of the Negro men were employed as machine operators, service workers, or laborers. Only 40 percent had white collar jobs or were in skilled trades. A similar pattern existed among the women. Fully 69 percent of the *white* women were in white collar occupations or skilled trades as opposed to only 34 percent of the Negro women. This, despite the fact reported

FIGURE 5

Occupation of Employed Persons by Sex and Race, 1965
Whites and Negroes Only



[a] Does not include Mexican Americans.
[b] Excludes private household workers considered with laborer below.

above, that at least in formal educational attainment there was little difference between the *white* and Negro women.

The pattern is a common one, found in many other communities. It does suggest, contrary to the assumptions of the original proposal to the Ford Foundation, that the *white* and Negro residents do differ somewhat in their socio-economic status, at least as measured by occupational prestige. The Negroes of Castlemont tend to hold what are typically regarded as the less desirable jobs.

The unemployment picture, found at the time of the survey, is summarized in Table 2. The rates presented there are not strictly comparable to those of the 1960 U.S. Census since they apply only to the adult population.[50] Nevertheless, a remarkable correspond-

[50] The Census figures include school children if they are 14 years of age or older. The questions used to ascertain employment and unemployment in the Castlemont Survey also differed from those of the Census.

TABLE 2

UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY RACE, SEX, AND REGION, 1965

Region and Race	Percent of Adult Labor Force Unemployed		
	Both Sexes	Men	Women
Total Castlemont			
All races	9%	9%	8%
Whites	7%	8%	6%
Negroes	10%	9%	11%
Above East 14th Street			
All races	6%	7%	6%
Whites	5%	5%	5%
Negroes	7%	7%	a
Below East 14th Street			
All races	11%	11%	11%
Whites	13%	15%	a
Negroes	11%	10%	12%

[a]Rate not given because the sample base was less than 100.

ence is found with the situation in 1960. At each time, the overall unemployment rate in Castlemont was nine percent of the labor force, and the rate was found to be six percent above East 14th Street and 11 percent below East 14th Street. It would seem that the general picture has not greatly changed in the last five years.

As would be expected, unemployment was more common among the Negroes than among the *whites*, at least for Castlemont as a whole. The difference, however, was not great, 10 percent of the Negroes in the labor force were unemployed as compared with seven percent of the *whites*. Although it is not shown in the Table, the unemployment rate for Mexican-Americans seemed to be higher, about 15 percent, but the figure is not wholly reliable since relatively few Mexican-Americans were included in the survey.

A closer look at the figures reveals that the higher unemployment rate for Negroes is largely attributable to the women. Eleven percent of the Negro women were unemployed as opposed to six percent of the *white* women. For men, the overall unemployment rates were about the same, nine percent for Negroes and eight percent for *whites*. This similarity in the men's overall unemployment rates, however, masks differences which appear when the two regions of Castlemont are examined separately. Above East 14th Street, there was a slightly higher rate of unemployment for Negro men than for *white* men, seven per cent as opposed to five percent. Below East 14th Street, the situation was reversed. Here 10 percent of the Negro men were unemployed as contrasted with 15 percent of the *white* men. This is but one of several indications which suggest that the white population residing in this predominantly Negro area is an especially distressed group, economically.

As is common throughout the United States, unemployment in Castlemont is most prevalent among the young, reaching an estimated 19 percent of the labor force under 25. Of the Negro men under 25 included in the survey, about a third were unemployed, but this cannot be offered as a reliable rate since it is based on too few cases. Unemployment also was more common among persons with less than a high school education. Eleven percent of this group were unemployed as opposed to eight percent of the high school graduates and five percent of those with at least some college.

To avoid painting too depressing a picture, it should be noted that only half the unemployed were heads of households. Of the household heads in the labor force, only seven percent were unemployed as opposed to 12 percent of the potential secondary earners in the household. The impact here is felt most by the Negro households. While the unemployment rate both for *white* and Negro household heads was six percent (and an estimated 11 percent for Mexican-American household heads), for potential secondary earners it was nine percent for *whites* but 16 percent for Negroes. These figures have been cited, in part, to overcome the overdrawn stereotype, which certainly does not apply to Castlemont, of a large proportion of the Negro families having an unemployed head.

Income and Poverty

In one respect, the unemployment statistics on household heads may have brightened the picture too much, for only persons who are in the labor force enter into the unemployment rate. The disabled who are unable to work, the destitute supported by welfare, and the retired living on meager incomes do not appear in unemployment statistics but comprise a major portion of the poor. When the incomes of Castlemont residents are examined in Table 3, it must be recognized that many of the households were headed by persons who were out of the labor force.

TABLE 3

HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 1964, BY RACE*

Household Income	All Households		White Households		Negro Households	
	%	Cum. %	%	Cum. %	%	Cum. %
Under $1,000	2%	2%	3%	3%	1%	1%
$ 1,000 - $ 1,999	9	11	11	14	7	8
$ 2,000 - $ 2,999	8	19	9	23	7	15
$ 3,000 - $ 3,999	11	30	12	35	9	24
$ 4,000 - $ 4,999	10	40	11	46	9	33
$ 5,000 - $ 5,999	13	53	11	57	14	47
$ 6,000 - $ 7,999	19	72	15	72	24	71
$ 8,000 - $ 9,999	14	86	13	85	15	86
$10,000 - $14,999	12	98	13	98	12	98
$15,000 and over	2	100	2	100	2	100
Median	$5,828		$5,415		$6,240	

* This table excludes 7 percent of the households for whom no income figures could be obtained.

Taking Castlemont as a whole, the median household income for the 1964 calendar year was approximately $5,800.[51] Almost a third of the households had incomes below $4,000, but more than a fourth had incomes of $8,000, or more. Approximately a seventh had incomes of at least $10,000, indicating that Castlemont contains many households with substantial incomes. The higher income households tended to be concentrated above East 14th Street, where a median income of approximately $6,200 was found. Below East 14th Street, Target Area D of Oakland's anti-poverty program, the figure was only $5,500.

As shown in Table 3, Castlemont's Negro households tended to have higher incomes than the *white*, with median income figures of $6,200 and $5,400, respectively. In part, this is attributable to the unusually low incomes of the *white* population living below East 14th Street. While some *white* households in this region had substantial incomes, the median was only $4,200. Not only was this $1,700 below the median income of Negro households in the same region, but even lower than the median income of Castlemont's Mexican-American households, $5,600. It has already been suggested that the *white* population living in the predominantly Negro area below East 14th Street is an extremely distressed group economically, and the income figures demonstrate it.

Even above East 14th Street, however, the median income of the *white* households was less than that of Negro, $5,900 as compared with $6,900. This is partially explained by the larger number of Negroes per household who were employed. Taking Castlemont as a whole, the Negro households had a mean of 1.23 employed persons per household as opposed to a mean of only .95 for the *white* households. Perhaps even more important, only 61 percent of the *white* household heads were employed as contrasted with 80 percent of the Negro household heads. The difference is largely explained by the larger proportion of *white* household heads who were retired or widowed housewives.

When only households with employed heads are considered, the median income of the *whites* is slightly greater than that of the Negroes, $7,200 as compared to $6,900. However, the median income of the remaining *white* households was very low, only $2,900, and this group made up more than a third of the *white* households. The figure for Negro households without an employed head was similar, $3,200, but there were a smaller proportion of such households among the Negroes.

Simple household income, however, may be a very poor indicator of economic distress, for it fails to take household size into account. Thus while an income of $5,000 may be adequate to support a widow living alone, it is wholly inadequate to provide for a growing family of seven. For this reason, households were classified as "poverty" or "non-poverty" depending on their income and size. The income limits were set at $3,000 for a household of one or two, $4,000 for a household of three or four, $5,000 for a household of five or six, and $6,000 for a household of seven or more.

As shown in Figure 6, 29 percent of Castlemont's households were at the poverty

---

[51] For those who are unfamiliar with the term, a household is defined as all persons residing in the same housing unit, that is a house, apartment, or similar unit designed as separate living quarters. Of Castlemont's households, 83 percent consisted solely of families, that is two or more persons all related by blood, marriage, or adoption; 14 percent were single individuals living alone; and 3 percent contained unrelated persons, such as a family and a boarder or two persons sharing an apartment as partners.

FIGURE 6

Proportion of Households at the Poverty Level by Region and Race, 1965



[a] Does not include Mexican American households.

level by these criteria in 1965.[52] As would be expected, poverty was more common below East 14th Street, where more than a third of the households met the definition. Even above East 14th Street, however, more than a fifth of the households apparently were living in poverty, implying that poverty is not confined to the target areas of Oakland's anti-poverty program.

---

52 The figures given are based on the number of households wnere the household income was known. Since almost half the households where income was not obtained were headed by persons 65 and over, the type of households where poverty was most common, the figures may represent under-estimates. At the same time, it should be noted that the income criteria employed here were somewhat more liberal than the now conventional criteria that define poverty by a base income of $2,500 for a single person household plus $500 for each additional person up to a limit of $8,000. These criteria could not be applied in the Castlemont Survey because income was not obtained in $500 increments. It is estimated that the methods employed increased the overall percent at the poverty level, approximately three percentage points over that which would have been found by the more conventional criteria.

Taking Castlemont as a whole, the proportion of *white* and Negro households at the poverty level was approximately the same, 29 percent and 28 percent, respectively. Within each of Castlemont's two regions, however, a larger proportion of *white* than Negro households were found to be poor. The apparent contradiction with the total is readily explained by the relative size of the four groups and need not concern us here. The figures do demonstrate, however, that the Negro families moving into the predominantly *white* area above East 14th Street are a relatively affluent group, while the *whites* remaining in the predominantly Negro area below East 14th Street are indeed an especially distressed one. As shown in Figure 6, fully 43 percent of the *white* households in this region were poor by the definition adopted.

Looking at the situation from another perspective, 50 percent of the poverty level households were *white*, 43 percent were Negro, five percent were Mexican-American, and 2 per cent were non-whites other than Negroes. Since it may appear surprising that a larger number of *white* than Negro households were found to be poor, it should be hastily added that the Negro households contained on the average more than twice as many people as the *white* households. The median size of the *white* poverty level households was only 1.8 persons as compared with 4.1 persons in the Negro poverty level households. In terms of people rather than households, therefore, the Negro poor outnumbered the *white* poor. Nevertheless, the identification of a sizable *white* poor population in Castlemont should not be overlooked, especially since most of the Interagency Project's action programs appear to have been aimed primarily at the Negro population.

The *white* and Negro poor differ in a number of respects aside from their typical household size. The *white* poor was primarily an aged poor, with 56 percent of their household heads 65 and over and fully 78 percent at least 45. Less than a third of the *white* poor households contained children. By contrast, the Negro poor was primarily a young poor. Fully two-thirds of its household heads were under 45, and almost three-fourths of the Negro poor households contained children, the majority having at least two.

If it is asked how poor are the poor, then the Castlemont Survey can provide few answers apart from possessions. Ninety-four percent had a television set, 80 percent had a telephone, 70 percent had a washing machine in their home, and 50 percent owned a car. Most of these possessions, however, have become almost as standard in American homes as indoor plumbing, and car ownership may be essential for finding and holding a job. Perhaps more to the point, 54 percent of the white poor and 41 percent of the Negro poor owned their own homes. According to reports they made of their own economic circumstances, 11 percent said they were well off, 59 percent said they just managed to get by on their incomes, and 30 percent said they went without necessities. These descriptions, however, may have represented exaggerations either of the magnitude of their economic difficulties or of their success in coping with them.

The Newcomers

The original proposal to the Ford Foundation cited the "newcomer" to Castlemont as a special target of the action programs. Unfortunately, the action agencies never reached consensus on a definition of the term, and it can be taken to mean persons who are new to their homes, new to Castlemont, new to Oakland, or new to the Bay Area, or it may simply serve as a euphemism for Negro.

Only the Alameda County Health Department attempted an operational definition of the term "newcomer", and they defined it as a person who had newly moved into

his residence. This definition is a reasonable one from an operational and administrative viewpoint, for newcomers so defined are relatively easy to identify and contact. It makes less sense conceptually, since persons who move generally move only a short distance. Newcomers so defined, therefore, are not necessarily new to Oakland and may be as familiar with its public services as those who have remained in the same home for a longer time.

If anyone who moved into a residence within Castlemont in the two years before the survey is defined as a newcomer, (two years corresponding to the period during which the Interagency Project was in full operation), then 38 percent of Castlemont's adult residents qualify as newcomers. Of these, fully 70 percent had moved from another address in Oakland, and possibly within Castlemont, and an additional 15 percent had moved from elsewhere in Alameda County. Two-thirds had been living in Alameda County five years earlier. While this might suggest that canvassing people who had newly moved into their homes is an inefficient method of locating persons who are truly new to the area, it should be pointed out that there is no ready alternative. It simply must be recognized that the process of locating truly new residents is a difficult one.

The newcomer, defined by length of residence, also makes a poor euphemism for Negro, or at least an imprecise one. Taking Castlemont as a whole, 41 percent of the adults with less than two years residence in their homes were *white*, and an additional five percent were Mexican-Americans. Only 51 percent were Negro, the remaining three percent being other non-whites.

The newcomer population did contain a disproportionate number of economically distressed households, at least below East 14th Street, and on those grounds it could serve as a convenient target for action programs. In this region, 43 percent of the newcomer households were poverty level as compared with 29 percent of the households who had been living in their homes for two years or more. This, of course, is another indication that the region below East 14th Street is losing its viability as a stable working class residential area and may be moving closer to the status of a slum. It should not be presumed, however, that all the newcomer poor in this region were Negroes, for 30 percent were *white*.

Above East 14th Street, newcomer status was not an indicator of economic distress for either race. Here the newcomers were quite similar to the longer term residents both in their median incomes and in the proportion at the poverty level. Thus, once again a somewhat different situation obtains in the two regions. Here it remains true that the new population is not greatly different from the old, at least as of 1965, while this is no longer the case below East 14th Street.

Integration and Plans to Move

While some small sections of Castlemont remain almost wholly *white* or are wholly Negro, most Castlemont residents live quite close to at least some members of the other race. When questioned about this during the survey, 85 percent of the household respondents reported that both *whites* and Negroes lived on their block, and an additional 11 percent said both races lived within two blocks of their home. All but a very small proportion of Castlemont's population, therefore, have experienced some degree of residential integration. The question may be raised as to how it is working out.

While there are social contacts between the *white* and Negro residents, the contacts

appear to occur principally among the children. Fully 78 percent of the respondents, who it will be recalled were primarily housewives, reported that the *white* and Negro children played together. Among the adults fewer contacts were occurring. In total, only 24 percent of the respondents said that social contacts occurred between adult *whites* and Negroes in their neighborhoods, but the picture looked somewhat different from the two sides. While 35 percent of the Negroes said there were social contacts between the races, only 15 percent of the *whites* agreed.

The *white* and Negro respondents also disagreed in their opinions of the success of the pattern of residential integration generally. When asked: "On the whole, how is it having both whites and Negroes living in the same block (neighborhood)?", 70 percent of the Negroes but only 29 percent of the *whites* said it was working out "very well." Half the *whites* answered with the lukewarm response that it was working out "fairly well," and 15 percent said "there are problems." The remaining six percent said they didn't know or wouldn't answer. Somewhat surprising, it was the older *whites*, those over 65 years of age, who were most likely to say "very well," while the younger *whites*, especially those between 25 and 44, were most likely to point to problems.

An additional question probing the stability of the pattern of residential integration was asked after the respondents were queried about possible plans to move. They were asked: "Would you prefer a neighborhood that was all one race, one with both whites and Negroes, or wouldn't it matter to you?" About half the *whites* and the same proportion of Negroes took the last alternative, saying it didn't matter. However, of the *whites* who expressed a preference, as shown in Figure 7, the great majority said they would prefer a neighborhood that was all one race, i.e. white, while the great majority of the Negroes who expressed a preference said they would prefer a neighborhood with both whites and Negroes.

Before too much motivational force is attributed to these preferences, it should be emphasized that approximately the same proportion of *whites* and Negroes, 24 and 23 percent, said they would move in the next two years. The primary impetus to move, moreover, appeared to be not dissatisfaction with the neighborhood or its racial composition but housing needs and preferences. The large proportions saying that the racial composition of the neighborhood wouldn't matter in choosing a new home probably should be interpreted in this light. It suggests what was meant was that other things, such as the type of home or financial considerations, were too important for them to be much concerned with neighborhood racial composition.

Nevertheless, the preference on the part of many *whites* for an all-white neighborhood undoubtedly will be realized in some cases, probably by the wealthier and younger *white* families who can best afford to move, and this is yet another pressure likely to continue the racial transition. For example, those *whites* who said they would prefer an all-white neighborhood were somewhat more likely to be planning to move than those who did not express such a preference. The difference was not great, 27 percent as opposed to 20 percent, for the *white* population as a whole, which hardly suggests an imminent mass exodus. Nevertheless, the pressures are still there and they seem to be somewhat stronger in the generally more mobile, younger *white* families.

FIGURE 7

Neighborhood Racial Composition Preferred by Race and Region, 1965



[a] Does not include Mexican American respondents.

Summary and Conclusions

Since the body of this chapter has examined the individual assumptions made in framing the Interagency Project, this final section will be devoted to summarizing Castlemont's basic trends and bringing together other information bearing on its likely future. For this task, it is convenient to consider Castlemont's two main regions separately, for in many respects they constitute two quite different social areas.

The region below East 14th Street, Target Area D, will be considered first. Perhaps the primary fact about this region is that it is already well along toward a full racial transition. Castlemont was selected as the site of the first of the Ford Foundation's Gray Area Projects in part because it had a racially heterogenous population but had not become overwhelmingly non-white as was the case in other parts of Oakland. Yet, only three years after the start of the Interagency Project, approximately one-half of Castlemont was rapidly approaching the same status. By 1965, three-quarters of the population residing below East 14th Street were either non-white or Mexican-American, and Negroes comprised more than two-thirds of all its inhabitants.

This in itself would not necessarily portend an unpromising future for this area, if the new residents were in fact little different from those who had left, but the evidence suggests that they are not. While many of its households are still solid lower middle and working class families, the area appears to be attracting more impoverished families with their patterns of dependency and broken homes, or at least absorbing them from other areas of Oakland. Some *white* families remain and others are still moving in, but in many respects they appear to be in even greater economic distress than their Negro neighbors. The area appears to be moving toward the status of a Negro ghetto, but to apply the term at this time would do an injustice to the majority of its residents who are not living in poverty and whose households generally do not fit the stereotype of the distressed, urban Negro family.

The housing of this region, as in the remainder of Castlemont, remains one of its strongest points, but there are signs that in this too, problems are increasing. Household size has been growing, especially in the Negro families, with the result that increasing numbers of housing units are now overcrowded and more likely to deteriorate. The *white* families are less crowded, but many are so poor, especially the older *whites,* that their residences may deteriorate from lack of resources to adequately maintain them. While all this may present too discouraging a picture, there appear to be more portents of an unpromising future for this region than of a promising one.

Above East 14th Street, the picture is certainly much more encouraging. Although the area has moved an eighth to a third non-white in the past five years, no serious signs of deterioration were found. The housing apparently remains basically sound and there is little overcrowding. New residents in the area are still predominantly *white*, and more importantly, neither the *white* nor the Negro newcomers appear to be any less solvent or stable than the older residents. The main problem of poverty in this region consists of older white households, most of them retired couples or widows, living on relatively meager incomes and thus, perhaps less able to keep up their properties.

While the situation is basically a healthy one at present, it seems almost inevitable that the pattern will repeat itself here too unless massive social intervention, perhaps at a scale not yet imaginable, is undertaken. The newer *white* population is tending to locate itself in rented apartments and thus is less committed to the area than the newer Negro population which is moving into the single family homes. The Negro families also are younger and have a greater growth potential. This is reflected in the school population which, by the survey results, already contains more Negroes than *white*. Neighborhood preferences also are likely to exert an influence, and in three different ways. The younger and more affluent *white* families probably will continue to move away in search of predominantly *white* neighborhoods. This will not happen rapidly, for their housing needs seem to be more important to moving than neighborhood racial composition, and the

area still offers good housing. At the same time, Negroes from below East 14th Street and other parts of Oakland should find the region above East 14th Street an attractive one to move into, both because of its good housing and because it is an integrated one. However, if the *whites* begin to leave in large numbers, the more affluent Negroes who prefer an integrated neighborhood may leave, too, transforming the area into a poorer Negro one with a residue of elderly poor *whites*. Or, perhaps, the region above East 14th Street will become the more desirable Negro residential area compared to below East 14th Street's less desirable one.

Thus the familiar tragedy of many central city residential areas seems likely to be acted out in Castlemont as well, a drama which seems equally tragic for all the players. There are promising signs, in the slightly greater willingness of the youngest whites, those under 25, to live in integrated neighborhoods, in the apparently low drop-out rate of Castlemont's Negro high school students, and in the high educational aspirations their parents hold for them, generally exceeding the aspirations the *white* parents of Castlemont hold for their children. But in the meantime, the problem of creating stable integrated neighborhoods for lower middle and working class families remains unsolved.

8. Economic Opportunity for Oakland

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 required that a representative board of lay citizens act as the policy making body for the Community Action Program title of the Act. The Mayor responded to this requirement in December, 1964, by appointing twenty-five people to serve for two years on the Oakland Economic Development Council. He was to be the chairman pro-tem. All the members of the Citizens Advisory Committee were invited to serve on the Council and the Committee of Executives was appointed to serve as a Technical Advisory Committee to the OEDC.

In selecting members for the OEDC, the Mayor made a serious effort to achieve a broad community representation. Those selected were from labor, management, minority groups, civil rights organizations, and religious organizations. There were also members of the boards of various public institutions and agencies. However, the idea of having the poor speak for themselves was not emergent at the time of the original appointments.

The creation of the Oakland Economic Development Council was sanctioned by a resolution of the City Council in February, 1965. The staff members of the Oakland Interagency Project were directed to serve as staff to OEDC, and the OIP staff was redesignated as the Department of Human Resources. The change in name did not alter the administrative hierarchy, since the director of the new city department still reported to

the City Manager, and the staff of the agency continued to be city employees. Although the OEDC was delegated the power to initiate and approve proposals for funding, the City Council retained the right to approve the release of funds for projects. The City Council retained a veto power over the actions of the OEDC.

At the first meeting of OEDC, in December, 1964, questions were raised about the council's policy making prerogatives. The membership of OEDC were concerned about the possibility of veto when their activities displeased the City Council. By February, 1965 the OEDC had replaced the Mayor as chairman pro-tem with an able and energetic judge elected from their own ranks.

At these early meetings, many council members expressed concern that members of Oakland's low-income population were not represented on the OEDC. In order to provide "grass roots liaison" with the client population, it was recommended that area advisory committees be established in the four target areas which had been designated for special services.

The Four Target Areas

Four sections of Oakland were designated as target areas for the new services to be forthcoming from the Office of Economic Opportunity. These target areas were selected because of the high incidence of poverty, based on 1960 census data. There were two basic considerations in selecting and developing boundaries for each target area. Target areas were first identified by rate of unemployment; any census tract with an unemployment rate of nine percent or more was included in the target area. Decentralization of services was the second consideration. Consequently, the total target area was divided into four small geographical service areas which would make services easily accessible to a client population and could be administered efficiently.

The target area contained a population of 151,000 or 41 percent of Oakland's population. Since the target areas were identified on the single criterion of unemployment, the ethnic correlates of unemployment provide interesting insights into the factors related to poverty. This area included 91 percent of Oakland's total Negro population, and 56 percent of the total Spanish surname population.

The four sections of the target area were identified as North Oakland, West Oakland, Fruitvale and East Oakland. West Oakland served the largest population of any target area and was the most depressed. (See Table 1, page 95.)

One of the problems facing planners and researchers is the unavailability of current data at the time programs are being designed. A survey of Oakland completed in 1966[53] revealed that significant population changes were taking place in the target areas. The population shift from white to Negro continued. If the OEDC had been aware of these conditions the membership might have been in a better position to plan programs for an area that was in the process of becoming a vast Negro ghetto. (See Table 2, page 97.)

The overall unemployment condition in the target and non-target areas did not change markedly from 1960 to 1966. However, there was a trend which merits further study. There was a decrease in male unemployment and a consistent increase in female unemployment throughout Oakland. Although the improved unemployment situation for males in the target areas brought the rate down to 11 percent, the magnitude of this

[53] William L. Nicholls II, *Preliminary Tabulations from the 701 Sample Census of Oakland, Characteristics of the Population of Oakland, California, 1966*, The Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, (December 2, 1966).

TABLE 1

DESCRIPTION OF TARGET AREA POPULATION

BY RACE AND EMPLOYMENT (1960 Census)

	North Oakland	West Oakland	Fruitvale	East Oakland	Total Target Areas
TOTAL POPULATION	29,904	60,784	36,947	36,955	164,592
White	11,669	16,609	23,444	16,149	67,871
Negro	16,146	37,621	6,148	16,197	76,112
Other	1,078	3,296	1,970	879	7,223
White, Spanish Surname	1,011	3,258	5,385	3,730	13,384
EMPLOYMENT					
Male – 14 years & older	10,093	21,031	10,977	10,134	52,235
Civilian Labor Force	7,619	14,064	8,338	7,686	37,707
Employed	6,884	11,456	7,350	6,898	32,588
Unemployed	735	2,608	988	788	5,119
%	.10	.18	.13	.10	.15
Female – 14 years & older	11,742	19,700	11,802	11,015	54,259
Labor Force	5,175	7,075	4,724	4,112	21,086
Employed	4,758	5,863	4,088	3,599	18,308
Unemployed	417	1,212	636	513	2,778
%	.08	.17	.13	.13	.13

figure suggests that conditions of poverty are still prevalent through large sections of Oakland. (See Table 3, page 97.)

The Economic Opportunity Act became law prior to the establishment of OEDC. The staff of the Interagency Project reacted quickly to the new legislation, and, acting on the recommendations of the Mayor and the City Manager, encouraged the community agencies to develop programs addressed to relieving problems of poverty. These programs were exposed to various ad hoc committees in Oakland and were then informally submitted to Washington. The Office of Economic Opportunity needed to allocate money quickly and the local communities were pressured to submit their applications without delay. Therefore, when OEDC was finally organized and ready to consider proposals, they resisted having to approve what they saw as a fait accompli. Although the OEDC did approve the original applications, the members made it clear from the outset that they would not be a passive body. The first twenty programs approved by OEDC are listed in Chart 1, page 99.

Although the OEDC asserted new qualities of community leadership there was a considerable delay before they were able to adjust organizationally to carry out their leadership role. Many months were to go by before they developed the sub-committees which would permit them to deal with the mechanical problems of a complex organization. At the time of this report, a year and a half after the initial organization, there is just emerging an adequate committee structure to consider new proposals and cope with the ongoing operational problems.

At the first meeting of OEDC, the membership decided to involve more of the community and instructed the staff of the Department of Human Resources to aggressively organize target area groups. By the fourth meeting, OEDC seriously considered the representation of these target area advisory committees on the council. At the fifth meeting of OEDC, the first representatives of the target areas were seated on the council.

Almost from the day that target area representatives became part of the council, these new members expressed a point of view that they should constitute a majority of OEDC. The position of the target area representatives was that, since they were elected by the area advisory committees which contained residents of Oakland who lived in the same neighborhoods as the poor, they were most qualified to speak for the poor.

The position taken by the majority of the OEDC for more than a year following the admission of the first target area representatives was that the area advisory committees were not representative of the residents of the area, and many poor people were unable to participate in these committees because of their problems of articulation. In the year that OEDC deliberated this question, much energy became focused internally on resolving this structural problem.

The representatives from the Federal Office of Economic Opportunity helped confound the issue of representation. The directives from Washington reiterated OEO's early terminology of "maximum feasible participation by the poor" as a clear and sufficient guideline to a local community. Apparently the evidence that many communities were in serious turmoil over the issue of representation did not persuade the Federal staff to produce a guide or code for the organization of an economic development council.

In Oakland the experience was that the last person who spoke to a Federal official found that his point of view was confirmed. Therefore, all the disagreeing parties felt that not only were they right, but they had the full support of the Federal representatives of the Office of Economic Opportunity. While OEDC was attempting to resolve their

TABLE 2

COMPARISON BY PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION CHANGES 1960[54] – 1966[55] IN AREAS OF OAKLAND

	North Oakland A		West Oakland B		Fruitvale C		East Oakland D		Total Target Area		Non-Target Area	
	1960	1966	1960	1966	1960	1966	1960	1966	1960	1966	1960	1966
White	.37	.22	.24	.18	.57	.45	.37	.18	.36	.26	.89	.80
Negro	.56	.72	.66	.71	.19	.33	.49	.73	.50	.61	.03	.11
Sp. Surname*	.03	.01	.05	.06	.18	.14	.11	.06	.09	.08	.05	.03
Other Non-white	.04	.04	.06	.05	.06	.09	.03	.03	.05	.05	.03	.06

*The 1966 study used the term Mexican-American, which included all white persons of Mexican birth or descent who were definitely not of Indian or other non-white race. Mexican-American descent, as determined by the *701 Sample Census,* should not be taken as the equivalent of Spanish surname as reported in the 1960 U.S. Census. Race was determined in the *701 Sample Census* primarily by interviewer observation.

TABLE 3

COMPARISON OF THE PERCENT UNEMPLOYED IN 1960[56] AND 1966[57] IN AREAS OF OAKLAND

	North Oakland		West Oakland		Fruitvale		East Oakland		Total Target Area Unemployment		Non-Target Area Unemployment		Total City Unemployment	
	1960	1966	1960	1966	1960	1966	1960	1966	1960	1966	1960	1966	1960	1966
Male	.10	.07	.18	.16	.13	.10	.10	.10	.15	.11	.06	.04	.08	.06
Female	.08	.08	.17	.17	.13	.18	.13	.20	.13	.16	.05	.07	.08	.10

54 1960 Census.
55 Nicholls, *701 Sample Census.*
56 1960 Census.
57 Nicholls. *701 Sample Census.*

internal problems, they had the responsibility of maintaining their ongoing job of studying and approving proposals. Their failure to establish a suitable committee structure caused future difficulties.

OEO had deadlines for submission of proposals. The staff of the Department of Human Resources were keenly aware of these dates, and the deliberation of each proposal by OEDC, acting as a committee of the whole, was a time-consuming process. Since the members of OEDC did feel a sense of responsibility to submit proposals in time for funding, proposals were approved and sent on; but the charge of railroading was a standard complaint at each meeting when proposals were considered for approval.

Since the policy of OEO is to allocate a maximum of three percent of the operation budget to evaluation, only a few projects could be selected for careful study. This allocation is less than one-third of the money needed for a study of all the OEO projects. At the present time complete evaluative information is not available on most of the OEO projects. However, a description of some of the projects which were innovative for Oakland may provide a clearer picture of the type of intervention which has taken place.

The $393,257 and $129,984 provided the Department of Human Resources was primarily for the operation of target area service centers. These centers were established in each of the target areas for the purpose of decentralizing services. The establishment of these centers was a major step for Oakland because it was the first time the city had become involved in the operation of a direct service program. Since these centers are operated by the city, the question has arisen as to how much control the area advisory committees should have in the center operation. Whether or not the City Council is simply a fiscal agent or whether they are also policy makers is a complex question which will be discussed later in this report. The city, by accepting the funds to operate the centers, accepted the role of a delegate agency to OEDC; but since OEDC was established by resolution of the City Council, is OEDC in fact a delegate agency to the city government?

The director in charge of each center is a city employee appointed with the approval of the area advisory committee. The title of this position is field services coordinator, and the job description assigns him the responsibility of coordinating the services within the center. However, with the exception of the receptionist and the various clerical workers, the personnel of the center are administratively responsible to the agencies which they represent, i.e. Legal Services staff to Legal Aid Society, Family Services staff to Family Service Bureau, etc. The field services coordinator reports to a supervisor at the Department of Human Resources and, at the same time, serves the area advisory committee. He is in the position of being held responsible for the efficient operation of the area service center but does not have the authority to carry out this function. The programs in the center are carried out by autonomous agencies. After the client leaves the receptionist, the field services coordinator has little influence on the services rendered by the other agencies within the center.

The projects which operate from the area centers are: Neighborhood Legal Services, Family Counseling, Neighborhood Organization, Adult Employment, and Bay Area Neighborhood Development (consumer education program).

CHART ONE

OAKLAND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

FUNDING UNDER ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1964 *

Component	*Program*	*Agency*	*Federal Funds*
1	In-Service Training	Public Schools	$ 90,570
2	Pre-School Education	Public Schools	71,100
3	Language Development	Public Schools	92,721
4	Remedial Reading Centers	Public Schools	86,423
5	Elementary Summer School	Public Schools	67,609
6	Secondary Summer School	Public Schools	40,805
7	Family Planning Clincs	Public Health Research Assn.	29,174
8	Preventive Health	Health Department	92,204
9	Compensatory Education	Parochial Schools	35,325
10	Neighborhood Legal Services	Legal Aid & Family Service Bureau	84,587
11	Homemaker Services	Oakland Visiting Nurse Assn.	27,163
12	Neighborhood Organization	Council of Social Planning	54,693
13	Planning, Coordination & Evaluation	Department of Human Resources	167,366
14	Program Development	Department of Human Resources	27,774
15	Operation Head Start	Public Schools & Health Dept.	92,858
16	Remedial Instruction for Dropouts	Public Schools & Urban League	102,243
17	In-Service Training of Community Action Staffs	Peralta Colleges	5,000
19	Summer Youth Employment	Central Labor Council	235,761
		Community Action Sub-total	$ 1,403,376
	Neighborhood Youth Corps (Summer)		130,850
		Grand Total	$ 1,534,226

* Additional programs have been funded since the original grant. The programs which have been funded as of January, 1967 are listed in Appendix, pages 108-109.

Neighborhood Organization Program

The Neighborhood Organization Program has been administered by the Council of Social Planning. The designation of this agency to operate such a program appears to be an outgrowth of their experience with the District Council Program. The neighborhood organization workers use the center as a headquarters, but spend most of their time in the field trying to build and strengthen neighborhood organizations.

One of the issues which has been vigorously discussed concerning this program is the role of the neighborhood organizer in relation to the area advisory committees. Some of the area committees wish to use the organizers to recruit more members. However, the organizers have typically interpreted their role as that of providing service to neighborhood associations such as community action groups and cultural and ethnic organizations. The neighborhood organizers wish to maintain their independence from the official extensions of OEDC, believing that independence is necessary if they are to help organizations in protest activities. The organizers' demands for independence have not received much community support. At this stage, it appears that most of their activities will be related to assisting the area advisory committees. The neighborhood organizers are seen as the most effective manpower to bring about a broader base of participation on the committees.

To tie neighborhood organization more closely to the area advisory committees, the Council of Social Planning and the OEDC agreed to transfer the sponsorship of this program to these area committees. This step will bring the target area advisory committees into a new relationship with the community because they will have the responsibility for operating programs. How this new sponsorship will effect neighborhood organization, and the target area advisory committees, will be studied during 1967.

Homemaker Service

The Homemaker Service, administered by the Visiting Nurse Association, was barely used by the potential clients. The purpose of this program was to provide temporary help to families in need of assistance during a period of crisis. This program was not intended to supplement the Welfare Department's responsibilities; therefore, only those persons not on welfare, but too poor to hire a homemaker, were eligible. Apparently there were not enough people in this in-between status to make this service worthwhile.

Family Counseling Program

Family counseling is administered by the Family Service Bureau. The type of counseling required in the centers is a departure from the traditional approach to clients by family social service agencies. The clients who use the centers are not accustomed to the clinical approach of long-term help built upon a system of verbalization of problems. Therefore, the family counselors have had to learn how to adapt their services to the cultural milieu of the working class. Seventy-seven percent of the clients came for the initial intake visit and one visit; very few clients came as often as four times. The skilled counselors had to learn new techniques and provide much of their help by acquainting the client with the community resources that are available.

Neighborhood Legal Services

The Legal Services Program was the most heavily utilized of all the center services prior to the consolidation of employment services and is an extension of the Legal Aid Society's activities. By a process of decentralization, the Legal Aid Society has been able to make their services much more available to the poor. For the first year of operation, only two centers had attorneys (West Oakland and Fruitvale), but the service has since been extended to all four centers. Approximately 300 clients request legal services at the four centers each month, or approximately 75 clients per center per month. The legal counseling is consistent with legal aid policy which is directed at civil matters. Criminal cases are referred to the public defender for legal assistance.

The Neighborhood Legal Services Program was designed to meet the needs of the poor in coping with the complex problems which they face in making an adjustment to society. The major categories of legal problems that have been handled at the centers have been: (1) divorce, (2) debtors' rights, (3) tenants' rights, (4) welfare laws and regulations.

The poor as well as the middle class may have to obtain divorces, and reorganize their lives; but the difference has been that the divorce process was prohibitively expensive for the poor. Now the center's legal services enable women who have been deserted to legally terminate a non-functioning marriage relationship so that they may remarry and stabilize their lives. In debtors' rights cases, the attorney provides protection for the poor from loan sharks and other unscrupulous persons who attempt various forms of extortion. In the tenants' rights cases, the attorneys represent the poor in securing minimal housing conditions from landlords. In welfare cases, the role of the attorneys is largely to correct arbitrary and unjust rulings which create undue hardships on clients. In other cases, the legal staff attempts to modify practices of public agencies that may have developed from some archaic traditions but are not consistent with current community attitudes. The neighborhood attorneys hoped to bring some cases to the appellate court so that rulings would affect many poor people in California, but to date they have not had an opportunity to try cases at this level.

The Neighborhood Legal Services Program appears to be the most significant step taken in Oakland to provide equal justice for all. This program is one of those being evaluated and by mid-1967 information should be available describing its effectiveness.

Other Neighborhood Center Programs

The Adult Employment Project (see page 56), administered by the California Department of Employment, has recently been transferred to the centers. This is not an OEO program, but was funded to carry out a plan for the decentralization of employment services. The employment service is consistent with the purpose of the neighborhood centers, and the use of common facilities is a logical convenience for target area residents.

The Bay Area Neighborhood Development Project, sponsored by the Consumers' Co-op of Berkeley, is another program which is housed in the neighborhood centers. The program is funded directly from OEO in Washington and not through the Oakland Economic Development Council. The purpose of this program is to offer consumer education services to the residents of the target areas.

Apart from the programs operating within the area service centers, there are additional programs which function directly from established agency facilities. A sample of these programs is presented on the following pages.

Family Planning Clinics

The Alameda County Health Department was one of the first public health agencies in the nation to request funds from OEO for family planning. The concept of family planning has stirred much religious and political controversy, and the Health Department demonstrated unusual courage by aggressively pursuing funds to provide contraceptives for those unable to afford the pills or intra-uterine devices. The Health Department proposal also included funds for an education program on contraceptives for mothers who had recently given birth at the county hospitals. Since the program has been under way the organized opposition has dissipated; the program is now progressing as smoothly as any of the other Health Department services.

Compensatory Education – Parochial Schools

Since 1964 compensatory education programs have become rather common in many communities. The program operated by Oakland's parochial schools has the unusual feature of being a cost-benefit study. Three different groups of children were exposed to two, four, and six hours per week of remedial reading; a control group received none. The objective was to determine the optimum input in relation to the gains made by the children.

Six hundred parochial school children in grades two through six were administered the Metropolitan Achievement Test in September, 1965. Those who scored at or below the 35th percentile in terms of national public school norms were eligible for remedial reading instruction. These children were randomly assigned to four groups; three groups received two, four or six hours of remedial reading per week and a control group received none. The children assigned to remedial instruction were taken from their regular classroom and placed in a special class of 8 to 12 students for the period of remediation.

The control group and the children who scored above the 35th percentile on the MAT were taught in the regular classroom during the remedial sessions. At the end of the school year all the children in grades two through six were retested with the MAT in order to assess the reading gain.

The 600 children who were eligible for remediation were, on the average, ten months retarded in reading at the start of the program. On the post-test, these children maintained their same relative position. They were still ten months behind their expected grade placement level. There were no significant differences in reading gains among the children receiving two, four, or six hours of remedial instruction, or those in the control group.

The 350 children who were not eligible for remediation were, on the average, four months ahead of their expected grade level on the pretest. These children showed improvement, ending the year 11 months ahead of their expected grade placement.

In studying faculty reports, the researcher may have uncovered a clue that would help explain these surprising findings. A minimum number of hours of reading instruction is required each week for each grade by school district regulations. For children receiving remediation, the minimum requirements were met by adding to the hours of remediation the amount of regular classroom instruction necessary to fulfill that require-

ment. The experimental differentiation of zero, two, four or six hours supplementary remediation had little effect on the amount of time the child was taught reading. The schools adjusted their schedules so that the children within each grade ended up with the same number of hours of reading instruction.

One of the side effects achieved by this program was a reduction in class size both for those attending remedial classes and those who remained in the regular class. It appears that if any benefits occurred from smaller classes, the more able readers had the most dramatic response. The better readers who remained in the smaller class made unusual gains. They began the year four months ahead, and ended 11 months beyond grade placement level. However, there were too many other variables involved to permit us to attribute these gains to reduced class size.

This program, like some of those previously described, suffered from having the initial design modified by the administrators of the program. It was not possible to test the major hypothesis of the study. Consequently, the original cost benefit study that was proposed still remains to be done.

This study was designed to help the community allocate its limited resources in a more efficient manner. If we are able to determine the optimum level of various types of social intervention, the community will be able to make a reasonable distribution of its funds. Far too frequently allocations are made on the basis of the popularity of the applicant or the emotional appeal of the program. There is also the danger that program designers become so enthusiastic about their type of intervention they become convinced that if two hours of input are good, six hours will be three times better. There is a need for communities to have more cost-benefit information. Concerted pressure should be placed on funding agencies to support this type of study.

Neighborhood Youth Corps

The Neighborhood Youth Corps is an OEO program which has received a most positive reaction in Oakland. This program has provided the work opportunities that were hoped for previously from the scuttled Youth Opportunities Project. The Neighborhood Youth Corps provides work for in-school and out-of-school youth. The theory behind the NYC is that positive work experience, with wages to help supplement the family income, will deter high school dropouts.

We do not have evidence that this program has been of help to young people in learning skills which eventually help them find jobs, or that this program has deterred young people from dropping out of school. However, the program has provided jobs. The 16-22 age category is our most seriously unemployed age group, and the Neighborhood Youth Corps has provided a useful service in creating jobs for this segment of Oakland's population. It is understandable that this program has been so enthusiastically accepted by the disadvantaged youth of Oakland.

We have touched upon only a few of the programs funded by OEO. The remainder of the programs funded under OEO will not be described in this report since the purpose of this study is to provide information on the effects of the Ford Foundation's social intervention in Oakland.

In September, 1965 a new Ford grant of $1,200,000 was announced at a meeting of the Oakland Economic Development Council. This was a block grant to Oakland with only broad general guidelines for the community to follow. One million dollars was earmarked for new programs and divided so that at least one-half was to be allocated for

self-help groups. The Ford Foundation retained the right to review proposals. The purpose of the review was to provide the Foundation with an opportunity to express their opinions and check for technical problems. The staff of the Foundation gave assurance that projects approved by the OEDC in Oakland would not be vetoed in New York. This new process of approval of proposals tended to remove the Foundation from active participation in the design of new programs. An additional condition stipulated by Ford was that they wanted the limited funds from the Foundation to be used only for those projects which could not be funded by Federal grants.

The Foundation had become intensely interested in self-help programs. Their decision to support self-help groups may have been in response to their articulate critics who charged the Foundation with underwriting unimaginative programs operated by conservative agencies. These critics frequently pointed to the failure of existing institutions to change practices in order to deal with the social and economic conditions of the poor. The self-help concept was suggested as a solution for filling in gaps in service, as well as bringing pressure on the institutions to adjust their practices to meet the existing social problems. In proposing an additional grant to Oakland, the Foundation apparently hoped that their support of self-help groups would provide a grass roots movement with enough strength to become an effective force.

From the outset, this grant excited the interest of the area advisory committees and the smaller institutions. One purpose of this grant was to supply new resources to the people who previously had little power to initiate programs. However, when OEDC accepted the charge of stimulating the activities of self-help groups with additional resources, they were unaware of the future difficulty in defining self-help.

Although it was not stated in the grant, the Foundation had moved away from funding demonstration projects. Since the proposals for self-help programs were to originate from indigenous groups, it was logical to anticipate that the requests for support would be to meet some immediate local need. Although a neighborhood group filling a gap in service may be a useful social action, the project would not be a demonstration without certain elements built into the program design. There was little likelihood that a self-help group would have a strong belief in a social action and, at the same time, invite an examination to determine the validity of those beliefs. Therefore, even though the new Ford grant did not reject demonstration projects, the conditions related to funding limited the possibility of implementing designs which would be a prerequisite for a demonstration.

Most of the proposals which were submitted by the self-help groups were for social action programs designed to fill gaps in service. An eligible self-help group was defined as one which established a non-profit corporation status with a board of directors, a majority of whom were of low-income status (income of less than $4,000 per year for a family of four).

The Oakland Economic Development Council had to undertake the serious tasks of defining self-help groups and coping with the funding of the proposals. The Office of Economic Opportunity increased the complexity of the problem by encouraging the submission of proposals for self-help activities. The OEDC then had to face the problem of developing machinery to encourage self-help groups to submit proposals and then find some method to determine which proposals should be submitted to the OEO and which to the Ford Foundation.

The method for submitting proposals was determined through a literal interpretation

of Ford's requirement that projects submitted to them not be eligible for Federal support. Following approval by OEDC, all proposals were submitted to the Office of Economic Opportunity. Those rejected were submitted to Ford.

Although this method for submission of proposals did meet the Foundation's desire not to duplicate Federal projects, the staff at Ford were not pleased that they were, in fact, receiving the rejects from the Federal Government. The Foundation was also displeased by the nature of the projects. They criticized self-help proposals which were not innovative, designed only to fill gaps in services. The Foundation, in developing a framework for their new grant, created a situation where the most skilled professionals in the community were almost excluded from designing proposals. When the proposals were consequently developed without the knowledge and insight that professionals are able to contribute, the Foundation was disappointed with the unimaginative qualities of the new proposals. It appears that the Foundation staff was disappointed that the OEDC faithfully carried out the conditions of the grant.

OEDC – A New Force

The Oakland Economic Development Council was established by a resolution of the City Council and since has become a self-propelling force. The City of Oakland cannot receive OEO funds without an OEDC, and these funds cannot be released without the approval of the City Council. At the time of this writing they are wed to each other, but the marriage is experiencing some severe stress.

The OEDC does not have the docility of the Interagency Project's Committee of Executives. The council has expanded to 40 members and continues to add more members who are militantly oriented toward solving the problems of poverty. There has been considerable conflict within OEDC in regard to increasing the representation from the area advisory committees. However, a recent action by the City Council has helped unify OEDC to face a confrontation with the city government.

The City Council has expressed its intention to veto the funding of a self-help proposal establishing a Police Review Board. In most core cities with large Negro populations, the police are seen as an instrument of persecution by the Negroes. When a self-help group developed a Police Review Board proposal, it received overwhelming support from the OEDC. The Police Chief had strong objections to a civilian review board, and made his feelings known to members of the City Council. The City Council subsequently issued a public statement that they would veto the creation of a review board.

This action on the part of the City Council has brought about an improved understanding among the members of OEDC. The conflict of representation from the target areas diminished in significance. What motivated the City Council to challenge the policy making prerogatives of OEDC at this time is difficult to comprehend. The Mayor has suggested the need for compromise and mutual understanding, but, at the same time, has issued statements which invite an immediate confrontation between the City Council and the OEDC.

Regardless of the issue which brings about the confrontation, some resolution of the policy making powers of the OEDC must be reached. The evolvement of OEDC from the Committee of Executives and Citizens Advisory Committee, without accommodation being made for the change in character and activities of this new body, has led to conflict.

Since the early organizational meetings, the OEDC functioned as though it was an

autonomous body, funneling money from different funding sources into various programs designed to improve conditions for the residents of Oakland. The membership of OEDC failed to take note of the interdependent relationship they have with the City Council. Both councils must act in order to apply, receive, and expend money from the OEO. From the guidelines of the new Ford grant, it appears that the same conditions hold true for the Ford Foundation funds. Therefore, unless some working relationship is developed, the flow of funds into Oakland could be effectively stopped by either body. It is unlikely that the OEDC or the City Council would wish to accept the responsibility for that occurrence.

The crisis brought on by the Police Review Board proposal has been healthy for Oakland because it has forced the community to recognize the unclear scope of responsibility of its Community Action Agency. The next step is for the community to carefully define what changes they expect from these new programs and who is to be responsible for bringing about these changes.

OEDC – And Delegate Agencies

When an agency applies for funds to OEDC and then receives support, the agency becomes designated as a delegate agency. There has been considerable debate in the community about how much autonomy an agency must surrender in this process.

Community agencies have traditionally sold their services in a manner similar to private enterprise. The position of agencies was that they were prepared to offer certain services which could be contracted for at a price. Once the extent of services and prices were negotiated, the agency was left to its own devices to fulfill the contract. OEDC has not followed this traditional pattern with its delegate agencies. The OEDC is concerned not only with services and price, but also with administrative detail. With some agencies, the OEDC or an area advisory committee has insisted on approving the hiring of personnel. In one case, OEDC insisted upon the rehiring of a staff member who had been fired. In other cases, OEDC has insisted on an administrative restructuring and has expressed concern about the time when services should be available. Apparently the new funds for social intervention are not only bringing new programs to Oakland, but are also making inroads in agency traditions.

Observations

When the Mayor appointed the Economic Development Council he created a new force in Oakland. This council quickly established its independence from any of the traditional political or economic alignments. As the OEDC extended into the community through the area advisory committees, it gained even more strength.

It is not surprising that, as the community began to assess this new force, the established leadership, as represented by the City Council, felt threatened. The OEDC applied pressure to agencies such as the Police Department, the Welfare Department, the Department of Housing, the Public Schools, and the California State Employment Service, among others. The OEDC violated the gentlemen's agreement code of interagency practice; they were overtly critical of community agencies and utilized pressure techniques to achieve change.

When the OEDC endorsed a Police Review Board, a highly sensitive topic to the Police Department, a crisis was precipitated. When the Police Chief reacted to the Police

Review Board, he was quickly heard by the members of the City Council. The decision made by the Council was to confine the new force so that it would be more manageable within the city structure. The question which the City Council has ignored to date is how much accommodation is necessary within the existing decision-making structure of the community to adjust to the OEDC.

APPENDIX – CHAPTER EIGHT

OAKLAND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

FUNDING UNDER ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT

January 1, 1967

Component	*Program*	*Agency*	*Federal Funds*
1	In-Service Training	Public Schools	$ 90,570
2	Pre-School Education	Public Schools	139,220
3	Language Development	Public Schools	92,721
4	Remedial Reading Centers	Public Schools	196,809
5	Elementary summer School	Public Schools	135,403
6	Secondary Summer School	Public Schools	89,389
7	Family Planning Clinics	Health Department	117,908
8	Preventive Health	Health Department	273,684
9	Compensatory Education	Parochial Schools	71,707
10	Neighborhood Legal Services	Legal Aid Society	389,037
11	Homemaker Services	Oakland Visiting Nurse Assn.	41,395
12	Neighborhood Organization	Target Area Advisory Committees	299,998
13	Planning, Coordination and Evaluation	Department of Human Resources	617,236
14	Neighborhood Service Centers	Department of Human Resources	387,384
15	Operation Head Start	Public Schools & Health Department	262,309
16	Remedial Instruction for High School Dropouts	Public Schools	166,847
17	In-Service Training of Community Action Staffs	Peralta Colleges & U.C. Extension	5,000
18	Motivational Counseling	Bay Area Urban League	34,847
19	Summer Youth Employment (1965)	Central Labor Council	191,539
20	Summer Camp Program (1965)	Department of Human Resources	88,325
21	Small Business Development Center	Small Business Development Center, Inc.	140,193
22	Operation Medicare Alert	Oakland YWCA	11,185
23	Family Counseling & Emergency Financial Assistance	Family Service Bureau	155,530

24	American Indian Community Development	Oakland American Indian Association	83,888
25	Emergency Lodging for Women and Children	Good Samaritan Home	70,893
27	Dental Care Services for Children	Health Department	83,943
28	Home Care Services	Health Department	63,224
29	Vision Services for Children	Children's Vision Center of the East Bay	52,834
30	Mexican-American Community Development	East Bay Spanish-Speaking Citizens Foundation	58,449
37	Summer Youth Employment (1966)	Department of Human Resources	234,988
39	Leadership Development	Corporation of the Poor	11,759
40	Teenage Pregnancies	Oakland YWCA	59,151
		Sub-Total Community Action	$ 4,717,365
	Neighborhood Youth Corps	Department of Human Resources	1,229,010
		Grand Total	$ 5,946,375

9. New Directions

In looking back now, more than five years since the original Ford grant, it is difficult to evaluate the success of the Oakland-Ford partnership. The designers of the proposal to the Foundation fulfilled one of the roles of social scientists, that is, to establish goals for the intervention in Oakland. In evaluating the Interagency Project, there is little point in comparing the achievement of the various programs with the five goals which were originally stated. This statement represented the hopes of the project designers who were suggesting a direction for social change, not a state of affairs that was readily attainable.

Since the role of social scientists is to think beyond existing conditions, the vast gap between the goals stated in the proposal and the resources available to achieve these goals is entirely predictable. In fact, had the authors of the proposal been so short-sighted as to propose only goals which were close enough to the existing conditions to be readily attainable, we would challenge their value in pointing out new directions. However, the designers of the proposal did not complete their task. In addition to establishing goals, they had a responsibility to identify guideposts or bench marks so that the community could determine the nature and rate of progress. This identification could have been accomplished by establishing specific objectives which, when achieved, would signify that the project was making progress toward the goals.

The unavailability of specific objectives that would serve as criteria for evaluation does not suggest that none existed. The fact that projects were designed and implemented required that the parties concerned have an understanding of objectives. But the crucial problem for evaluation was that these objectives were unstated.

There is no evidence that the agencies or the Ford Foundation agreed on a central focus for social intervention. We have been able to evaluate the impact of many of the individual programs which were undertaken as part of the Interagency Project. But this step was managed only by identifying and isolating the apparent objectives of each separate program. The Interagency Project appears to have operated without an overall strategy, and any comprehensive evaluation of the total project effort is limited by the absence of any measurable criteria of success. Because we do not have precise criteria, we have to rely upon the interpretation of statements, articles, and letters produced by the interested parties during the life of the project in arriving at some hypothesis of the unstated objectives.

The Public Affairs Division of the Foundation was looking for a community where a small investment would stir extensive and innovative social action. The leadership of Oakland was looking for assistance to deal with the problems of its core city. The staff of the Foundation and the leadership in Oakland were sophisticated enough to know that their stated goals were unattainable. From interviews with the participants who designed and implemented the project, it appears that there were understandings about the objectives, but this information is dependent on the accuracy of memories. It is unfortunate that we do not know more about the unstated objectives and how the parties involved perceived their goals.

From observations and interviews with the Ford Foundation staff, it appears that a primary unstated goal was to create a new social awareness in Oakland. There was hope that if the project was successful, a special concern would be generated among community leaders, city and county officials, agency executives, and professional workers, as well as residents of the neighborhoods receiving project services.

The Foundation grant did contribute to a new level of social awareness in Oakland, far beyond what was reasonable to anticipate. The Oakland Interagency Project involved major local public agencies which serve the residents of Oakland. Eventually State and Federal agencies were stimulated to participate. Perhaps the Ford grant was indirectly related to the concern about Oakland in the national press in 1965 and 1966.

As part of the application to the Office of Economic Opportunity, the staff of the Oakland Interagency Project developed a report entitled *Profile of Target Areas for Economic Opportunity Program*. The data and projections about the population of Oakland contained in this report apparently concerned Federal officials sufficiently to release this information to the press.

The activities of the Ford Foundation, in funding projects dealing with urban poverty on the East and West Coasts, attracted the attention of social planners employed by Federal agencies to find solutions to the problems of core city. Federal legislation was enacted to cope with these problems. The fact that the Ford Foundation staff was frequently consulted during the drafting of the Economic Opportunity Act was symptomatic of a growing response to the Gray Area Project. The early plans, at the time the EOA was developed, provided for the new office established under this act to function as a Federal Interagency Project for problems dealing with the poor. The difficulties faced by the Oakland Interagency Project, in attempting to modify traditional prerogatives of agencies, were compounded many times at the Federal level.

The discussions during the planning stage of EOA suggested that grants to local communities by the Department of Labor, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Department of Commerce would be coordinated by the Office of Economic Opportunity. The intent of this reorganization was to facilitate the process by which communities apply for and receive grants. At the time the legislation was being discussed, there were serious problems in many communities because the leaders did not know what funds were available from the various Federal agencies to cope with many types of problems. When the Office of Economic Opportunity subsequently became operational, it functioned as another Federal agency with a minor coordinative role.

The Federal Government's creation of legislation which had so many of the features of the Gray Area Project suggests that the Ford Foundation aroused a national concern which resulted in a national action. The Economic Opportunity Act placed great emphasis on broad community involvement. The legislation required "maximum feasible participation" of the poor, and the potential recipients were visualized as a force in the administration of the anti-poverty programs. The intent of the legislation to give the poor a voice in decisions which affect their own destiny may be a laudable objective, but in Oakland we have not yet discovered an appropriate or efficient method for involving large numbers of poor in the decision-making process. The poor have not turned out in large numbers to attend meetings or to participate in organizations. Typically the poor will attend several meetings hoping for a job; when the job does not materialize they stop attending meetings.

Apparently the rationale for the legislation related to recipient participation is that the poor need to participate organizationally to protect themselves from the imposition of middle-class values. However, the advocates of organizing the poor have failed to note that participating in organizations which are oriented toward social change is a middle-class activity. At some point we must re-examine the available research on the expectations and needs of the poor. If we are to help the plight of the sick and hungry poor, we should be able to offer something more therapeutic and edible than non-middle class values.

In appraising the Foundation's success in attaining one of their unstated goals, that of bringing about a social awareness by familiarizing many people with Oakland's severe social problems, we may evaluate that their investment in Oakland was an exceptionally successful venture.

A second unstated objective of the Foundation appears to have been to encourage agencies to experiment with programs aimed at improving and extending services. With the availability of Ford funds, agencies which were motivated to do so had the necessary financial support to seek new solutions to clients' problems. The money was intended to demonstrate the effectiveness of new methods and to stimulate innovative approaches to Oakland's social problems. The Foundation anticipated that those projects which were proven successful would be incorporated into the normal operation of the agencies.

Providing agencies with seed money to bring about change could be categorized as a "change from within" method. This method is contrasted to a "change from without" technique, whereby pressure groups exert force on agency policy through application of political power and the disruption of agency operation.

Large community projects rarely represent pure forms of either method. In Oakland the proposals which were submitted to Ford were the result of many influences, but the attitudes expressed by community pressure groups do much to shape the nature of the

projects finally implemented. The community designers of the Interagency Project insisted that a community organization component should be part of the program so that an outside pressure group would have an avenue for expression. The District Council Program received modest and reluctant funding from Ford. There is not sufficient documentation to determine if the Foundation's reservations were related to their concern about the contributions which outside pressure groups could make to the progress of the project, or their disapproval of the design of the community organization program submitted by the Council of Social Planning.

The District Council Program was dispersed throughout Oakland, rather than being confined to Castlemont, and consequently had limited organizational strength in the project area. The negligible citizen involvement and the limited impact in Castlemont do not provide a fair estimate of the potential of pressure from without.

Although the Oakland Interagency Project should be categorized as a "change from within" system, community pressure groups made their influence felt. While the project was in operation numerous citizen groups were actually bringing outside pressure on the schools, Welfare Department, Police and Recreation Departments. These protest groups were oriented toward maintaining their independence and seldom requested or received services from the staff of the project. They retained their independence and criticized the direction of the project as various issues developed.

Determining which method (within vs. without) is most effective in bringing about social change is a prerequisite in understanding the basis for the allocation of funds. A decision to apply one or the other method will result in radically different types of allocation of resources. A comparison of the Oakland and San Francisco Community Action Programs may serve as a useful illustration.

The programs in San Francisco and Oakland, although somewhat similar in organization, have distinctly different goals. The approach in San Francisco seems to be to develop powerful neighborhood organizations, not aligned with any of the established community agencies, to influence long-range State and local legislation directed at the needs of the poor.

Organizations which are formed to develop political pressure attract the attention of those seeking to achieve political power. The San Francisco program has been characterized by internal conflicts which have sapped much of the potential from the project.

The goal in Oakland has been to provide immediate and necessary services to the poor. Therefore, most of the resources have been allocated for providing such services as education, health, legal, and employment assistance.

In San Francisco most of the funds were allocated to community organization to build a strong political base. The advocates of the San Francisco approach would argue that the comparatively few dollars available through the Economic Opportunity Act could not make a meaningful impact in improving the living conditions of the poor. Those who identify with the Oakland approach believe that improved social services to the poor will enable those reached by the services to gain sufficient strength to join the mainstream of society. For those who are advocates of service, the challenge remains to obtain enough resources to reach large numbers of the poor.

Both the Oakland and San Francisco approaches are based on untested assumptions. The Oakland assumption is that improved services will improve the living conditions and productive capacity of the poor. The San Francisco assumption is that a new political alignment will create legislation that will reduce the social and economic distance be-

tween the h .es and have nots. Comparing the Oakland and San Francisco approaches in solving the problems of poverty, we may observe that the issue of the efficiency of within vs. without methodology for bringing about social change remains unresolved. In Oakland the approach was determined when the Ford Foundation gave the grant to the city government and the authors of the proposal decided to duplicate the Associated Agencies organization in the design of the Interagency Project. This project evolved into the administrative agency for Oakland's Economic Opportunity Program.

Previously, we have made inferences about the Ford Foundation goals in Oakland—but what did Oakland hope to gain from this partnership?

The public and private agencies serving Oakland were confronted with an opportunity to find solutions for relevant social problems. The limited Ford funds permitted only small scale experimental projects, but some solutions could be demonstrated within the limited scope of the grant. As a result of this grant, new techniques could be applied to social problems, and those found to be successful could be employed in general practice by the public agencies.

Most of the agencies met the challenge of seeking new solutions with great enthusiasm and energy. The only major public agency which remained immune to the new spirit which had invaded Oakland was the Alameda County Welfare Department. The Welfare Department did not submit any proposal for either of the Ford grants, nor did they make use of the Economic Opportunity Act. Title Five of the Act is specifically intended for the use of welfare departments and provides funds for new programs designed to help welfare recipients move from their dependency status.

Locally, community groups have urged the Welfare Department to implement a Federally sponsored food stamp program which would increase the food budget of the welfare recipients by approximately 13 percent. Funds from the Ford Foundation were provided so that the Director of the Welfare Department could visit other communities to learn about the administration of a food stamp program. He submitted a report of his observations to the County Board of Supervisors, but the Board refused to approve a food stamp plan.

Although the Welfare Department failed to aggressively support food stamps and have not taken advantage of other Federal funds available to help welfare recipients, these failures may be in response to the anticipated behavior of the Board. This Board has been resistant to new approaches to solving social problems even when funds were available from outside sources and projects would not have required expenditure of local taxes.

In Chapter Six we described the difficulty in persuading the Board to accept funds from Ford for a pre-trial release project, even though the project had received the endorsement of most of the law enforcement and legal societies in the area. The statements of some of the Board members reflect a strong resistance to even modest changes in social services. Since the Board of Supervisors controls the budget of the Welfare Department, the departmental policies have reflected the Board's approach to social issues. Many of the other community agencies learned new approaches for dealing with community problems. Even as the individual projects came to an end and the results of the demonstration projects were not yet known, the agencies had incorporated new techniques and policies within their on-going operations. As examples, the schools began compensatory education programs throughout their twelve grades, the Health Department experimented with new outreach programs, the Council of Social Planning undertook

direct services to neighborhood organizations, and voluntary agencies began to modify their services in an effort to find improved techniques for serving the poor.

The creation of the Oakland Interagency Project developed the vehicle which uncovered the array of Federal and foundation grants which were available to community agencies. The agencies discovered that they no longer had to depend on the funds provided by the local community for social services; but they now had to be sufficiently imaginative to propose projects which would offer solutions to their problems. They discovered that ideas were a rarer commodity than money; as a result, many of the projects which were funded demonstrated little beyond the good intentions of the program designers. However, most important, agencies had the opportunity to learn that, if they desired to find new methods for giving better service to their clients, they no longer had to be resigned to providing inadequate services because of budget limitations.

The Oakland residents who were, in part, stimulated by the activities of the OIP encouraged lay public and agency professionals to concern themselves with the quality and extent of services provided. When agency executives failed to respond to the needs of their client market, they learned that they would be confronted with various forms of protest. New avenues of communication were opened between professionals and recipients of service; and communication has been steadily increasing since the time of planning for the original Ford grant. Such communication appears to have increased the sensitivity of the executives of agencies. One obvious by-product has been the rapid increase in the numbers of minority group persons who have been employed for responsible positions by public agencies.

At this point, it is impossible to assess with any precision the impact of the Ford grant on the Economic Opportunity Program in Oakland. However, some observations may help us develop an educated guess. Through participation in the Oakland Interagency Project, agencies had learned how to take advantage of opportunities for grants. When opportunities were made available through OEO, the agencies were able to organize sufficiently to make a timely application. It seems clear that the administrators of the Oakland community action program benefited from the experiences of the Oakland Interagency Project. The foundation and operating framework for an extensive social service program had been established in Oakland for several years. Thus, Oakland was able to avoid much of the organizational trauma experienced by many communities in creating an administrative vehicle for the Economic Opportunity Program. In Oakland the transitional problems were comparatively minor; the city government, as well as public and private agencies, readily adapted themselves to make optimum use of the available Federal funds.

The Role of the Professional

We previously discussed how the new programs supported by various grants have had an effect on agency policy and practices. We may gain even greater insight by examining the changing role of the professionals employed by the community agencies.

The professionals have had to learn how to deal with a new aggressiveness on the part of the client population. Prior to the recent changes in Oakland, the agencies' clients had played a passive role as recipients of social services. Today the professional is confronted with demands instead of requests. Planning for individuals and organizations, and the designing of new programs, is no longer the exclusive province of professionals. The people who are the target for these programs insist on participating in designing

and delivering services. Frequently community groups reject the need for professional skills in the design and operation of programs. It is argued that the poor have first-hand knowledge about the problems of the poor and, therefore, are better equipped to help their compatriots in poverty. The professionals have had to learn to adjust to the questioning of their skills. In addition, they are often accused of using funds for their own salaries which should instead be going into the pockets of poverty. It is difficult for professionals to maintain their objectivity while being attacked as unneeded. In response to these problems, the professionals have developed new skills. They have learned how to listen to ideas and complaints while recognizing that their clients have dignity and pride. The skillful professional has learned that his training has not given him a monopoly on good ideas, and he has become sensitive to the unorthodox solutions to social problems by an awakened population of poor who now refuse to accept an orthodox recipient role.

Evaluation

From the time of the writing of the first proposal to the Ford Foundation until the present, those responsible for the operation of the Interagency Project were concerned about evaluation. With millions being spent on programs, there was a need to know what was effective as well as what failed. The original proposal set forth five goals, and only through some systematic evaluative process was it possible for the community to determine these goals were attained.

The decision of the policy makers in Oakland to insist upon rigorous evaluation was unique among the Ford Gray Area Projects. In the original proposal to Ford, provision was made for the Research Advisory Committee. The role and influence of this committee of scholars has remained undiminished although there was a significant reorganization of the administrative structure of the Oakland program. In Oakland the policy making body changed from an agency executive to a lay board, but the new community leaders remained concerned about determining the effectiveness of their efforts.

The research staff which was recruited to undertake the task of evaluation had to learn how to adapt social science evaluative techniques to community action programs. Typically those responsible for operating programs were tolerant of research, but were primarily concerned with getting programs under way as quickly as possible. Program managers were oriented to serving their potential clients quickly, and they felt considerable pressure from their agency administrators and community groups to produce results. Results most frequently meant that large numbers of people received some kind of service.

Therefore, when the research staff requested that forms be completed, or that a systematic approach be adopted in accepting clients for service, their requests were often interpreted as a hindrance to the smooth flow of programs. In addition, program managers did not perceive evaluators as being helpful. Without objective study, most programs could be interpreted as successful. By observation one could conclude that enthusiastic, energetic people were trying to help others. There was warmth to the scene of helpers and helped. There was the danger that the intrusion of evaluation would create doubts about the warmth and social utility of the scene.

Therefore, the researcher undertook the process of evaluation with the support of the policy makers and the suspicion of the program managers. The researcher faced a paradox of a broad community acceptance of research as a concept but rejection of the process that was required to undertake a study. When evaluating a program the re-

search staff had to resolve many issues. Frequently they were faced with the issue of differentiating between the program that was described for funding and the program that was operating. The difference in the two programs typically came about because of the reluctance of an agency to modify its traditional organizational structure.

An example of this problem is the freedom of the school principals to re-interpret the intention, staff responsibilities, and the scope of services of a program. Hence, researchers discovered that they were not studying the program the community believed was being funded, but something quite different, without any of the necessary built-in controls to permit objective study. Some of the program modifications were described in previous chapters. Compensatory education programs appeared to be providing substitute educational experiences rather than additional experiences for children, and counselors were assigned administrative responsibilities instead of counseling activities.

Since the researcher had little authority to insist on the maintenance of the program design, he adjusted to the frustration of observing a strong evaluative design become converted into a weak descriptive study. He was able to recognize that the demonstration project that was originally funded was no longer a demonstration, but simply another agency activity that yielded a minimum of new information.

Although the policy makers in Oakland have been sympathetic to research and evaluation, they have not as yet learned how to take full advantage of this service. Typically program changes take place without the knowledge or approval of policy makers. Frequently the head of the agency conducting the program will be unaware of the changes. To insist on the proper conduct of a project might well cause discord within and outside the agency. During the history of the project, great distress was expressed by operational staff about diminished flexibility when researchers protested the deviation from the original design. The researcher was rarely successful in convincing program managers to return to the original design.

Recently the OEDC has become aware of this problem, and they have taken corrective steps. They have insisted that each program be monitored by the staff of the Department of Human Resources. Since no additional staff was employed to undertake the monitoring function, there is some question if the decision to monitor can be effectively implemented.

The research staff in Oakland has had to learn how to adjust to the impatience of the community. Since most of the social action programs require at least a year of study, a community that is impatient for answers becomes frustrated at delay. Some communities make the error of calling upon experts who, by intuitive examination, provide the desired reassurance that programs are valuable and beneficial. In Oakland, the expert error has been avoided. The policy makers have consistently demanded evaluations supported by research findings.

The leadership in Oakland has demonstrated unusual sophistication in demanding objective studies. Hopefully, Oakland will continue to maintain this level of integrity. Currently there exists a national style of problem solving which assumes that a consensus of feeling is a satisfactory evaluation without the appaication of research methods. With the prevalence of that attitude, there is little hope that we will be able to distinguish between the politically expedient and the socially constructive.

Re-evaluation

Those who are deeply involved in new programs which are intended to improve

social conditions frequently become so engrossed in implementation that they fail to recognize that the assumptions on which these programs rest are untested. Unfortunately, those in charge of developing or managing programs appear to behave as though we have completed our testing and have evidence that our activities are bringing about a social good.

Some of the current assumptions which are treated as truths are:

1. Decentralization brings services to people who otherwise would not receive them.
2. With additional services people in the ghetto are able to move out of the trap into the mainstream of American life.
3. Those people indigenous to a neighborhood have a greater rapport with the residents than professionals and are more likely to be able to develop a helpful relationship.
4. Compensatory education programs are intensive educational experiences for children of poverty which will help close the gap between the poor and middle class children.
5. Job developers create new jobs and redirect existing jobs to the large pool of unemployed.

The list of assumptive truths could be expanded for several pages, but the five listed should serve as an adequate example. Making assumptions is a useful and necessary device in order to get programs under way. The danger comes when we become so blinded by our enthusiasm for a project that we are unable to examine the evidence that may contra-indicate our original assumptions. Some of the five assumptions we have been testing in part, in the evaluations described in the previous chapters. However, when a program hits some responsive chord in a community, it is difficult for lay or professional people to pause long enough to remember the assumptive nature of the project.

An example of a concept that has had nationwide appeal is the decentralization of services through neighborhood centers. The neighborhood center is seen as the entrance way for residents of a neighborhood to a variety of needed social services. In Oakland we have gathered sufficient data to cause concern about this concept, if we wish to be responsive to new information. In Chapter Six we described the decentralized employment service in the neighborhoods, and we found that the neighborhood employment offices' client population was approximately 90 percent minority groups, while the main office was approximately 40 percent minority groups. The job placements made through the neighborhood centers were predominantly for those jobs which were historically appropriate for minority groups. Therefore, we do have evidence which may suggest that we have developed a ghettoized employment service.

This finding should stimulate us to examine whether we may have developed a ghetto social service center in each of the neighborhoods. If we have, a second question to ask is whether this neighborhood program is providing better social service than a central office? If more people are being reached through this neighborhood approach, or the people using the neighborhood services feel that they are more accepted, is the creation of a ghetto social service program too high a price to pay for the improvement of the delivery of services to more people? This is a decision the community must make. But it is difficult for any intelligent resolution of the problem to come about unless we

are able to remain open enough to re-examine our programs and look at our evidence objectively.

At the same time that a community is examining their programs individually, they may also wish to take a broad look and perhaps arrive at some generalized approach to problems. As an example, should the community have a consistent approach toward decentralization of social services, or should each program be determined separately? If each is to be determined separately, what would be the criterion for determining when to decentralize?

We currently have a differentiated view on decentralization. We find a large number of people who advocate providing social services by neighborhood but reject the enrollment of children in school on the same basis. The schools are charged with de facto segregation, while the neighborhood centers are commended for effectively reaching clients. A similar ghettoized situation occurs in both cases; however, one appears to be viewed as a social good and the other a social evil. Perhaps, by maintaining a willingness to continue to study and re-evaluate our ideas and programs, we may be able to arrive at a better understanding than our present state of knowledge allows.

Local Government

What is the role of local government in providing improved services to the poor? The county and city governments have the major control of services. The services are supported mostly by locally derived taxes, and controlled by locally elected officials. The various Federal grants, although helpful for improving the quality of services, are not of sufficient magnitude to effect the basic service pattern.

The nature of the problem comes into focus when we hear the concern expressed by the Superintendent of Schools, who can readily obtain money for pre-school programs for the poor but cannot operate a quality kindergarten program for all children to be serviced by the school district because the local tax rate provides insufficient funds. In allocating services the Superintendent of Schools should be concerned about the 20 percent who are the children of the poor; but, in addition, he must also allocate reasonable resources to the remaining 80 percent. In order for a Superintendent of Schools to do his job, he must have many objectives beyond raising the educational achievement of children from poverty.

The Superintendent reports to a school board which, in turn, is responsible to an electorate made up of a predominantly non-poor population. This electorate, although perhaps sympathetic to the needs of the poor, are typically more concerned about their own children's needs for an adequate education. All the Federal and Ford funds for special programs in the Oakland School District amount to perhaps $3,000,000 per year. This is not substantial enough, when compared to the school operating budget which exceeds $40,000,000 per year, to give the grantors power to demand a basic overhaul of education practices. As long as the local electorate carries the major burden of paying for education, the school programs will reflect the attitudes of those elected to represent the local viewpoints. When the local community wants a change in educational practices, the first sign will be a change in the composition of the school board.

The same principle holds true for the municipal government. The City Council controls the destiny of Oakland. Although OEDC may be a powerful pressure group which can influence the actions of the City Council, the OEDC exists only by the sufferance of the elected officials. If OEDC becomes powerful enough to change the composition of

the city's legislative body, they will be able to exert greater influence; but even then they would be able to make policy only within the strictures laid down by the City Council.

OEDC is in a dependent position to the City Council relative to administering basic services. OEDC has control over only limited funds in comparison to the City Council. The bargaining power of OEDC is, therefore, restricted to negotiations for fringe services. The basic services are controlled by the elected representatives regardless of whether OEDC is a part of, or apart from, the city.

Federal Government

In recent years, the Federal Government has given greater recognition to the needs of local communities and the help they require in solving their social problems. Such laws as the Manpower Development and Training Act, the Economic Opportunity Act, and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act are examples of specific legislation directed at solving social problems related to poverty.

These acts were created with the assumption that something was wrong with the individual and that bringing about some modest changes within the individual would remove him from the conditions of poverty. Such slogans as "matching men to jobs" were used to express the sentiment of the MDTA legislation. The Economic Opportunity Act was intended to improve the system of delivery of social services in local communities. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act was primarily directed at children from depressed areas for the purpose of breaking the cycle of poverty, by bringing more educational services to children of the poor.

Current legislation is inadequate to solve the social problems of the Oakland community. When we consider "matching men to jobs", we must ask, "What jobs?" Recent labor market surveys conducted by the State Department of Employment suggest that there is a considerable labor surplus in most occupations in Oakland. We have an abundance of information to indicate that there are not enough of the blue collar, unskilled, or entry level jobs to go around. From the employment project, reported in Chapter Six, we determined that the training programs which were undertaken were typically for low-paying, low-skilled occupations. The question we must ask concerning those job categories is whether these occupations had shortages because of the unavailability of skilled workers, or because the pay is so poor that workers are unable to sustain themselves in those jobs. Placing people in this type of work does not solve the problem of poverty; it simply contributes to the activity level of the participants.

It is, of course, impossible to match men to non-existent jobs. Recent history has demonstrated how efficiently industry was able to train men for jobs when there was a labor shortage. During World War II, the shipyards in the San Francisco Bay Area trained thousands of men, who had migrated from the rural South, to build ships to meet a national emergency. When jobs were available, men migrated thousands of miles to undergo training and then carry out their job and citizen responsibilities. During World War II, when jobs were available, national unemployment fell to approximately one percent of the labor force. When unemployment reaches 10 percent in Oakland, it is illogical to think that the desire for honorable work is no longer of value to the children of those families who travelled so far twenty years ago seeking work. Therefore, spending hundreds of thousands of dollars on programs to motivate people to accept jobs which are not being offered is a shameful waste of our resources.

The Economic Opportunity Act is not appropriately named when one examines the content of the legislation. The programs which are provided through OEO are, at best, ancillary. They can be a useful adjunct to a more pervasive program aimed at providing people . ith reasonable economic opportunities. The Economic Opportunity Program has the ingredients for improving social services in a community. But such services are constructive only when they assist individuals in becoming contributors to a productive society. We may have to consider a situation whereby large numbers of people cannot be trained to a level of skill that is needed by a competitive market. Without a program aimed at making jobs available at all levels of skill, well directed and well operated social services appear to be an enlightened form of relief.

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act is an expression by the Federal Government that something must be done to improve public education. At the local level the funds from this act have been used to provide compensatory education classes in the schools serving depressed areas.

Because the schools had failed to design an overall plan for a compensatory education program under the Ford project, they had little additional knowledge to apply to the new Federally funded projects. The approach to ESEA is similar to the planning for the Interagency Project; in Oakland no coordinated plan has been designed to study the problem of educating children from depressed areas.

Oakland receives approximately $2,500,000 in ESEA funds each year. Unless some serious attempt is made to develop an organized, overall plan which includes comprehensive evaluation, the school administrators will conclude these programs with the same level of knowledge as at the time they first applied for Ford funds. Unless some corrective action is taken, each year we will begin another round of compensatory education programs with the same level of ignorance as the previous year. The designs for the evaluation of most ESEA programs appear to be based on the assumption that present teaching methods are good; therefore, children will succeed if they are exposed to more of these good methods. The schools persist in treating children in isolation rather than as members of a family and a community. The schools have failed to apply new techniques which acknowledge that the social conditions of the children of the poor may have special significance in the educational process.

The children who participate in special educational programs return, as before, to homes where they see the despair of unemployment and hunger. It is reasonable to predict that the lessons children learn at home are better understood than the material presented during interviews with a motivational counselor at school. The children learn that the studies which lead them to a high school graduation are an asset in finding a job; they also learn that this is not true if you are Negro. From national studies conducted by the Department of Labor, we find that Negro high school graduates below the age of 20 have no better chance of finding a job than Negroes who have not completed high school.

The children of the poor learn lessons at home that cannot be counteracted by special programs which exalt the good life in the future. They see in their fathers and mothers the mirrored image of their future lives. Unless children have an opportunity to observe that the adults they love and admire have the option to work and live a life of dignity, they can never take seriously the promises of compensatory education.

Beyond the Scope

In this section, some observations are presented by the author that go well beyond the stage of drawing inferences from data produced by this study. This part of the report was written in response to a request from the staff of the Ford Foundation who felt that the report would be incomplete if it was restricted to critical observations of what occurred. Therefore, the following new directions are suggested for a program to make a significant inroad toward the solution of the problems of poverty.

The major legislation which can be applied to solve most of the problems of poverty is still to be passed. A law recognizing that work is a right of man must become a basic part of a democratic society. If we recognize that man has a right to work, we should be ingenious enough to design the instruments to insure this right. One possibility is to create a public employment-private employment partnership. When private employers are unable to absorb the labor force the public sector adjusts accordingly.

We have two examples in recent history of the Federal Government's employment of people in a direct effort to absorb some of the surplus labor force.

The New Careerist program sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity is a current method of creating jobs for the unemployed. This program provides funds to public agencies to engage people to carry on tasks which are required for optimum operational efficiency. Previously, these jobs went undone or were superficially performed because of budgetary and personnel limitations. It is hoped that one of the benefits of this program will be the creation of permanent new positions in public agencies—for example, an agency could create new permanent positions by deciding to use social work aides to compensate for the shortage of trained social workers. Similar new jobs such as teacher aides and police aides could be created to meet the shortages in those occupations.

A new Public Works Administration—similar to the program operated in the 1930's—has been advocated by Leon Keyserling as a means of utilizing the productivity of the unemployed.[58] He suggests that needed projects such as the building of low-cost, low-rent housing should be among the early tasks of the PWA. During the period when the PWA was an active agency, there was considerable controversy about its projects because many of its building activities were seen as competition with private industry. The full employment of the World War II period ended the need for the agency. Keyserling points out that unemployment is again a serious national problem and that we should reconstitute the agency that performed so effectively during the previous period of severe unemployment.

Additional ideas which have been suggested through the years include tax adjustments to industry for the training and employment of new workers and conditional government contracts which contain not only specifications for the quality of the product, but also specifications for numbers of workers in various job categories, including trainees. Tax adjustments could be made for individual family incomes which would encourage private householders to employ more service workers in home repair and maintenance jobs. These are but a few of the steps which could be instituted to provide a job market for our unemployed.

With some carefully constructed legislation, our national needs may become more accurately reflected by the labor market. Automation is frequently identified as a cause

---

58 Leon H. Keyserling, *Progress or Poverty*, Conference on Economic Progress (Washington, D.C., 1964).

of unemployment. This theory suggests that with modern machinery we can meet all the needs of man with a comparatively small labor force. This is the type of logic that contributed to the riots against machinery during the early days of the Industrial Revolution. The assumption that unemployment is caused by technology fails to take into account the changing needs in our society. What is considered a luxury today becomes a basic necessity tomorrow; the drawing board designs of today go into mass production tomorrow. Hopefully, technology should eliminate drudgery but not employment. Those temporarily displaced by technology could readily be retrained by a public-private sponsored program.

If we are to approximate something like a Great Society, we have to meet many of the presently unmet needs. The labor force required to achieve this is of such magnitude that we are forced to conclude that we are suffering from a serious shortage of manpower to do the job. The right to work is as much a part of citizen participation as is the right to vote. Once we accept the premise that earning a living wage is a right of man, each child can be assured that his strength and skill will be utilized. Adults will know that the new skills learned in a training program will be used in building a stronger community. When the threats of joblessness and imposed dependency are removed, specialized social services may be fully utilized by non-fearful people who wish to make an optimum use of their potential.

In the Los Angeles riot fires were lit, and the needs of a small part of the community were voiced with cries of "Burn, baby, burn!" The action in this riot resulted in brutality, looting and arson—a variety of senseless and vicious behavior of man toward his fellow man. The tragedy of the Los Angeles outbreak stimulated Federal and local officials to focus attention on an area of human need that had too long been neglected. However, a year later, it is disheartening to see how little has been done to improve conditions in Watts.

Throughout the year since the Watts riot the national news media have been busily predicting the possibility of similar outbreaks in other U. S. cities. Their predictions have been realized in Cleveland, Chicago, San Francisco, and other urban areas. In January, 1966 *Newsweek* magazine, in an article about the country's mounting racial tensions, cited specifically the frustrations of many of Oakland's Negroes. The article pointed to the "racial tinderbox" in the community and warned of an explosion within a year.

The social action programs in Oakland would be very shortsighted if their sole intent was to prevent riots. The social problems which face Oakland today have been more than 20 years in the making. We cannot hope to solve the problems of the poor in one year, or two, or perhaps even ten years. We must develop long-term, comprehensive programs which provide low-income people with needed services. Most of all, we must provide jobs.

There is recognition in all areas of the community, among minority groups, city officials, Department of Human Resources staff, and others that the current services offered by the anti-poverty program fall far short of the goal of economic opportunity for Oakland. But the Ford Foundation has given us an opportunity to experiment with possible solutions to our social problems. Spurred on by the staff of the Foundation, the community leaders in Oakland have vigorously sought new approaches for providing better services to the poor.

Because of the knowledge we have obtained in Oakland, we know that social services are not sufficient to deal with the problems of core city. We believe that full em-

ployment will solve many central city problems. Community leaders are attempting to solve this problem by encouraging new industry, new projects, and new Federally sponsored jobs in Oakland. The availability of additional jobs may serve as a temporary expedient in Oakland, while the rest of the country has an opportunity to learn, as we have learned, that social services are not sufficient. What we have observed in Oakland may speed up the learning process in the rest of the country—and the fire kindled by the Ford Foundation may have a profound effect on our future national policy toward the problems of core city.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alameda County Health Department. *Extended Prenatal Services for "High Risk" Maternity Patients.* December, 1965.

Alameda County Health Department. *Geriatric Multi-phasic Screening in the Oakland Community Health Improvement Plan, Food Habit Patterns of the Aging Population.*

Alameda County Health Department. "Postcard Reminders to Improve the Keeping of Child Health Conference Appointments."

Austin, Leonard. *Around the World in San Francisco.* San Francisco: The Abbey Press, 1955.

Bernardi, Gene. *Characteristics of the Spanish Surname Population in the City of Oakland.* City of Oakland, Oakland Interagency Project, February, 1965.

Bernardi, Gene. *Evaluation Analysis of the Council of Social Planning's Neighborhood Organization Program.* City of Oakland, Department of Human Resources,December, 1966.

Bernardi, Gene. *Target and Non-target Areas–Incidence of Welfare; Target and Non-target Area Census Tracts — Incidence of Welfare and Median Income, City of Oakland.* City of Oakland, Department of Human Resources, July, 1965.

Blake, Evarts I. (ed.) *Greater Oakland 1911.* Oakland: Pacific Publishing Company.

Bronson, William. *The Earth Shook, the Sky Burned.* New York: Doubleday and Co., 1959.

California State Employment Service. *Application for a Demonstration Adult Training Program under the Manpower Development and Training Act.* Oakland, California, 1964.

Carusone, John J. *Cyesis Program.* Oakland Public Schools, Special Urban Educational Services, 1965.

Carusone, John J. *Cyesis Program.* Oakland Public Schools, Special Urban Educational Services, 1966.

City of Oakland. *Associated Agencies Elementary School Project.* Department of Human Resources, 1966.

Conmy, Peter Thomas. *The Beginnings of Oakland, California.* Oakland Public Library, 1961.

Cummings, G. A., and Pladwell, E. S. *Oakland . . . A History.* The Grant D. Miller Mortuaries, Inc., Oakland, California.

deVeer, Daisy Williamson. *The Story of Rancho San Antonio.* Oakland Public Museum. Published by the Author, Oakland, California, 1924.

Drury, Aubrey. *California, An Intimate Guide.* Revised edition. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947.

Felson, Jack R. *An Evaluation of a Creative Arts Workshop.* Oakland Recreation Department, 1965.

Felson, Jack R. *An Exploratory Study of a Language Arts Development Program.* Oakland Recreation Department.

Felson, Jack R. *A Follow-up Study of Racial Attitudes in the Day Camp Situation.* Oakland Recreation Department.

Felson, Jack R. *A Study of a Mobile Service Project in Recreation.* Oakland Recreation Department.

Gordon, Margaret S. *Preliminary Review of Activities of the Oakland Adult Minority Group Employment Project, September, 1964 to January, 1966.* Berkeley: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1966.

Gross, Stewart B., Johnson, Wilma, and Malcolm, James C. *A Descriptive Study of Newcomers to the Castlemont Area.* Alameda County Health Department.

Gross, Stewart B., Johnson, Wilma, and Malcolm, James C. *Health Maintenance Among Newcomers.* Alameda County Health Department.

Hawthorne, Hildegarde. *Romantic Cities of California.* New York: D. Appleton – Century Co., Inc., 1939.

Heyman, Ira. Michael. *Civil Rights U.S.A. Public Schools Cities in the North and West, 1963, Oakland.* Staff report submitted to the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights and authorized for publication.

Hinkel, Edgar J., and McGann, William E. (ed.) *Oakland 1852-1938.* Published by the Oakland Public Library as a report of Official Project No. 465-03-3-337 conducted under the auspices of the Works Progress Administration. Oakland, California, 1939.

Hunter, Floyd. *Housing Discrimination in Oakland, California.* Floyd Hunter Co., Berkeley, California. 1963-64.

Jeffrey, F. B. *Proposal for a Comprehensive Demonstration Program for Unemployed Youth and School Dropouts in Oakland, California.* Youth Opportunities Board of Alameda County, 1964.

Johnson, Charles S. *The Negro War Worker in San Francisco.* A Local Self-Survey. May, 1944.

The Journal of Educational Sociology. Vol. 19, No. 3, November, 1945.

Juster, Barbara. *Parochial School Compensatory Education Report.* City of Oakland, Department of Human Resources, December, 1966.

Keyserling, Leon H. *Progress or Poverty.* Conference on Economic Progress. Washington, D. C., 1964.

Kuykendall, D. L. *Oakland Pre-Trial Release Project, Research Report No. 4, A Mid-Project Summary of Research Findings.* November, 1966.

McEntire, Davis. *A Study of Racial Attitudes in Neighborhoods Infiltrated by Non-Whites–San Francisco, Oakland, and Berkeley, California.* Bay Area Real Estate Report, Second Quarter, 1955.

Meadows, Kathryn P. *Evaluation of an Experiment in Intergroup Attitudes.* Oakland Recreation Department, 1964.

Monroe, Keith. *California.* New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1963.

Moore, Robert C. A. *Research Report on the Oakland Public Schools Youth Opportunities Project: The Experience of the First Year, 1964-65.* Berkeley: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1966.

Nicholls, William L., II. *Preliminary Tabulations from the 701 Sample Census of Oakland, California, 1966.* Berkeley: The Survey Research Center, University of California, 1966.

Nicholls, William L., II, Hochstim, Esther S., and Babbie, Sheila. *The Castlemont Survey, A Handbook of Tables.* Prepared for the Department of Human Resources of the City of Oakland. Berkeley: The Survey Research Center, University of California, 1966.

Oakland Chamber of Commerce. *History of Oakland.* Information Department, 1965.

Oakland Chamber of Commerce. *Oakland in the Early Days.* Information Department, 1960.

Oakland City Planning Commission. *Oakland's Future.* April, 1957.

Oakland City Planning Department. *Retail Trade in the Oakland Central District, Analysis and Projections 1962 to 1980.* July, 1965.

Oakland Interagency Project Legal Services Task Force. *Proposal for Oakland Pre-Trial Release Project.* March, 1964.

Oakland Public Library. *An Oakland Chronology.* Compiled by the Oakland Public Library History Division during the Centennial Celebration of the Incorporation of the Town of Oakland, May 4, 1852. Second Edition Revised. Oakland Public Library, Oakland, California, 1952.

Oakland Public Schools. *Elementary Library Programs.* Special Urban Educational Services, 1966.

Oakland Public Schools. *Language Development-Third and Fourth Grade.* Special Urban Educational Services, 1966.

Oakland Public Schools. *Research and Evaluation Report of Special Instructional Program at Madison Junior High School 1964-65.*

Oakland Public Schools. *School-Community Worker Program.* Special Urban Educational Services, 1966.

Oakland Public Schools. *Stonehurst Primary Language Development Program.* Special Urban Educational Services, 1966.

Oakland Public Schools. *Study Centers 1964-65.* Special Urban Educational Services.

Oakland Public Schools Research Department. *Preliminary Report of Evaluation of Pre-School Program at Clawson, Cole, and Stonehurst Schools – 1964-65.* Report No. 12, 1966.

Oakland Public Schools Research Department. *Report of Evaluation Project, Head Start Program.* Summer, 1966.

Oakland Tribune. "Bright Spot '64". Progress Report on Metropolitan Oakland, 1964. (also 1940, '42, '44, '45, '50, '55, '60, '63, '64, and 1965.)

Proposal to the Ford Foundation for a Program of Community Development. Oakland, California, 1961.

Record, Wilson. *Minority Groups and Intergroup Relations in the San Francisco Bay Area.* Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1963.

Regal, J. M. *Profile of Target Areas for Economic Opportunity Program.* City of Oakland, Department of Human Resources, October, 1964.

San Francisco Examiner. June 11, 1964.

Sheffield, Susan S., and Woodson, William B. *Interim Report of the Oakland Adult Project Follow-up Study.* Berkeley: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1966.

Sheffield, Susan S., and Woodson, William B. *Second Interim Report of the Oakland Adult Project Follow-up Study.* Berkeley: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1966.

Soles, Stanley. *Evaluation Study of District Community Councils.* Prepared for the Council of Social Planning-Oakland Area, 1965.

Taylor, Alvin Nephi. *The Oakland Recreation Department: A Study of Institutional Transition.* Unpublished Master's dissertation, Political Science, University of California, 1962.

Thompson, Wayne E. *The People Problem.* National Civic Review, LI, No. 8, September, 1962.

University of California. *Proposal to the Ford Foundation for a University of California Extension Service Program in Cooperation with the Oakland, California Inter-Agency Community Project.* Proposal to the Ford Foundation for a Program of Community Development. December, 1961.

U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. *The War on Poverty, The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.* 88th Congress, 2nd Session, 1964.

U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. *Census of Population and Housing: 1960, Final Report PHC (1) – 137, Census Tracts, San Francisco-Oakland, California.*

U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. *Income, Education, and Unemployment-Oakland, California.* January, 1963.

Vance, James E., Jr. *Geography and Urban Revolution in the San Francisco Bay Area.* Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1964.

Warren, Phyllis A. *Leadership Development Through Community Service, A Project of the Bay Area Urban League.* City of Oakland, Department of Human Resources, 1966.

Wurster, Catherine Bauer. *Housing and the Future of Cities in the San Francisco Bay Area.* Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1963.